Antonio Cazorla Sánchez Surviving Franco’s Peace: Spanish Popular Opinion During the Second World War The Second World War began exactly six months after the end of the Spanish Civil War. Contrary to what has been claimed, Spain in 1939 was not a country which was materially ruined but rather morally destroyed, and, above all, socially divided.1 The hun- dreds of thousands of deaths that resulted from military opera- tions, albeit painful and emotionally irreplaceable losses, were not in themselves the main obstacle to reconciliation among Spaniards. What made such a reconciliation impossible was that the winning side, having formed the New State, proceeded to recall and celebrate its victory at the expense of the losing side, while subjecting it to ferocious repression. It was their daily pres- ence, and the historical memory of roughly 180,000 people killed during the war and postwar (approximately three quarters of them killed by the Francoists) which created the real and appar- ently unbridgeable gap in popular opinion.2 A drastic decline in the standard of living was added to these recent horrors, as well as the personal dramas of prison, exile or purges which people were experiencing. Under these circumstances, it should come as no surprise that the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, and the immediate declaration of war on Germany by France and the United Kingdom, were received by Spaniards, like most Euro- peans, with apprehension.3 Studies of British, German, French, Italian and American society during the Second World War are classic areas of scholar- ship. Nonetheless, almost all research concerning Spain’s rela- tionship with the Second World War have centred on diplomatic, political, strategic and economic issues (probably in that order), with much less attention paid to social issues. This gap in the literature has to some extent been filled, mainly by foreign European History Quarterly Copyright © 2002 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol. 32(3), 391–411. [0265-6914(200207)32:3;391–411;026062] 392 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 diplomats stationed in Madrid during those war years. But when writing their memoirs and personal impressions, in general their interest does not extend beyond a discussion of the difficulties of their missions, or of the various reasons for which Franco and his regime were or were not favourable to the interests of their respective countries.4 However, the Second World War was not only a backdrop for the shadows of Spanish political reality, but also the stage upon which circumstances were played out that could have radically changed the fate of the Francoist dictatorship, and which can only be properly evaluated if studied from the popular opinion viewpoint in Spain.5 This article explores this arena of popular opinion in order to determine to what extent Spanish society as a whole viewed the (at times very real) possibility of Spain entering the war as part of the Axis, the development of the conflict, and how these affected the support or hostility that certain social groups felt towards the Francoist dictatorship. It tries to evaluate the extent to which this factor was important (and for whom), in the context of other concerns such as famine, the economic crisis, corruption, political repression or the definitive form of state organization (monarchy or republic, dictatorship or democracy, etc.). Finally, this article attempts to determine if the dictatorship and Franco’s own position in power had anything to fear from popular opinion, and if not, why not; or on the contrary, whether the development of the war ended up favouring consolidation of the Franco regime. Any research concerned with popular opinion under a dic- tatorship encounters the problem of sources. In this case, we have used archival material from a wide variety of sources (British, Italian and German diplomatic archives, as well as General Franco’s archive), contrasting them with one another where possible. For example, the information gathered by British diplo- mats is viewed in relation to that gathered by their colleagues and rivals from the Axis, or with those of the Francoist police. Geographical, social and political diversity was also sought. Obviously, the opinions expressed in such sources were largely conditioned by the interests they defended and often, in addition to being self-interested, are biased or not very representative. Needless to say, the result does not presume to be as precise as a sociological study, but rather to furnish some elements which may help us to understand the political dynamic of early Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 393 Francoism, and the later stability of a long dictatorship in the midst of a democratic Europe, without limiting ourselves to political repression as an explanation for both phenomena.6 In 1939, citizens hostile to the regime obviously could not express their opinions freely for fear of grave personal risk, which means that their opinions remained limited to comments, rumours, jokes, confidential conversations and individual acts of hostility. But we should differentiate their actions from political opposition in the narrow sense, since the latter refers to an active minority that continued to confront the dictatorship through agitation and even armed struggle, and that attempted to regroup with some success in the mid-1940s. On the contrary, those hostile to the government comprised a much broader group that, while feeling that they were the defeated enemies of the regime, understood that direct confrontation with the New State meant paying too high a price, and so shunned an openly rebellious or organized posture. We are especially interested in the evolution of opinion among those enemies of Francoism who did not participate directly in politics due to either intimidation or con- viction, but who shared the ideology of the opposition organiza- tions. The same applies to those sectors of the population that supported the dictatorship without being members of the official single party (Falange Española Tradidicionalista de las JONS). Similarly, among the supporters of the dictatorship we pay more attention to those people who did not participate officially in poli- tics, that is, the majority, rather than the active supporters or official spokespersons of the regime. In sum, the major thesis to be explored in this article is that with respect to the possible Spanish participation in the war, there was the possibility of a serious split: not only between the mass of the population and the regime, but also extending into broader sectors of the dictatorship’s supporters. In other words, partici- pation in the war could have been unpopular even among Francoists, and for this reason could have affected the stability and the future of the New State. For similar reasons there were also elements among those hostile to the regime who did not agree with official positions taken by the various opposition parties and unions; for these people, however little it offered, maintaining peace was preferable to embarking on a war on the Allies’ side, which might or might not have brought greater free- dom and justice. Unlike the case of the Mussolini regime, for 394 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 example, the non-entry of Spain into the war would end up being a factor which favoured the stability of the dictatorship.7 1. Between Two Wars, 1939–41 In 1939, the Francoist New State had a fairly compact bloc of supporters. In first place there was the army, full of officers clamouring to be at the forefront of the political scene, and owing everything to Generalísimo Franco who had led them to victory. Next to them was the church, chastized by the revolution and now redeemed and generously financed by the dictatorship. Also present was the world of finance: business, landowners, the con- servative peasantry — mainly but not exclusively in Castile and the north — who, along with certain middle-class elements, formed the broad minority voting for the Right in 1936.8 Nor were the lower classes immune from being co-opted by the right wing. The CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas) party had already succeeded in drawing in many votes from these sectors and, although the fact remains relatively unknown, there were even large numbers of urban workers and day-labourers who joined the Falange, both before and after the outbreak of war.9 As had been the case in a number of European countries at that time, the reasons for their membership may have included not only patronage networks and pressure from employers, but also a genuine identification with these parties’ messages of order, patriotism and defence of religion.10 During the war, these groups were joined by many people, probably the majority of less politicized Spaniards, who were tired of the long (almost three-year) conflict and of the barbarities committed during it.11 On the opposite side were those who had voted for the Popular Front in 1936, a not very clear majority of the population now greatly reduced due to fatigue brought on by the war and its negative outcome for the Republic. These were the majority of the working class, concentrated mainly in Catalonia, the Basque country, Asturias and in large cities, as well as day-labourers and part of the small peasantry in the centre, south and east. Added to these were the middle-class and liberal employees who, in the case of Catalonia and the Basque country, had nationalist tend- encies. In much of the Basque country, this nationalism was Carzorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 395 more conservative and Catholic, while it also rejected, and was repressed by, the New State (although in many parts of the Basque country and Navarre, traditional populist Catholicism not only accepted the new regime but had also been, by way of Carlism, a key element in its creation).12 Political repression, economic chaos and hunger were the most serious problems faced by Spaniards at the end of the Civil War.