128 128 TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION? 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN CEE Bulgaria on the Path towards Elected Autocracy: How Far Have We Gone? ADRIAN NIKOLOV ADRIAN NIKOLOV 129 uring the transition towards liberal democracy and a mar- ket economy, some coun- tries from the former Eastern ELECTORAL Bloc managed to success- AUTHORITARIANISM, Dfully mimic the model that had already been proven to be successful in the West – IS PRESENT a multiparty democratic system, combined with mostly free market capitalism. TO A DEGREE Some, however, were less successful – es- IN A NUMBER pecially in the democracy department – and several decades later ended up with a form OF POST-SOVIET of a façade democracy, which in reality con- ceals a type of oligarchic rule that shares lit- COUNTRIES tle of the characteristics of a genuine liberal democracy. Political science has dubbed this concept democratization into hybrid regimes, and electoral authoritarianism, and it is present the failure of some of them to develop fully to a degree in a number of post-Soviet functional democratic institutions1. While countries. A quite telling thing of its pres- those types of definitions often also include ence is the de-ideologization of real politics, assessments on the quality of markets and while maintaining an outside stance – usu- economic competition in the studied coun- ally a populist and nationalist one – accom- tries, here we focus primarily on the political panied by the consolidation of the party sys- side of the matter. tem and marginalization of the opposition. Such a phenomenon occurred also in Bul- Contrary to the cold-war clear-cut distinc- garia, which is why it is worth examining the tion between democracies and dictatorial development of the Bulgarian party system regimes, Bogaards points out that in the and government ideological lean through wave of transition after the 1990s, many the lens of the concept of electoral authori- countries now exist in a “gray area” between tarianism and tracing how far towards the the two. These typically have façade demo- establishment of this model of government cratic institutions modelled after the fully Bulgaria has gone in the past three decades. functional Western democracies, particu- larly when it comes to holding elections, but ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM: in practice have entrenched political elites WHAT IS THAT? that capture all the institutions and political Before we proceed to the specifics of the power that are pitted against puppet oppo- Bulgarian case, it is necessary to define sition as well as compromised civil liberties. the concept of electoral authoritarianism, as it is the starting point of this evaluation Moreover, Bogaards points out that there of the development of electoral politics are quite a few terms coined for this type in the country. A very popular definition comes from Bogaards (2009), whose work 1 Bogaards, M. (2009) “How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? focuses particularly on the transformation Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism”, of the countries from the third wave of [in]: Democratization, Vol. 16(2), pp. 399-423. 130 TRANSFORMATIVE TRANSFORMATION? 30 YEARS OF CHANGE IN CEE of regime – “semi-authoritarianism”, “illib- eral democracy”, “liberalized autocracy” to name just a few, each with its own specif- ics and differences. In short, he provides AMONG THE THIRD a spectrum, from functioning democracy WAVE OF DEMOC- to full-blown totalitarianism, with electoral authoritarianism in the middle of it. RATIZATION Bogaard’s two-pronged approach to the COUNTRIES, RUSSIA definition of the concept also points to the primary indicators to be taken into consid- IS OFTEN POINTED eration when identifying the regime – the freedom of elections, political participation, TO AS AN EXAMPLE civil rights, horizontal accountability, and effective government. Apart from that, he OF WORKING emphasizes that the concept of electoral authoritarianism focuses chiefly on the role ELECTORAL of the electoral process. Here, however, let us use a less strict definition, borrow- AUTHORITARIANISM ing somewhat from the broader concept of defective democracy. The need to go beyond the electoral process and study institutions in a broader sense in of opposition and their ability to leverage order to properly classify regimes is also elections as an instrument and overall lib- stressed by Snyder (2006)2. He views regime eralization. Howard and Roessler’s findings, classification not as clearly defined groups, however, are more relevant to slowly de- but as a spectrum. In his view, it is possible mocratizing authoritarian regimes than to to have competitive democracy from the former full democracies declining towards legal perspective, combined with captured electoral authoritarianism. institutions and lack of real opposition. This brings us to the cases of electoral au- Meanwhile, Howard and Roessler (2006) thoritarianism in the former Eastern Bloc. offer a more traditional approach to the Among the third wave of democratization matter, focusing on the electoral process countries, Russia is often pointed to as an itself, and the presence of true pluralism and example of working electoral authoritari- the rule of law in truly democratic regimes, anism. Gel’man (2013) enumerates all the with electoral authoritarianism retaining characteristics that rank it among those the electoral process, but lacking those regimes: widespread abuses of power, full two features3. They stress the importance control of the media by the ruling elite, mar- ginalized and weak opposition, and almost 2 Snyder, R. (2006) “Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: complete capture of the institutions by the The Spectrum of Nondemocratic Regimes”, [in]: Elec- ruling party.4 To this we may add electoral toral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Com- petition, pp. 219-231. 50(2), pp. 365-381. 3 Howard, M. M., & Roessler, P. G. (2006) “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Re- 4 Gel’man, V. (2013) “Cracks in the Wall: Challenges to gimes”, [in]: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia”, [in]: Problems of ADRIAN NIKOLOV 131 fraud and active targeting and suppression often than not, truly democratic country’s of the opposition, from the more recent party systems include ideologically diverse years. While Gel’man stresses that the parties, which are actually divided along country is far from a completely captured the lines of ideological differences, while authoritarian state, it still appears that true authoritarian ones (especially in more eco- liberalization of political life and genuine nomically developed countries) only pro- competition are far off. vide an ideological façade, while the dividing lines between the parties are focused on The phenomenon is also present among the obtaining and maintaining political power – countries which managed to become mem- especially for currently ruling parties. bers of the European Union (EU) – most notably Hungary, as demonstrated by Ágh As is typical for the post-socialist space, (2015), among others5. The scholar clearly the traditional cleavage for the Bulgarian demonstrates how the ruling elite infiltrated party system is the socialism versus liberal the institutions, changed key “rules of the democracy divide. The past three decades game”, and marginalized the opposition. An have brought about the deterioration of this important note on the role of the EU insti- cleavage, and while its dampening over time tutions in constraining the expansion and is quite typical for post-socialist systems, it full capture of the Hungarian state by the has not been replaced by some of the other currently present hybrid regime, however, is cleavages characteristic of mature demo- made by Bozóki and Hegedűs (2018)6. Ac- cratic systems – such as urban versus rural cording to them, the EU has a dual role in or working versus capitalist class, as exem- this case, as it also serves as a source for plified by Whitefield (2002) in relation to the external legitimacy for the regime. Parallels post-socialist space7. Therefore, the current with Hungary will thus be quite common as party system is shaped primarily by power it is the country with the closest conditions distribution and struggles, not by ideologi- to Bulgaria, both historical and present, in- cal clashes. ternally and relative to the EU. The most value-driven parliaments in mod- TOWARDS DE-IDEOLOGIZATION: ern Bulgarian history were the two at the be- DEVELOPMENT OF THE BULGARIAN ginning and end of the 1990s. The first one PARTY SYSTEM marked the most intensive debates on the In any study of the de facto (as opposed formation of the new political and economic to de jure) nature of a democratic politi- systems of the country, while the second cal system, it is necessary to pay very close confirmed the geopolitical path towards the attention to the development of the party country’s integration in the Western world, system, its chief ideological cleavages, and through its accession in the EU and NATO. the makeup and ideological lean of the gov- ernments. The reason for this is that, more One could argue that the 1995 government, led by the former communist party, is also Post-Communism, Vol. 60(2), pp. 3-10. quite ideologically-driven as many of its 5 Ágh, A. (2015) “De-Europeanization and De-Democra- policies were attempts to restore the fea- tization Trends in ECE: From the Potemkin Democracy tures of the planned economy of the previ- to the Elected Autocracy in Hungary”, [in]: Journal