US-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS FROM THE 1952 REVOLUTION TO THE SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956 Mohamed Abd El-Wahab Sayed-Ahmed Thesis submitted for the Degree of PhD in Politics, in the Department of Economic and Political Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London April 1987 ProQuest Number: 10672698 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10672698 Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 2 ABSTRACT If the late 1940s and early 1950s were a period of close and friendly relations between the United States and Egypt, the late 1950s and early 1960s mark the deterioration in those relations. US-Egyptian relations from the 1952 revolution to the Suez crisis resembled to some extent a game of chess between Nasser of Egypt, and Secretary John Foster Dulles of the US. The Free Officers' rise to power in Egypt in July 1952, raised the hope of the American policy-makers in the establishing of closer and, moreover, cordial relations with Egypt. They fe lt that i t was to their advantage to deal with the military officers who were not associated with the corrupt ancien regime of politicians. Moreover, the Free Officers did not have any political commitment nor a predetermined position in "* n foreign policy. Therefore the Eisenhower administration, especially Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, expected that Egypt under Nasser and his military colleagues would help achieve objectives of American strategy in the area, such as the containment of Soviet penetration, and peace between the Arab states and Israel. These hopes or aspirations, however, could not be easily translated into practical policy. Dulles looked to Nasser for support of US initiatives, without appreciating problems Nasser might face. Nasser's policy was soon to clash with American strategy in the Middle East and Egypt's foreign policy would be marked to a great extent by recurrent clashes with the US, especially from 1955 onwards. Nasser saw US policy becoming reflexively pro-Israel and he fe lt that Washington was jeopardising his leadership of the Arab world, especially after the formation of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955. The honeymoon between the 3 Free Officers' regime in Egypt and the US was now over. Nasser fe lt he had to confront the US and the Western powers on their own terms, in a more forceful and radical way. Nasser found the Soviet Union a willing partner in furthering his aims, even though he s till le ft his options open regarding his relations with the US. As for the Eisenhower administration, the turning-point came in mid-March 1956 when Secretary of the Navy Robert Anderson returned from his mission to promote peace between Egypt and Israel empty-handed. Dulles was determined to show Nasser how tough he could be. Events then moved rapidly to the Suez cri si s. The documentary and other evidence proved that Nasser's ambitions for a regional leadership of the Arab Middle East were in conflict with those of the US as a global power in the Middle East. The Eisenhower administration, for its part, had hoped and intended to contain Nasser's influence in the area and not to promote him into a major Third World leader, but in vain. The American policy turned Nasser from a local Arab leader of Egypt into the charismatic leader of the Arab world and a major political figure in the Third World. This research mainly depends on American documents which were declassified during the past two years. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT......................................................................................................... 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................... 7 ABBREVIATIONS............................................................................................... 8 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 9 CHAPTER ONE : THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS UP TO 1952.................................................... 15 The Period prior to the Second World War 15 American-Egyptian Relations during and after the Second World War .................................... 16 American-Egyptian Relations from 1947 onwards .......................................................................... 25 The Palestine War....................................................... 34- The Wafd in Power....................................................... 36 The Korean War............................................................. 38 The Abrogation of the 1936 Treaty...................... 44 CHAPTER TWO : THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION AND THE EARLY CONTACTS BETWEEN THE OFFICERS AND THE USA............................ 57 The Internal Situation ............................................ 57 The King......................................................................... 59 The Political Parties : the Wafd ........................ 63 The Young Army Officers.......................................... 69 The Early Relations between the CIA and the Free Officers.............................................................. 76 Nasser's Tactics to avoid the Discovery of his Conspiracy ............................................................ 80 The Egyptian Military Mission to the United States............................................................................ 83 The Road to Revolution............................................ 89 CHAPTER THREE : THE UNITED STATES AND THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION 94 The Safety of the Coup d'Etat.............................. 94 Egypt and the United States in the Revolutionary Era................................................... 102 The Military in Power and the USA (The Regency Council and the Wafd) ............................ 106 The New Regime and Communism................................ I l l Agrarian Reform ........................................................... 116 Naguib's Cabinet ......................................................... 123 Economic Co-operation............................................... 131 5 Page CHAPTER FOUR : UNITED STATES AND THE 1954 ANGLO-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT....................................................................... 136 Sudan ............................................................................... 146 Eisenhower Administration andthe Dispute 151 Dulles' Trip to the Middle East........................... 157 American Efforts to Break the Impasse after Dulles' T rip ....*................................................... 156 American Embassy Efforts to Ease Tension 171 Dulles' Efforts to Break the Impasse................... 175 Nasser's Role............................................................... ISO The Agreement............................................................... 188 CHAPTER FIVE : PEACE COLLAPSES........................................................... 194 The Eisenhower Administration and the Arab- Israeli Problem....................................................... 197 United States Efforts for restoring Peace in the Area and its Impact on United States- Egyptian Relations ................................................. 199 The Informal Talks ........................................ 201 GROWING U.S INVOLVEMENT ................. .................. 205 Johnston' s Plan.. ............ 209 The Gaza Raid ............................................................... 217 Baghdad Pact and the Raid ....................................... 218 The Arms Deal ....................................................... 224 Dulles' Peace In itia tiv e ....................................... 231 Anderson's Mission..................................................... 237 The High Dam................................................................. 244 CHAPTER SIX : THE UNITED STATES AND THE SUEZ CRISIS................. 253 The First London Conference: 16-23 August ............................................................. 266 The American In itia tive........................................... 272 The Suez Canal Users' Association....................... 274 The Second London Conference................................. 276 The United Nations..................................................... 282 The War........................................................................... 284 The Last Phase............................................................. 293 CONCLUSION..................................................................................................... 304 BIBLIOGRAPHY 312 6 To my son Sherif and his generation: This is a real part of the Modern History of Egypt 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I should like to express my thanks to the staff of the American National Archives, especially Mrs. Sally Marks, the Library of Congress, the Harry S. Truman Library, the Eisenhower Library, and the office of the Historians at the State Department, especially Dr. Paul Claussen. My greatest debt is to my supervisor, Professor P.J. Vatikiotis. Without