Number 186 July 1996 Algeria After the Election: A Giant Small Step by I. William Zartman Algeria has been an exceptionally visible three of which-the Front lslamique du policy concern in recent years because of Salut (FIS), Hamas, and Nahdah-were the striking contrasts and sharp issues it Islamic fundamentalist in orientation. presents. This seemingly vigorous Algeria's first free and fair competitive country's descent beginning in 1988 into election was held without violence or severe violence and repression came as a intimidation in June 1990. It resulted in a shock to Algerian leaders and foreign major upset victory for the FIS, which observers alike. The climb out of this near­ recei ved about 55 percent of the total valid collapse of state legitimacy has been rough vote, thereby gaining control of two-thirds and slow. The danger of an Isla mist of the 48 regional assemblies and over half overthrow of the government seems over, of the I ,541 communal assemblies, some encouraging progress in economic including all 34 municipal assemblies in reform has been achieved, and in Algiers . Thus, pluralism came to Algeria in November 1995 Algeria became the first the form of a two-party system roughly Arab nation to conduct a multicandidate corresponding to the potent socioeconomic presidential election, with open dichotomy between modernization and campaigning. But President Liamine neo-traditionalism. Claiming a popular Zeroual has not taken advantage of the mandate, the FIS immediately called for opening afforded him by his landslide new national elections and eventually victory to open a broad dialogue with all resignation of Bendjedid's government. political forces toward reconstituting a In some ways, the FIS victory was less mutually acceptable political system. and impressive than it might seem . Only some violence in 1996 (after a postelection lull) 62 percent of those eligible to vote did so has risen again to significant levels. (whereas there was more than 75 percent Algeria's evolution since the 1988 riots participation in the earlier single-party can be viewed in terms of four major elections of the 1970s); thus, over a third of dimensions: violence, elections, dialogue, the electorate--more people than voted for and reform. All need to be taken into the FIS-found no candidate or party to account in formulating an appropriate their liking Moreover, the FIS vote (4 .5 policy toward a situation that has left the million and 4.3 million in the communal headlines but still troubles an important and regional elections respectively)-a part of the post-cold wa r world. record that has not since been matched­ can be seen as primarily a protest against A Decade of Violence the FLN rather than an embrace of fundamentalism. Week-long riots ove r social and economic Under the hammering pressure of the issues that began on October 4, 1988 new majority party, Bendjedid called a ushered in nearly a decade of violence. parliamentary election for June 27 , 1991. Order was restored for a time after the The FIS demanded that a presidential arm y put down the disturbances and the election take place at the same time, government of President Chadli Bendjedid protested the pre-electoral redistricting, introduced a flurry of political reforms and in late May issued a call for a general culminating in con stitutiona l revisions that strike that led to violent demonstrations. opened up the political system to The government responded by imposing a multiparty competition after a quarter state of emergency and postponing the century of single-party rule by the Fron t de parliamentary election to December 26, Liberat ion Nationale (FLN) Suddenly over with a runoff sc heduled for January 1992. 60 parties sprang into existence. at least 2/ CSIS AFRICA NOTES Despite the strong showing of the FIS in the 1990 insecure, often with government control in the daytime election, the lackluster performance of the local FIS giving way each evening to lslamist control at night. governments and a rising popular fear of the implications of Yet the overall trends are cl ear, albeit contradictory. On a national-level FIS victory led observers to predict that only th e one hand, an lslamist takeover by force-the dominant some 30 percent of the electorate would vote for the FIS in fear in the early 1990s- is now deemed unlikely. The back of 1991 . This assessment was nearly correct, but did not take the insurgency has been broken, in large part because the into account the fact that almost half (48 percent) of those terrorists alienated their potential supporters- those parts eligible to vote chose not to do so. Even though slightly less of the public seeking an alternative to the government. In than a quarter of the electorate opted for the FIS in the the end, the Isla mists' promise was perceived as no better, December balloting, this amounted to almost one-half of the and thei r practice worse, than the state's past failure and valid votes cast. Thus, three-fourths of Algerians eligible to recent repressiveness. vote rejected the FIS, but the party won nearly one-half of On the other hand, t he violence continues. Some the parliamentary seats in the first round and was in a good random examples taken from government accounts (which position to win half of the rest in the second round. are often underes timates): 250 people, including 50 That runoff never took place. Instead, Bendjedid resigned policemen , were killed in the last week of May 1996: II army on January II , 1992 , under pressure from the military, and draftees and their families were killed and a leading Muslim shortly thereafter the FIS was banned and thousands of its scholar wounded in the first week of July; and 7 French leaders and sympathizers arrested. Trappi st monks were murdered at the end of March . At least Th e lslamist movement had long been split between tens of thousands of embittered youths have been won over those who saw the way to power in the votes of a population and trained by the terrorists, in their militant rather than newly awakened to the call of religious revival and those­ th eir rel igious guise, and hundreds of thousa nds of citizens more closely attuned to the revolutionary traditions of are simply waiting to see whether the prese nt stalemate in Algerian politics- who believed that violence was necessary terror will yield a better system of governance. Elements of to sweep away the impious corruption of the existing the an swer lie in the current elections, pol itical dialogue, system . The FIS called a general strike in May 1991 and in and economic reform . June threatened to declare a jiflad (holy war). and while its political leadership was preparing for the legislative election, The Current Elections and Dialogue another group attacked a military post in November to Many of t he pa rti es that sp rang up after the 1989 capture its stock of arms. Now the political wing of the constitutional reform s had no experience and few of the movement wa s blocked and the militant wing, along with its attributes of functioning political parties (established military opponents, took over the stage. The FIS quickly membership, kn own leaders. independent fin ances, degenerated into militant factions and then autonomous distinctive platforms)- hence their disastrous performance persona l groups ranging from the followings of charismatic rela tive to the FIS in the 1990 and 1991 elections. Ironically, local emirs to simple bandit bands. These various groups the period of military rul e has allowed some of them to soon turned from subjects of centralized control by political sett le down , gai n adherents, develop organization , think out leaders to objects of a competition for support among ri val aspirants. Increasingly, the armed groups have bee n composed of CSIS AFRICA NOTES is a briefing paper series designed to unemployed urban youths, angry and alienated, with nobody serve the special needs of decision makers and analysts with to lead them and nothing to lose. The targets of terror have Africa-related responsibilities in governments, corporations, for the most part been not state leaders but intellectuals, the media, research institutions, universiti es, and other journalists, police and their families, moderate religious arenas. It is a publication of the African Studies Program of figures , women deemed improperly dressed. and other the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C. CS IS is a private, nonpartisan , nonprofit ordinary citizens. policy research institute founded in 1962. Confronting these groups has been the tightly organized army, united in its opposition to the threat that the Is la mist Editor: Director of African Studies Helen Kitchen movement poses to military perquisites and to the army's sense Deputy Editor: J . Coleman Kitchen of a modern secular state, and led by the so-called "Eradicators," who believe that the Islamists can be defeated militarily. Military SUBSCRIPTION RATE: CS/S Africa Notes is sent tactics include not only hunt-and-destroy missions but also first class to subscribers worldwide. The annual subscription price for 12 issues and occasional supplements is $60. retaliatory raid s and search-and-seizure tactics agai nst villages Please make checks payable to: suspected of supporting the armed Isla mists. CSIS Africa Notes, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Generally cited fig ures refer to about 40 ,000 deaths on 20006, U.S.A. both sides but the total may well be double that am ount. As Telephone: (202) 775-3219. Telex: 71 08229583. of 1996, large areas of the countryside have been returned to Cables: CE NSTRAT.