Proper Names A Cognitive-Philosophical Study by Eduardo Garc´ıa-Ram´ırez A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Philosophy) in The University of Michigan 2010 Doctoral Committee: Assistant Professor Eric P. Swanson, Chair Professor Marilyn J. Shatz Professor Richmond H. Thomason Associate Professor Andrew M. Egan Wie seltsam, wenn sich die logic mit einer ‘idealen’ Sprache befaßte und nicht mit unserer. — Ludwig Wittgenstein Philosophische Bemerkungen ... A conspicuous difference between old epistemology and the epistemological enterprise in this new psychological setting is that we can now make free use of empirical psychology. — W.V.O. Quine Epistemology Naturalized c Eduardo Garc´ıa-Ram´ırez All Rights Reserved 2010 To my family — in loving memory ii Acknowledgments This dissertation would not have been possible without the help and support of my commit- tee: Eric Swanson, Marilyn Shatz, Andy Egan, and Rich Thomason. My work has been greatly influenced by their guidance. Each one of them has, in her / his own way, helped me become a much better philosopher. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 have benefited from presentations at different venues. Thanks are owed to audiences at the Proper Names Reading Group (PNRG) at UofM, the graduate seminar on Psycholinguistics at UofM, the Philosophy of Language Seminar at IIF’s-UNAM, the second annual AAMPh conference at CUNY, the faculty seminar of the Logic and Phi- losophy of Science Department at UCM-Madrid, the Vortragsreihe at the Ruhr-Universitat¨ Bochum, the workshop on Cognitive Perspectives on Mind and Language at IIF’s-UNAM, and the first annual EFA conference at UBA-Buenos Aires. Special thanks are owed to Lina Jansson, Sam Liao, Ivan Mayerhoffer, Nate Charlow, Maite Ezcurdia, Mario Gomez-´ Torrente, Axel Barcelo,´ Angeles´ Erana,˜ Agust´ın Rayo, Rasmus Winther, Carla Merino, Carlos Montemayor, Raul´ Saucedo, Ricardo Mena, Luis Fernandez,´ Albert Newen, Ulrike Pompe, Christoph Michel, Isidora Stojanovich, and Edouard Machery. Special thanks are also owed to Lenny Clapp and Francois Recanati for their detailed comments on previous versions of chapter 4, and to Marilyn Shatz with whom I coauthored chapter 2. Thanks are owed as well to Dustin Tucker and Molly Mahony for their editorial help. This dissertation also benefited from two term-long visits to MIT-Philosophy and to IIF’s-UNAM. Thanks to Agust´ın Rayo and Guillermo Hurtado for making them possible. My philosophical development has also benefited enormously from the wisdom of my peers. I feel fortunate for having had the chance to work with the class of 2005. Substantial thanks are owed to Alex Plakias, Lina Jansson, Wendy Tng, Sam Liao, Michael Docherty, Neil Mehta, Ian Flora, and David Plunkett. I am also fortunate for being part of a Department with such an excellent group of graduate students. Thanks are owed to all. My research has improved substantially thanks to the amazing work of our librarian. Thanks are owed to Molly Mahony for keeping me up to date with respect to proper names. Thanks are also owed to Linda Shultes, and to all the philosophy staff, for turning the PhD iii into a less daunting, more liveable, task. Not everything has been nice during the past few years. I want to thank the faculty and staff of the Philosophy Department at UofM for their extraordinary support during the horrible times. Thanks are owed as well to Abraham Arceo, Juan Esp´ındola, Jonathan DeVore, Luciana Meli, Bruno Velazquez, Moises´ Vaca, and Marco Rigau for their unyielding support. Finally, I want to thank Catalina for keeping up with a partner-unfriendly academic lifestyle and, most importantly, for keeping me alive. iv Table of Contents Dedication ....................................... ii Acknowledgments ................................... iii List of Tables ...................................... vi List of Figures ..................................... vii Abstract ......................................... viii Chapter 1 Introduction: Why should we care about proper names? ......1 1.1 Reference . .2 1.2 Belief and Intentionality . .3 1.3 Imagination and the use of language . .6 Chapter 2 On Problems with Descriptivism: Psychological Assumptions and Empirical Evidence ................................ 10 2.1 Background . 10 2.1.1 Mill’s view . 11 2.1.2 Frege’s insight . 11 2.2 Varieties of descriptivism . 13 2.2.1 Expanded descriptivism . 13 2.2.2 Cluster descriptivism . 14 2.2.3 Boethian expanded descriptivism . 14 2.2.4 Basic causal descriptivism . 15 2.2.5 Two-dimensional (expanded) descriptivism . 16 2.2.6 Wide scope expanded descriptivism . 16 2.2.7 Metalinguistic descriptivism . 16 2.3 What descriptivism presupposes . 17 2.3.1 Towards an operative account of descriptivism . 17 2.3.2 A caveat . 21 2.4 The evidence . 22 2.4.1 Early lexical development . 22 2.4.2 Cognitive development . 23 v 2.4.3 Memory for proper names . 25 2.5 Preliminary Conclusions . 28 2.6 Objections and replies . 30 2.6.1 Accounting for natural languages . 30 2.6.2 A descriptivist reply . 31 2.6.3 If not definite descriptions, what then? . 33 2.6.4 Why philosophers should care . 34 2.7 Concluding remarks: Where are we now? . 35 2.7.1 Psychology . 36 2.7.2 Philosophy . 37 2.7.3 Conclusions . 38 Chapter 3 The Puzzle of Names ........................... 47 3.1 The puzzles . 48 3.1.1 Informativeness . 48 3.1.2 Substitution failure . 50 3.2 Case studies . 53 3.2.1 Frege . 53 3.2.2 Recanati on belief reports . 56 3.2.3 Plantinga and the Boethian compromise . 57 3.2.4 Stalnaker on two-dimensionalism . 60 3.3 A historical account . 64 3.4 Why is there substitution failure? . 65 3.5 A working hypothesis . 69 Chapter 4 An Integrated Account of Substitution Failure ............ 75 4.1 How much substitution failure is there? . 76 4.2 The evidence . 78 4.2.1 Memory . 78 4.2.2 Semantic assumptions for proper names . 80 4.2.3 The localization of labels . 85 4.3 The psychological side . 86 4.3.1 The account . 86 4.3.2 How to count names . 89 4.4 The linguistic side . 91 4.4.1 Meaning transfers . 92 4.4.2 Deferred interpretation and belief reports . 94 4.5 Integrating the accounts . 98 4.5.1 Solving Frege’s puzzle . 99 4.5.2 Solving Kripke’s puzzle . 101 4.5.3 Non-linguistic believers? . 102 4.6 Explanatory power . 103 4.6.1 Simple sentences . 103 4.6.2 Demonstratives . 105 4.6.3 Anaphoric reports . 107 vi 4.6.4 Mistaken identities . 109 4.6.5 Embedded reports . 109 4.6.6 Anaphoric and de se reports . 110 4.6.7 Germans . 111 Chapter 5 The Cognitive Theory of Empty Names ................ 118 5.1 A theory and the phenomena . 119 5.1.1 Mental content . 121 5.1.2 Fictional discourse . 122 5.1.3 Pretense and imaginings . 125 5.2 The cognitive theory . 126 5.2.1 The decoupler . 127 5.2.2 Belief, pretense, and EDUs . 130 5.2.3 EDUs and empty names . 133 5.2.4 EDUs and propositions . 135 5.3 Problem solving . 139 5.3.1 Homogeneous semantics . 139 5.3.2 Meaningfulness . 140 5.3.3 Fictional discourse . 140 5.3.4 Psychological adequacy . 141 5.3.5 Non-fictional empty names . 141 5.3.6 Errors and hallucinations . 143 5.3.7 Belief reports . 143 5.4 Advantages . 144 5.4.1 Metaphysics . 145 5.4.2 Problematic assertions . 145 5.4.3 Explaining intentional inexistence . 146 5.4.4 Metanormative theory . 147 5.5 Negative existentials . 148 5.5.1 Positive and negative uses . 148 5.5.2 Metalinguistic interpretation . 151 5.5.3 The mechanisms . 152 5.5.4 Problem solving . 154 5.6 Closing remarks . 158 Chapter 6 Conclusions: Lessons from proper names ............... 164 vii List of Tables Table 2.1 Varieties of Description Theories . 13 2.2 Speakers according to Description Theories . 21 2.3 Actual Memory and Descriptivist Demands for Names . 29 5.1 Kinds of Mental States . 138 viii List of Figures Figure 5.1 Primary and other representations . ..