Shared identity as a cause for rivalry between rebel groups A comparative case study of the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014 and the conflict between Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front in 2017 Karl Modig Thesis, 30 ECTS (hp) War Studies Master’s Programme in Politics and War Autumn 2020 Supervisor: Sophia Hatz Word count: 17 815 Abstract The aim of this thesis is to answer the question of why rebel groups engage in conflict with each other despite sharing an identity. Previous research suggests that a shared identity should promote cooperation, but recent conflicts between rebel groups in Syria seem to suggest that shared identity can instead be a cause for rivalry. This thesis investigates this puzzle by using Pischedda’s theory on windows of opportunity and vulnerability and Hafez theory on proxidistant ideologies. The cases of the thesis are the conflicts between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014 and between Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front in 2017. The results indicate that shared identity does cause rivalry, and both theories receive support for their explanation of inter-rebel conflict. All three rebel groups are labeled as extremists, which supports Hafez theory that extremist groups are more likely to engage in conflict with rivals. The military strength and the possible costs of attack of the rebel groups seem to support Pischedda’s theory that rebel groups use specific windows in time to attack their rivals. There are however some problems that neither theory can explain, such as Ahrar Al-Shams friendly relationship to Al Nusra between 2014 and 2017. This thesis provide insight into the understudied field of inter- rebel conflict of War Studies by highlighting the importance of identity. Keywords: rebel groups, Syria, identity, rivalry, inter-rebel conflict Contents 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 1.1. Background and research problem .............................................................................................. 1 1.2. Aim and research question ........................................................................................................... 2 2. Previous Literature ................................................................................................................... 3 2.1. Rebel group alliances, infighting and identity .............................................................................. 3 3. Theory ...................................................................................................................................... 6 3.1. Window of opportunity and vulnerability .................................................................................... 7 3.2. Proxidistant ideologies ................................................................................................................. 8 3.3. Theoretical framework ................................................................................................................. 9 4. Research design ...................................................................................................................... 11 4.1. Comparative case study ............................................................................................................. 11 4.2. Case selection ............................................................................................................................. 12 4.3. Data analysis & operationalizations ........................................................................................... 13 4.4. Reliability and validity ................................................................................................................ 15 4.5. Material ...................................................................................................................................... 16 5. Empirical background ............................................................................................................. 16 5.1. Ahrar Al-Sham and IS .................................................................................................................. 16 5.2. Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front ....................................................................................... 17 6. Analysis .................................................................................................................................. 18 6.1. The proximate identity of Ahrar Al-Sham, IS and the Al Nusra Front ........................................ 18 6.1.1. The three dimensions of ideology ....................................................................................... 18 6.1.2. Summary.............................................................................................................................. 22 6.2. The windows of opportunity and vulnerability .......................................................................... 22 6.3. Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014 ................................................................................................. 23 6.3.3. Summary of the results for Ahrar Al-Sham and IS in 2014 .................................................. 25 6.4. Ahrar Al-Sham & the Al Nusra Front in 2017 ......................................................................... 26 6.4.1. Summary of the results for Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front in 2017 ....................... 29 7. Discussion and conclusion ....................................................................................................... 29 7.1. Proxidistant ideologies ............................................................................................................... 29 7.2. Windows of opportunity and vulnerability. ............................................................................... 31 7.3. General discussion ...................................................................................................................... 33 7.2. Conclusion, limits and future research ....................................................................................... 34 References ........................................................................................................................................ 37 1. Introduction 1.1. Background and research problem Despite having cooperated for five years, the two rebel groups Ahrar Al-Sham and the Al Nusra Front engaged in open combat in 2017. This was despite the two groups sharing both an identity as Salafi Jihadists and having similar goals (Hassan, 2017). The groups, who had been allied in their fight against the Assad regime in Syria, had occasionally had violent confrontations before 2017 but nothing of this scale. Viewing this from Christias influential perspective on rebel alliances, this makes little sense. Christia (2012:32) would argue that rebel organize themselves into coalitions where they seek to win the war with minimum marginals, yet this case seems to illustrate a case where rebels chose to do otherwise. Furthermore, previous literature has indicated that a shared identity can be an indicator of increased cooperation between rebel groups. While studying the alliances of rebel groups active in the Syrian civil war, Gade, Gabbay, Hafez and Kelly findings implicate that groups that are ideologically similar are more likely to cooperate than groups who are ideologically dissimilar (2019:2091). This puzzle, that rebels fight each other despite their similar identity, is what this thesis will study. In civil wars, rebel groups are often in a conflict with the government. The very intent of the creation of the rebel group is often in response to actions conducted by the government. The goals of the rebel groups may vary, they can include territorial sovereignty, overthrowing the current regime or creating a new state (Buhaug, 2006:695). Despite this, rebel groups often engage in warfare with other rebel groups. The obvious, but sometimes simplistic, solution would be for the rebels to band together in an alliance and unite to fight the government. Yet, Ahrar Al-Sham fought its former allies. What can explain this phenomenon? Using theories on identity, ideological extremism and rationalistic power-grabbing, this thesis tries to explore this topic further using a comparative case study on the Ahrar Al-Sham, IS and the Al Nusra Front rebel groups. The motivation for analyzing these three rebel groups is because of their shared identity as jihadist groups and because of the change in their relationship from cooperative to hostile. Ahrar Al-Sham was founded in 2011 by jihadists who were released from a Syrian prison after having served sentences for their involvement in the Iraqi insurgency. These former prisoners banded together and created the first incarnation of Al-Sham (Yasir, 2016). Ahrar Al- Sham cooperated with IS from 2012 to 2014. Initially following the same pattern as the first case, the relationship between Ahrar Al-Sham and IS was cooperative during the first years, 1 exemplified when they cooperated in taking the Latakia region in 2013. The relationship turned hostile in late 2013 when IS killed Abu Rayyan, a leader of Ahrar Al-Sham. In January the following year, the conflict escalated into open conflict when Ahrar Al-Sham, together with other rebel groups, drove IS out of strongholds in northeastern Syria (Steinberg, 2016:3; Nassief, 2013; Lund, 2014c). IS has been known as Al Qaeda in Iraq, ISIS, ISIL and Daesh but for this