Master Thesis Overcoming the Human Condition An Arendtian analysis of the antipolitical tendencies in transhumanism Author: Alexander Hjelm Supervisor: Henrik Enroth Examiner: Mats Sjölin Term: Spring 2020 Subject: Political Science Level: Master Thesis, 30 hp Course code: 5SK30E Abstract This article critically analyses transhumanism, an ideological movement that advocates the radical biomodification of the human body in order to overcome our deficiencies and progress towards our next phase in evolution. Following previous criticism against the depoliticization within transhumanism, the article will aim to highlight the difficulty within transhumanism to balance the respect for diversity against the imperative for human enhancement. This paper then turns to the political theory of Hannah Arendt as the theoretical lens to highlight the source of this tension as the ideology’s reductive view of politics. The paper concludes on the difficulties reconciling diversity with human enhancement, as well as raising awareness of the possibility of conscious action in concert related to the use of biomodification technologies advocated by transhumanists. Key words transhumanism, Arendt, depoliticization, action, diversity, political philosophy, human enhancement Acknowledgments I would like to thank my supervisor Henrik Enroth for his continued support and guidance throughout the process of writing this thesis. Table of contents Abstract 2 Acknowledgments 3 1 Introduction 1 2 Transhumanism: enhancing the individual and remedying our deficiencies 3 3 Critics against transhumanism 7 3.1 The comparison with eugenics 8 3.2 Dévédec: The anthropology of deficiency 9 4 Beyond depoliticization 11 5 Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition 13 6 Fabricating human beings for the future 15 7 The freedom found in action 19 8 Conclusions 23 References 25 1 Introduction “[The] future man, [with altered size, shape, and function], whom the scientists tell us they will produce in no more than a hundred years, seems to be possessed by a rebellion against human existence... which he wishes to exchange, as it were, for something he has made himself. There is no reason to doubt our abilities to accomplish such an exchange… The question is only whether we wish to use our new scientific and technical knowledge in this direction, and this question cannot be decided by scientific means; it is a political question of the first order” (Arendt in The Human Condition (1989), p. 2-3). This article addresses the ideological movement known as transhumanism, the proponents of which seek to improve “the human condition... by developing and making widely available technologies and to greatly enhance human intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities” as well as “to overcome fundamental human limitations” (Bostrom 2003, p. 4). It is a movement or “class of philosophies” that sees the current state of the human condition as one in several steps in the evolutionary trajectory, in which we would improve ourselves with technologies in order to no longer “suffer from disease, aging, and inevitable death”. The transhumanist movement does not entail or endorse particular technologies (More 2013, p. 3-4), but rather any which may improve the human condition. Such technologies include but is not limited to; biomodification of human beings to make them smaller to reduce their carbon imprint (Liao et al 2012); modifying human psychology to remedy it of its cognitive biases (Persson & Sandberg 2012); and uploading ourselves to digital platforms in order to overcome the limits of our biological bodies (Kurzweil 2005). Though the movement has generated a debate since its inception in the 80s and 90s, reservations about transhumanism have primarily concerned implementation of the technologies advocated by transhumanists, and what their implementation would mean for our concept of humanity (See Fukyama 2001; Agar 2010) or how unjust distribution of technologies would affect societies (See Brown 2001). More striking criticism appears in Dévédec’s (2018) writings in which it is argued that the 1(27) movement - in addressing the deficiencies of human beings - exchanges the goal towards “social and political emancipation with the goal of technoscientific and biomedical adaptation” of the human to demands of the status quo or an inevitable future. In so doing, the movement constitutes a depoliticization of social issues and hence “marks a major rupture with the modern democratic project of autonomy” (p. 488, 490, 501). This paper will expand on Dévédec’s critique and make a two-fold contribution; First, the article argues that the problem of depoliticization runs deeper than existing critique has suggested. Transhumanism not only removes social issues from political deliberation and decision-making; it rests on a reductive view of the political realm, a view that fails - both analytically and normatively - to identify what it means to speak and act politically. Second, to address these shortcomings, the article turns to the political thought of Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), primarily outlined in The Human Condition and Between Past and Future. Through the lens of Arendt’s political theory, the paper will argue that the question of the “future man” is indeed a political question, one that warrants questioning and debate as to its desirability. My ambition is not only to shed light on some of the troubling aspects of transhumanism in terms of its antipolitical tendencies, but also to raise consciousness in the choices we have in these matters, and in so doing, restore agency. The paper is structured as follows: First, it will map out several strands of the transhumanist movement in order to bring to light the commonalities between them for critical analysis. After a brief review of previous criticisms against the movement, the paper will then focus on Dévédec’s critique of the movement as depoliticizing. It will then look to Arendt’s political theory for a concept of politics to highlight the reductive view of politics in transhumanism as well as to resolve an internal tension within the movement between human enhancement and diversity. 2(27) 2 Transhumanism: enhancing the individual and remedying our deficiencies There are many strands within transhumanism (Hughes 2012), and it is beyond this paper to map out all the nuances that differentiate them. Here, transhumanism will be referred to as a movement that endorses the use of human engineering or biomodification as a means of achieving a political goal. This goal is either 1) taking charge of our evolution towards the next stage of evolution, either as an improved version of the homo sapiens or a post-human existence that bears little resemblance to homo sapiens as we know it in the name of progress or improving the human condition; or 2) taking charge of our evolution to avoid disaster by correcting our deficient biology, which causes the human species to be prone towards self- destruction. According to transhumanists, the human species has yet to attain its true potential which remains to be unlocked through “technological advancements and scientific understanding”. The prospects of such enhancement technology include: [Giving] us control over the biochemical processes in our bodies, enabling us to eliminate disease and unwanted aging. Technologies such as brain- computer interfaces and neuropharmacology could amplify human intelligence, increase emotional well-being, improve our capacity for steady commitment to life projects or a loved one, and even multiply the range and richness of possible emotions. In other words, the transhumanist movement concerns the use of enhancement technologies in order to further the capacities of the human being. Such technologies include but is not restricted to; germline manipulation, which would allow us to alter the genetic composition of an individual while also making such changes hereditary (See Stock 2013); “uploading” the consciousness and personality of a person to a new digital platform following the Singularity1 (Kurzweil 2005); and achieving a substrate-independent mind (a mind that is no longer reliant on a brain to perform its thinking process) (See Merle 2013; Koene 2013). As such, it includes a broad range 1 The hypothesis predicting a point in time when there will be an intelligence explosion as a result of exponential technological growth (Kurzweil 2005). 3(27) of authors and thinkers that endorse this movement towards the next step in evolution. However, this evolution would not be left to chance, but rather controlled and deliberate (See Harris 2007; Bostrom & Sandberg 2009) through a market structure in the form of an “enhancement market”. This has been envisioned by Miah (2013), who see these enhancements are merely an extension of cultural capital products that consumers may pick and choose between. “As such, it is sensible to presume that a transhuman future will be brought about within a commercial structure” (p. 300). Within this commercial structure, individuals would be free to exercise their “morphological freedom”, which Sandberg (2013) defines as “the right to modify oneself according to one’s desires.” (p. 56) While some transhumanists emphasize the potential for self-expression with human enhancement technologies, others highlight their potential in overcoming the limitations of human biology. Persson and Savulescu (2012) argue that due to the tangible risk that humans pose to future life on Earth, we are ill-equipped biologically to consider the moral repercussions