Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 1991 Morality as Interpretation Joseph Raz Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons Recommended Citation Joseph Raz, Morality as Interpretation, 101 ETHICS 392 (1991). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2232 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Moralityas Interpretation* JosephRazt With the growinginterest in interpretationas an activityessential in the study of the artsand of societyit was inevitablethat the question of the relationbetween moralityand interpretationwould attractconsiderable interest. Given thatmoral viewsand argumentsare expressed in language, are essentiallylanguage bound, there is no doubt thatthe understandingof moral viewsand argumentinvolves, at least at times,interpretation (of argumentsand propositions,etc.). The same can be said of physics.The question is whethermorality is interpretativein a way in which physicsis not. Some writershave claimed that it is. I will examine the claims and arguments to that effectadvanced by Michael Walzer, though much of my argument will be general and not limited to the arguments he explicitlyadvances.' THE MAIN THESES At the beginning of his book Walzer declares his intentionto defend the view that "the path of interpretation"in moral philosophy is the one that "accords best withour everydayexperience of morality"(p. 3).2 Later on, he explains: What we do when we argue is to give an account of the actuallyexisting morality.That moralityis authoritativefor us because it is only by virtue of its existence that we exist as the moral beings we are. Our categories, relationships,commitments, and aspirationsare all shaped by, expressed in termsof, the existingmorality. [P. 21] One might say that the moral world is authoritativefor us because it provides us with everythingwe need to live a moral life, including the capacity for reflectionand criticism.... The capacity for criticismalways * A review of Michael Walzer, Interpretationand Social Criticism(Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1987). References to thisbook will appear parenthetically in the text. t This articlegrew out of a discussionat theHartman Institute in Jerusalem (in June 1989) in whichI criticizedWalzer's views along the lines elaborated upon here.In writing thearticle I benefitedfrom contributions to thatdiscussion by Amos Funkenstein, Sydney Morgenbesser,Hilary Putnam, and MichaelWalzer. 1. Walzerhimself does notdraw the contrast with physics. 2. Strictlyspeaking, he only claims there that it is betterthan what he calls the paths of discoveryand invention.His descriptionof thosesuggests that his targetsare some formsof moral realism (discovery) and constructivism,or contractarianism (invention). His mainargument is, however,a positiveone, supportingthe path of interpretation,rather thanmerely an argumentfor the comparative superiority of thepath of interpretation. Ethics101 (January 1991): 392-405 C 1991Thisby contentThe University downloadedof fromChicago. 128.059.178.073All rights reserved. on September0014-1704/91/0102-0002$01.00 25, 2018 10:24:00 AM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 392 Raz Reviewof Walzer 393 extends beyond the "needs" of the social structureitself and its dominant groups. I do not want to defend a functionalposition. The moral world and the social worldare more or less coherent.Morality is alwayspotentially subversiveof class and power. [Pp. 21-22] The general question about the rightthing to do is quickly turned into some more specificquestion-about the career open to talents,let's say, and then about equal opportunity,affirmative action, and quotas. These ... require us to argue about what a career is, what sorts of talents we ought to recognise,whether equal opportunityis a "right.". These ques- tions are pursued withina traditionof moral discourse-indeed theyonly arise withinthat tradition-and theyare pursued byinterpreting the terms of that discourse. The argument is about ourselves; the meaning of our way of life is what is at issue. The general question we finallyanswer is not quite the one we asked at first.It has a crucial addition: what is the rightthing forus to do? [P. 23] Walzer's argument is based on the assumption that some moral claims are better,or better founded, than others. This does not commithim to the view that all moral statementsare eithertrue or false,but it commitshim to holding that some moral claims are true and some false. Where a moral claim is better foundedthan another, the statementthat it is, is true,and itsdenial false.Moreover, in such cases various statementsentailed by the precept that people should act in accordance withthe betterclaim are, presumably,true too.3 Given thisassumption, Walzer advances one major and one subsidiarythesis: Ti: Argumentsin moral philosophy are interpretationsof the morality that exists. T2: Even so, there is plentyof room for social criticism. Three main intuitionsinspire the theses. First,and most important,is the view that moralityis sociallydependent, thatis, thatwhat is rightand wrong for a person to do, what is good or bad, laudable or deplorable, virtuousor revealing of moral defectsin character,etc., depends on social practices.Second, morality does not forma systemof principlesand preceptsarranged in some logical way (in the way in which, e.g., Rawls's theoryof justice is a system),nor is there a specialmethod (like decision behind a veilof ignorance,or thetest of thecategorical imperative)for discovering or testingmoral claims. Third, our societyis not the only morallydecent societythat ever existed. Nor is it the morallybest society thatever existed,with other societiesmere stages of imperfectioncompared with us. Nor are othermorally decent societiesin the past or in the presentnecessarily more like ours than those societiesthat are less morallyappealing, that is, there are ways of being moral and having a morallydecent environmentwhich are veryunlike our ways of being morallydecent, and in environmentsvery unlike ours. These statementsof the intuitionsare veryvague. The degree to which the intuitionsare controversialdepends on their more precise formulations.Few people deny that what is rude, arndtherefore on occasion immoral,depends on 3. As the statementof Walzer's assumption above makes clear, his view is consistent withthe existenceof a widespread moral incommensurability,leading to considerabletruth value gaps. The general driftof his argument suggests that he regards intrasocialmoral issues as largely morally determinate,while contemplatingextensive moral incommen- surabilitywhere intersocialcomparisons are in question. This content downloaded from 128.059.178.073 on September 25, 2018 10:24:00 AM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 394 Ethics January1991 social practices.Many deny thatthe contentof moralityis exclusivelydetermined bythe social practicesof, let us say,the societyto whichthe person whose conduct or characterare under considerationbelongs. Few people believe that morality is a deductivesystem in whichall trueconclusions follow from one simpleprinciple withthe addition of purely factualpremises. Many believe that all cogent moral precepts are to some degree interdependent. Walzer's theses, especially the firstand main one, are an attemptto give a more precise articulationto the intuitions.The argumentsfor the thesesare also argumentsfor the intuitions. I willnot challenge or discussthe underlying intuitions. The only matterunder examination is the thesis that moral argumentsare in- terpretative.In challengingthis thesis I willbe challengingthat way of understanding and explaining the intuitions.But none of the followingarguments is directed against the intuitionsthemselves. It is possible to argue that the best verdicton Walzer'stheses is "not proven."There is too much whichis leftobscure in Walzer's discussion to enable one to reach any substantiveconclusion. In particular,it is unclear what he refersto when he speaks of moral argument being "an inter- pretationof the moralitythat exists." Three clustersof questionsremain unresolved. First,which of the existingmoralities does he have in mind? We generally assume that differentmoralities are practicedor at least avowed (and therefore can be said to exist) in differentsocieties, and, in pluralisticsocieties, different moralitiesare practicedor avowed by differentsections of the population within a single society.This briefstatement is itselfmerely an abbreviateddescription of a much more complex phenomenon of divisionsand crosscurrents.Which of the differentmoralities which exist is interpretedin valid moral arguments? Second, what kindof interpretationis involvedin moralargument? Consider some of the activitiesgenerally referredto as interpretative,such as that of professionalinterpreters in multilingualinternational conventions, the interpre- tation of musical compositionsby conductors,soloists, or orchestras,the inter- pretation