GIULIA DE CESARIS-PHILLIP SIDNEY HORKY HELLENISTIC PYTHAGOREAN EPISTEMOLOGY ABSTRACT: The paper offers a running commentary on ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and Sense Perception, with the aim to provide a clear description of Hellenistic/post- Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology. Through an analysis of the process of knowledge and of the faculties that this involves, ps-Archytas presents an original epistemological theory which, although grounded in Aristotelian and Platonic theories, results in a peculiar Pythagorean criteriology that accounts for the acquisition and production of knowledge, as well as for the specific competences of each cognitive faculty. SOMMARIO: L’articolo offre un commentario dell’opera Sull’intelletto e la sensazione dello Pseudo-Archita, con l’obiettivo di chiarire cosa sia l’epistemologia pitagorica in epoca ellenistica/post-ellenistica. Attraverso la descrizione del processo conoscitivo e delle facoltà in esso coinvolte, lo Pseudo-Archita presenta un’originale teoria della conoscenza che, pur affondando le proprie radici in nozioni platoniche e aristoteliche, si traduce in una peculiare criteriologia pitagorica e rende conto tanto dell’acquisizione e della produzione della conoscenza quanto delle specifiche competenze di ciascuna facoltà conoscitiva. KEYWORDS: Hellenistic Pythagoreanism; Epistemology; Pseudepigrapha; Ps-Archytas; Theory of Knowledge 1. Introduction 1.1. The Problem of Hellenistic Pythagoreans A formidable challenge presents itself to those who would like to know something about Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology: how, exactly, to LPh, Special Issue, 2018 ISSN 2283-7833 http://lexicon.cnr.it/ Giulia De Cesaris-Phillip Sidney Horky define ‘Pythagorean’ in relation to the Hellenistic period.1 As we will see, some doxographical accounts whose information can be confidently dated to the post-Hellenistic period, usually associated with the closing of the philosophical schools in Athens in 86 BCE, but prior to the dramatic transformation of Pythagoreanism under the Neoplatonists (especially Iamblichus of Chalcis) in the middle of the 3rd century CE, demonstrate the close connections between Pythagoreanism and Middle Platonism.2 This evidence, while fundamental for constructing a framework for Hellenistic Pythagorean epistemology, is apt to colour our views with a certain hue and cannot be isolated from other sources. Our best evidence is a series of pseudepigraphical treatises ascribed to certain Early Pythagoreans who lived prior to the dissolution of the Pythagorean philosophical communities in the middle of the 4th century BCE and written in an affected Doric.3 Dating these texts is challenging and fraught with difficulties, but the consensus view is that they were likely to have been composed between the 1st century BCE and the 1st century CE.4 We hold the view that, whoever actually wrote them down, the Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha which take the form of 1 This article is co-authored by Giulia De Cesaris and Phillip Horky, who worked together on the document as a whole. Each author, however, is primarily responsible for these sections: De Cesaris 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4; Horky 1.1, 1.2, 2.5, 2.6. they are equally responsible for the conclusions in 3. All translations are by Horky, unless otherwise mentioned. The authors would like to thank especially Francesco Verde, Angela Ulacco, Federico Petrucci and Mauro Bonazzi for their help at various stages of this article’s development. 2 On post-Hellenistic philosophy, see now G. Boys-Stones, Platonist Philosophy 80 BC to AD 250: An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 1-6. 3 We do not refer to these texts as ‘pseudo-Pythagorean’, or to their authors as ‘pseudo-Pythagoreans’, as is now the common approach today. Instead, we refer to the texts as ‘Hellenistic/post-Hellenistic Pythagorean’, and for their authors we apply the prefix ‘pseudo-’. The corpus of pseudepigraphical treatises associated with the Early Pythagoreans we call the ‘Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha’. For a short explanation for these terminological choices, see P. S. Horky, “Pseudo-Archytas’ Protreptics? On Wisdom in its Contexts”, in D. Nails-H. Tarrant (eds.), Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato, Helsinki, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 2015, p. 21 n. 4. 4 Cf. A. Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica. I trattati di argomento metafisico, logico ed epistemologico attribuiti ad Archita e a Brotino. Introduzione, traduzione, commento, Boston-Berlin, de Gruyter, 2017, p. 4-7; B. Centrone, Pseudopythagorica ethica. I trattati morali di Archita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 1990, p. 41-44 (chiefly on the ethical treatises). 222 Hellenistic Pythagorean Epistemology philosophical treatises were composed after 150 BCE (at the very earliest), when Critolaus of Phaselus, whose arguments evidence connections to some of the treatises, was head of the Peripatetic school, and prior to 50 CE, when figures such as Philo of Alexandria would appear to demonstrate knowledge of their content.5 Hence, the texts would appear to lie at the threshold between the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic periods, and they are most readily to be associated with the philosophical environs of Alexandria, where Eudorus, in particular, describes a kind of Pythagoreanism similar to what is found in the pseudepigrapha.6 Two treatises from the collection of Pythagorean Pseudepigrapha arranged and edited by Holger Thesleff7 were explicitly committed to expounding Pythagorean epistemology: ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and Sense-Perception8 (in two fragments, comprising around 87 lines of Greek) and ps-Brontinus’ On Intellect and Discursive Thought9 (in one fragment, comprising seven lines of Greek). These texts, together with the fragments of ps-Archytas’ On Principles and On Opposites, have been recently edited and translated into Italian with a commentary by Angela Ulacco,10 whose book explores in detail both textual references and content-related connections the treatises entertain with other authors. Therefore, our main objective will not be to trace a broad network of references for these texts, but rather to give a discursive and holistic account of its content in the context of certain passages of Greek philosophy that help to elucidate this 5 For a recent appraisal, see A. Ulacco, “The Appropriation of Aristotle in the Ps- Pythagorean Treatises”, in A. Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, Leiden, Brill, 2016, p. 202-205 and 210-212. 6 Cf. Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica, p. 6-7; M. Bonazzi, “Pythagoreanising Aristotle: Eudorus and the Systematisation of Platonism”, in M. Schofield (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC. New Directions for Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, and Centrone, Pseudopythagorica ethica, p. 30-34. 7 H. Thesleff (ed.), The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period, Åbo, Åbo Akademi, 1965, which remains the standard text of these fragments (generally accepted by Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica). 8 Title in original Greek: Περὶ νοῦ καὶ αἰσθάσιος. The first fragment is recorded by Stobaeus (Ecl., I, 41, 5 Wachsmuth) as having the title Περὶ ἀρχᾶς (On the First Principle), but this is probably a mistake based on the fact that the first word of the treatise is ἀρχά. 9 Title in original Greek: Περὶ νοῦ καὶ διανοίας. 10 Ulacco, Pseudopythagorica Dorica. 223 Giulia De Cesaris-Phillip Sidney Horky content.11 In order to do so, our analysis will provide excerpts of the text together with a running commentary. The purpose is to try to keep the discussion as continuous as possible, with an eye to a clear understanding of how the epistemological process takes place and what elements it involves, by providing some answers regarding the questions raised by the texts. For this reason, the analysis will focus more attentively on the division of the parts of knowledge and the description of the knowledge-process, touching on other issues addressed by the treatises by the way. We will aim to show that a general coherence can be detected across the whole of ps-Archytas’ On Intellect and Sense-Perception, with a focus on process and ontological division of knowledge and its faculties. We will see that ps-Archytas formulates an original epistemological theory out of pre- existing materials he found in both Plato and Aristotle, and/or in the Academic and Peripatetic traditions that preceded his treatise; that this two- world theory accommodates both pure intellection and sense-perception, which are seen as reciprocal and co-dependent vis-à-vis the truth within the overall epistemological process; that ps-Archytas develops an original and unparalleled theory of the criterion of being, which involves a complex criterial apparatus for knowledge-acquisition, involving a subject of judgment, and object of judgment, and a paradigm or standard by which to produce the judgment; that this critical apparatus serves to produce philosophical accounts in syllogistic structures involving both inference from particulars and deduction from universals; and that these syllogistic structures, which are diverse, are probative and ultimately corroborative. Additionally, we will see that ps-Archytas shows his ‘approval’ of Plato’s Divided Line (Resp., VI, 509d 6-511e 5), in a rhetorical bid to subsume Plato’s quadripartition of the segments of knowledge under his own quadripartition of the parts of knowledge. Finally, it will be argued that the lone surviving