Surviving Franco's Peace: Spanish Popular Opinion During the Second

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Antonio Cazorla Sánchez

Surviving Franco’s Peace: Spanish Popular Opinion During the Second World War

The Second World War began exactly six months after the end of the Spanish Civil War. Contrary to what has been claimed, Spain in 1939 was not a country which was materially ruined but rather morally destroyed, and, above all, socially divided.1 The hun- dreds of thousands of deaths that resulted from military opera- tions, albeit painful and emotionally irreplaceable losses, were not in themselves the main obstacle to reconciliation among Spaniards. What made such a reconciliation impossible was that the winning side, having formed the New State, proceeded to recall and celebrate its victory at the expense of the losing side, while subjecting it to ferocious repression. It was their daily presence, and the historical memory of roughly 180,000 people killed during the war and postwar (approximately three quarters of them killed by the Francoists) which created the real and appar- ently unbridgeable gap in popular opinion.2 A drastic decline in the standard of living was added to these recent horrors, as well as the personal dramas of prison, exile or purges which people were experiencing. Under these circumstances, it should come as no surprise that the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, and the immediate declaration of war on Germany by France and the United Kingdom, were received by Spaniards, like most Euro- peans, with apprehension.3 Studies of British, German, French, Italian and American society during the Second World War are classic areas of scholar- ship. Nonetheless, almost all research concerning Spain’s rela- tionship with the Second World War have centred on diplomatic, political, strategic and economic issues (probably in that order), with much less attention paid to social issues. This gap in the literature has to some extent been filled, mainly by foreign

European History Quarterly Copyright © 2002 SAGE Publications, London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, Vol. 32(3), 391–411. [0265-6914(200207)32:3;391–411;026062] 392 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 diplomats stationed in Madrid during those war years. But when writing their memoirs and personal impressions, in general their interest does not extend beyond a discussion of the difficulties of their missions, or of the various reasons for which Franco and his regime were or were not favourable to the interests of their respective countries.4 However, the Second World War was not only a backdrop for the shadows of Spanish political reality, but also the stage upon which circumstances were played out that could have radically changed the fate of the Francoist dictatorship, and which can only be properly evaluated if studied from the popular opinion viewpoint in Spain.5 This article explores this arena of popular opinion in order to determine to what extent Spanish society as a whole viewed the (at times very real) possibility of Spain entering the war as part of the Axis, the development of the conflict, and how these affected the support or hostility that certain social groups felt towards the Francoist dictatorship. It tries to evaluate the extent to which this factor was important (and for whom), in the context of other concerns such as famine, the economic crisis, corruption, political repression or the definitive form of state organization (monarchy or republic, dictatorship or democracy, etc.). Finally, this article attempts to determine if the dictatorship and Franco’s own position in power had anything to fear from popular opinion, and if not, why not; or on the contrary, whether the development of the war ended up favouring consolidation of the Franco regime. Any research concerned with popular opinion under a dictatorship encounters the problem of sources. In this case, we have used archival material from a wide variety of sources (British, Italian and German diplomatic archives, as well as General Franco’s archive), contrasting them with one another where possible. For example, the information gathered by British diplomats is viewed in relation to that gathered by their colleagues and rivals from the Axis, or with those of the Francoist police. Geographical, social and political diversity was also sought. Obviously, the opinions expressed in such sources were largely conditioned by the interests they defended and often, in addition to being self-interested, are biased or not very representative. Needless to say, the result does not presume to be as precise as a sociological study, but rather to furnish some elements which may help us to understand the political dynamic of early Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 393

Francoism, and the later stability of a long dictatorship in the midst of a democratic Europe, without limiting ourselves to political repression as an explanation for both phenomena.6 In 1939, citizens hostile to the regime obviously could not express their opinions freely for fear of grave personal risk, which means that their opinions remained limited to comments, rumours, jokes, confidential conversations and individual acts of hostility. But we should differentiate their actions from political opposition in the narrow sense, since the latter refers to an active minority that continued to confront the dictatorship through agitation and even armed struggle, and that attempted to regroup with some success in the mid-1940s. On the contrary, those hostile to the government comprised a much broader group that, while feeling that they were the defeated enemies of the regime, understood that direct confrontation with the New State meant paying too high a price, and so shunned an openly rebellious or organized posture. We are especially interested in the evolution of opinion among those enemies of Francoism who did not participate directly in politics due to either intimidation or conviction, but who shared the ideology of the opposition organizations. The same applies to those sectors of the population that supported the dictatorship without being members of the official single party (Falange Española Tradidicionalista de las JONS). Similarly, among the supporters of the dictatorship we pay more attention to those people who did not participate officially in politics, that is, the majority, rather than the active supporters or official spokespersons of the regime. In sum, the major thesis to be explored in this article is that with respect to the possible Spanish participation in the war, there was the possibility of a serious split: not only between the mass of the population and the regime, but also extending into broader sectors of the dictatorship’s supporters. In other words, participation in the war could have been unpopular even among Francoists, and for this reason could have affected the stability and the future of the New State. For similar reasons there were also elements among those hostile to the regime who did not agree with official positions taken by the various opposition parties and unions; for these people, however little it offered, maintaining peace was preferable to embarking on a war on the Allies’ side, which might or might not have brought greater freedom and justice. Unlike the case of the Mussolini regime, for 394 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 example, the non-entry of Spain into the war would end up being a factor which favoured the stability of the dictatorship.7

1. Between Two Wars, 1939–41

In 1939, the Francoist New State had a fairly compact bloc of supporters. In first place there was the army, full of officers clamouring to be at the forefront of the political scene, and owing everything to Generalísimo Franco who had led them to victory. Next to them was the church, chastized by the revolution and now redeemed and generously financed by the dictatorship. Also present was the world of finance: business, landowners, the conservative peasantry — mainly but not exclusively in Castile and the north — who, along with certain middle-class elements, formed the broad minority voting for the Right in 1936.8 Nor were the lower classes immune from being co-opted by the right wing. The CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas) party had already succeeded in drawing in many votes from these sectors and, although the fact remains relatively unknown, there were even large numbers of urban workers and day-labourers who joined the Falange, both before and after the outbreak of war.9 As had been the case in a number of European countries at that time, the reasons for their membership may have included not only patronage networks and pressure from employers, but also a genuine identification with these parties’ messages of order, patriotism and defence of religion.10 During the war, these groups were joined by many people, probably the majority of less politicized Spaniards, who were tired of the long (almost three-year) conflict and of the barbarities committed during it.11 On the opposite side were those who had voted for the Popular Front in 1936, a not very clear majority of the population now greatly reduced due to fatigue brought on by the war and its negative outcome for the Republic. These were the majority of the working class, concentrated mainly in Catalonia, the Basque country, Asturias and in large cities, as well as day-labourers and part of the small peasantry in the centre, south and east. Added to these were the middle-class and liberal employees who, in the case of Catalonia and the Basque country, had nationalist tend- encies. In much of the Basque country, this nationalism was Carzorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 395 more conservative and Catholic, while it also rejected, and was repressed by, the New State (although in many parts of the Basque country and Navarre, traditional populist Catholicism not only accepted the new regime but had also been, by way of Carlism, a key element in its creation).12 Political repression, economic chaos and hunger were the most serious problems faced by Spaniards at the end of the Civil War. Over and above these issues floated uncertainty regarding the increasingly tense international situation, which had only been postponed by the Munich agreement of September 1938. In opposition to official propaganda and the government’s international allies, in mid-April 1939 most Spaniards, according to Portuguese diplomats, wanted the country ‘to remain neutral in the case of an outbreak of a European conflict’.13 In fact, the fore- seeable outbreak of the war had undermined the high esteem in which the Germans were held by Francoism, even amongst its leaders. On the other hand, the neutral Italians gained in prestige since it was believed that they could help Spain in her initial decision to stay out of the conflict.14 The Nazis’ spectacular victories in May and June 1940 would radically alter this landscape, at least among élite sectors of the New State. Falangists, along with army leaders and officers, greeted the French defeat and the seemingly imminent British surrender with euphoria. These groups’ hatred for the Allies was not at all surprising. It was a mixture of disdain for democracy, considered corrupt and decadent, and a historical view of France and England as longstanding enemies of Spain, against whom they had conspired to destroy, while infecting it with the evil seeds of nineteenth-century liberalism.15 Now there was an opportunity for historical revenge: with Hitler and Mussolini’s help a North African empire could be acquired at bargain prices.16 But the leaders’ ambitions were one thing, and the nation’s quite another. While the official press feverishly followed German victories in Belgium, Holland and France, in Carlist Navarre there was ‘indignation at the possibility of Spain and Italy joining Germany’.17 It is in this context that we must understand the ambitious list of political and territorial goals which Franco presented at the famous Hendaye interview with Hitler in October 1940, includ- ing territorial acquisitions (at France’s expense) and material aid (to be provided by Germany), which the German dictator 396 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 refused. At that point, Hitler was confident of his imminent victory, and this made the price that Franco was asking for his co-operation too high, especially since Hitler preferred not to antagonize another state which he valued more highly: Vichy France.18 Later, when the Second World War was about to end with the victory of the ‘wrong’ side, Francoist propaganda would begin to construct a political myth which became fundamental for the legitimization of the regime. The foresightful Franco engineered, by his ‘Galician cunning’, to avoid the pressure from the until- then unstoppable Hitler, thus saving Spain from the horrors of another war.19 It was an absolute falsehood but one which co- incided, after the fact, with the desires and expectations of the majority of Spaniards. For them, the French armistice was not a chance to relive a fascist version of the conquests of the Catholic monarchs Isabel and Fernando or Felipe II, but simply cut short the possibility of another war, of more suffering, which threatened at any moment to spread to Spain. The day when its ratifi- cation was made public in Spain, the Italians — who were already embroiled in the conflict — had to recognize that it had been ‘received in all Spanish circles with keen satisfaction and a feeling of relief, as there had begun to be some worrying about the idea of seeing German armies fighting right up to the Pyrenees’.20 What is more, general sympathy for Latin and Catholic France (even among some Falangists, again according to the Italians) was in clear contrast to the official euphoria at the German victory, as seen in the mass media. This desire for peace was so strong that even among those sectors of the population where anti-Franco sentiments were dominant, as was the case among the working class, hostility towards Italy, and above all towards Germany, ‘whom they know as allies and upholders of the present regime’, did not necessarily translate into identification with the cause of the Allies, as the British Consul in Seville stated in August 1940. This was due in part to the recent experience of the Civil War, in which France and England’s policy of appeasement had led to the Republic’s defeat. It could not help but seem contradictory now for the United Kingdom to present its struggle as the defence of democracy. But even more important was the fact that workers blamed England for ‘prolonging the war at the time when they desire peace at all cost’21 after the French defeat. These workers’ Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 397 ideas ran counter to those of almost all the opposition forces (socialists, anarchists, liberal bourgeois as well as Catalan, Basque and Galician nationalists) who were solidly behind their cause, despite their resentment towards the Allies. The communists were still the exception, not because they were more in tune with the masses as they claimed, but because they had been instructed by Stalin to defend ‘Peace’ in the face of the struggle amongst ‘imperialisms’.22 However, it is also true that this ‘peace at any price’ was not a unanimously held sentiment among Spanish workers.23 In November 1940 Eberhard von Stohrer, the German ambassador in Madrid, considered the economic and food supply situation to be even worse than a few months earlier, especially due to the scarcity of cereals and gasoline, and to the impact of corruption. Moreover, the economic crisis was so severe that ‘increasing numbers of people previously favourable to the regime are joining the Red element’, to such an extent that opposition to entering the war — ultimately the major concern of all diplomats stationed in Madrid — would have become generalized in popular opinion. ‘Certain military and Falangist circles’, von Stohrer declared, ‘are the only exception.’24 But this widespread desire for peace must not be confused with unanimous public support for the New State. Rather, it concealed current realities and future political expectations, which were not only different from but also counterpoised to it. As for workers, the Francoist authorities were conscious that, particularly in areas with more political and trade union traditions, they identified the New State with its international allies, and with its precarious material situation. Thus, when reporting on the mood amongst workers at the Barcelona docks in December 1940, the police explained how

the criticisms of our Government are of such a nature that they cannot be transcribed. The failure of the New Regime in Spain is a motive for satisfaction for them [workers], since everyone is disillusioned . . . Speaking of the international conflict, they affirm that the Italians have suffered numerous defeats and this fills them with satisfaction, since they believe that the war will be won by England and that this will change the regime in Spain. Then, they say, will be the time to settle accounts and obtain the justice that is so much trumpeted about, adding that the prisons are full of honest people and that thieves and black-marketeers are the only ones who can survive.25

On the contrary, as we will see in detail later, the possibility of political change and the probability of revenge by those defeated 398 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 in the Civil War could not fail to be a gloomy prospect for those social sectors that supported Franco. Meanwhile, despite the dis- astrous economic and social policies which his government was implementing, Franco’s prestige remained intact, since the bulk of the criticisms and resentment were directed at his brother-in- law and de facto prime minister, Ramón Serrano Súñer.26 The split image which the New State’s two main leaders enjoyed among the Francoists was confirmed by the British diplomat Mr Victor Malley, when he took advantage of a meeting of alumni from the élitist Colegio Universitario del Escorial in November 1940, to sound out the opinions of those in attendance, com- prising ‘members of the services, of the liberal and learned professions, churchmen and business men’. Malley found that, while the Generalísimo remained popular, Serrano Súñer was increasingly discredited in the public eye. He also noted that pro- Germanism, of which Serrano had been the most visible propo- nent, had been replaced since the previous summer by a realistic

concern for the non-belligerence of Spain. The lesson of other invaded countries is being taken to heart. Conviction of the impossibility of Great Britain being invaded, [and] manifest contempt for Italy and her arms.27

In addition to each social group’s respective expectations, behind these views favourable towards neutrality there was a generalized consciousness of the New State’s political failure that embraced the whole of Spanish society, to the point that, according to the police, the mood in the country at the beginning of 1941 was:

Frankly unfavourable and pessimistic due to the growing lack of work, worsened by the scarcity of those foodstuffs most needed by producers . . . The policy regarding bread distribution had been received with rejoicing by the working masses, but now they are realising that it will be no more than a policy and will only be respected by people of good will. Defeatism and grumbling are the order of the day and are always based on the lack of food and the abandonment of the working and middle classes . . . The international conflict has been forgotten and is only commented on by those elements which use it as a weapon to discredit totalitarian regimes . . . But we have come to such a point and the opinion of the Falange is at present such that many people openly admit their disillusionment, proudly boasting of not belonging to it.28

Understandably, the hispanophobic British ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, determined to take advantage of this situation Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 399 and keep Spain out of the war, could hardly conceal his satisfaction when he informed his minister, Anthony Eden, how a high- ranking official of the party had stated that ‘the Falange’s days are numbered’ and that if the party were dissolved nothing would happen in Spain except that the republican prisoners would be freed and their cells filled with corrupt bureaucrats.29 He was obviously exaggerating, but from Barcelona the police reported again in 1941 that resentment against the Falange and Serrano Súñer ‘from all social classes’ was widespread, ‘holding it [the Falange] responsible for the lack of political direction, for hunger, for the lack of work and fuel. The politics are not active but rather passive, deaf, joking and all-round “boycotting”.’30 Nonetheless, there was no reason to think that there could be a serious internal threat to the stability of the dictatorship. And although, for example, the pro-Franco Catalan middle classes resented the government’s management and the prejudicial effects of its isolationist economic policies, they remained grate- ful to Franco for having restored order and for maintaining social peace, which they were not inclined to gamble away.31 Among the defeated, repression or the memory of repression neutralized any attempt at open protest. The mechanism, described in April 1942 by the Falange in the Valencian town of Requena, where 80 per cent of the population was leftist, had been extremely effec- tive

due to the timely action on the part of a Mayor well-acquainted with the area, all those who made up the murderous committees were killed by firing squad during the first days after the end of the war, and those less responsible were condemned to various prison sentences. This meant that the Red masses were left without immediate leaders and that anyone left with the desire to stand up and lead would be severely punished. The activities of these elements is without question almost nil, and the most they can manage now is floating the occa- sional hoax and commentaries on the war in favour of the democracies, whose victory they say is a sure thing.32

The workers, distanced from political struggles by hunger and terror, demonstrated their dissidence through all sorts of jokes and rumours against the authorities. All the more so when their loyalty towards their former union organizations was still alive. The authorities’ fear of the workers’ persistent loyalty to their old unions was well justified, and they could not help but notice how the Allies’ victory in the war was seen as the last hope that those organizations would soon return.33 With the doubts and shadows 400 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 of 1940 past, by mid-1941, Spanish anti-fascists were identifying themselves with the British resistance. Britain had managed to remain on her feet and showed signs of being able, if not to win, at least to avoid defeat. Furthermore, for some months now the prime enemy of Spanish non-belligerence — that is, of her desire for peace — had without a doubt been Germany.

2. Poor Expectations, 1941–42

On their inspection trip along the whole Andalusian coast in January 1941, a certain RAF officer, Wing Commander James, and his wife, believed it ‘needless to record again details of the appalling state of inefficient misrule, brutal oppression, starva- tion, economic chaos and breakdown everywhere prevailing and increasing’. But they also indicated how ‘among that numerical- ly small, but politico-militarily important section of Spaniards, the upper, middle, and officer classes, anti-German feeling has spread rapidly during the past few weeks’, because any political disorder or change would be an excuse for the feared German invasion of Gibraltar (Operation Felix, which was never carried out). And the possible British victory would mean immediate revenge by the ‘Reds’. According to James, the only way to guarantee a peaceful transition, precluding both invasion and another civil war which nobody wanted after the violence of recent years, was the restoration of the monarchy, which would find majority support.34 But these opinions were not limited to Andalusia. That same month, Madrid was buzzing with rumours about an imminent German invasion, assassination attempts against Franco, the dissolution of the Falange, the restoration of the monarchy and the unleashing of a government crisis leading, it was feared, to a political cataclysm which might have unpre- dictable consequences.35 A few months earlier, the fear among Spaniards that Franco might enter the war voluntarily, was rapidly being replaced by the fear that he might be forced into it by Germany which was more and more impatient to achieve total victory. As a consequence, hostility towards the Third Reich was palpable amongst most Spaniards.36 These fears were present even among the generals, who had been previously very much in favour of entering the war, to the extent that the Germans thought that a split was emerging. Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 401

Other contributory factors included the agitation instigated, and the bribery employed, by the British; the open hatred of Serrano on the part of the military hierarchy — who were beginning to complain about the scant military aid that they received from Germany — and the government’s inability to deal with corruption and chaos within the administration. The situation was so serious that, in the opinion of the German ambassador in February 1941, a monarchist coup could happen at any time.37 He was mistaken. While it was true that the government’s loss of prestige was enormous, it barely affected Franco, victorious Generalísimo of a bloody civil war that now threatened to re- appear on the horizon. Moreover, this went hand in hand with possible foreign intervention, the consequences of which nobody could predict with any certainty, except that they would be tragic. Some ministers, led by Serrano, might fall, since that could spell some relief of the internal political tension, as happened in September 1942, but Franco was, and would continue to be, the best guarantee of the social and political order achieved through the 1936–39 struggle, so long as he did not enter the war or begin to lose it. When the Spanish Right considered the other possible route to gaining international acceptability, that is to say the monarchy, the difficulties and dangers of restoration were in the end enough to cause them to wonder if it was actually worth running the risk. Despite all this, the dictator continued to sow seeds of doubt about the future. As if hunger, repression or corruption were not enough, public life took a dark turn when, shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, a violent speech by Franco during a ceremony marking 18 July seemed to commit Spain to joining the conflict. This speech, broadcast by a euphoric press, only provoked renewed fear of an imminent entry into the war.38 The general feeling of unease became so great that, even as loyal a Francoist as the mayor of Barcelona, Miguel Mateu (the proto- typical Catalan bourgeois who identified completely with the regime), dared to express the disquiet of his circle of fellow industrialists. He privately described this speech as ‘a disaster’, in view of the catastrophic consequences that deteriorating relations with the British could have for Spain’s already battered national econ- omy.39 In Seville, the British Consul, Mr Lee, noted that many entrepreneurs were having increasing doubts about what might happen in Spain if Germany were defeated, and speculated that 402 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 in such a case civil war would break out again, with the final result being a ‘death sentence, at least for all those who actively participate in the present system’. The consul felt obliged to ask his ambassador to obtain guarantees that His Majesty’s government would not let this happen.40 Despite the fears which it generated, in immediate strategic terms the German invasion of the Soviet Union reduced any risk of an invasion of Spain, since it shifted their strategic interest from Gibraltar to the eastern front. Nonetheless, the spectre cast- ing a shadow over the future — that the Soviets might one day be allied with the winners of the war — was to materialize in the end. With the prolongation of the war and deepening of the social and economic situation in Spain, other pro-Franco business interests, apart from the industrial sector, began to resent the economic alliance with Germany which they correctly judged to be very harmful to the country. In November 1941, landowners and businesspeople in Cáceres and Badajoz, perhaps in order to distract attention from their own activities on the black market, were blaming this alliance for provoking the scarcity of foodstuffs through the commandeering of material for the war effort; the British consul in Seville did not hesitate to qualify their sentiments towards the Germans as ‘genuine hatred’.41 In 1942, the Francoist authorities in the province of León were informed of the general opinion that ‘the shortages we are suffering are to be blamed solely on Germany’s demands; Spain’s interests are being subordinated to Germany’s’.42 With Germany’s spectacular military victories in the East, German prestige was once more on the rise in the higher circles of the regime. The press repeated over and over again that these feats would finish off communism in a matter of weeks. None- theless, even the Spanish soldiers who had gone to fight as volunteers against Russia in the División Azul (Blue Division, 1941–44) brought back their own views of what was happening on the front, views that were very different from the official opti- mism which presented it as a crusade by Christian Europe against barbarian Asia. As early as 1942, a train pulled into Irún station bearing 600 División Azul wounded. Francoist authorities there and in San Sebastián were forced to take note, not only of the population’s ‘absolute lack of enthusiasm’, but also these soldiers’ criticisms about the Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 403

bloody repression carried out in the rearguard of occupied zones, citing cases of barbaric treatment, especially in Poland, Lithuania and Russia; they point out in fact that for the Germans, the life of a Pole or a Russian is worth absolutely nothing.43 Already at that point the international situation was beginning to call for caution, a call which Franco was still unwilling to heed. The crisis in Francoist external policy was forged with the definitive new direction taken by the war, beginning with the brutal irruption of Japan and the United States in December 1941 and ending a year later with the Axis’ military setbacks in North Africa (the battle of El Alamein and the Morocco land- ings) and on the eastern front (Stalingrad). Nonetheless, this decisive change in the external panorama did not for the moment signify a serious risk of destabilization for the Franco regime. On the contrary: fear of the future, nursed by both conservative social groups and a broad sector of the Left, was to serve as a powerful glue in strengthening Franco’s position. Although a few lieutenant-generals were conspiring to bring back the monarchy, the dictator’s prestige among army officers was enormous, giving him control of the regime’s main pillar. Unless the Germans were defeated and Spain militarily implicated in their defeat, there seemed to be no possibility of forming a coalition of moderate political forces from the two camps that was capable of over- coming the shattering effects of the Civil War and bringing an end to the New State. Meanwhile, a reinterpretation of the recent past, in which Franco appeared as a skilled and subtle pacificist, was being put in place, albeit still confusedly, by the regime’s propaganda machine. The myth of Franco as guarantor of peace would turn out to be very useful; traumatized as they were by the Civil War, Spaniards received it with a strong desire to believe in its truth. From then on, the regime would harp repeatedly on those images of war in the Spain of yesterday in order to contrast them with the present-day peace in the midst of a world which seemed to be blowing itself to pieces. Thus, the most barefaced opportunism tried to pass itself off as the most cunning prudence. British Ambassador Hoare, in an accurate report of February 1942, understood and expressed the situation:

The people’s discontents have increased in bitterness, the incompetence, the corruption and the vindictiveness of the Falangist machine have grown worse, famine and disease have constantly shown their threatening heads, and, to judge from criticisms that daily are more outspoken, the Government has lost 404 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3

almost every friend that it ever possessed . . . Had Spain still possessed her former capacity for ‘pronunciamientos’, had she now freedom of action to change the Government, the present regime would certainly have disappeared. But Spain in her present state has had her natural powers paralysed by two deadening forces. On the one hand, there has everywhere been the demoralisa- tion that has followed upon one of the most savage civil wars in European History. On the other hand, there has been the threat of the German army upon the frontier . . . I would say that General Franco is determined . . . to keep Spain out of the war, not because he dislikes the Germans or believes that Germany can be beaten, but because he knows that not a single Spaniard wishes to see Spain involved in the fighting.44 Peace, and the myth of its preservation by Franco in the face of chaos, was much more powerful than the calls for acceptance of pseudo-Fascist ideology which had dominated Spanish public life since 1939. When reporting on the impact of the dictator’s visit to Barcelona in May 1942, the police noted that:

Among elements of the Catalanist right-wing . . . in its industrial and merchant sector . . . they state that, for their part, they would like to demonstrate their sympathies for the Caudillo only, and so they want to have nothing to do with the Falange, despite the fact that most of them are members . . . The apolitical middle class: despite having bewailed their suffering, and having often criti- cized current policies, especially with respect to supplies, in the presence of the Caudillo these elements reawakened the tragic memory of Red rule and praised the sincerity of the Generalísimo when he said he is aware of the tribulations which this class must suffer. They also recognize Franco’s efforts to keep Spain from becoming involved in the current armed conflict . . . [Amongst] the working classes, some people’s comments are neither in favour of nor opposed to said visit. The most generous say they recognize that Franco is a good person, but that he is surrounded by a band of opportunists.45 The unpopularity of the government and the single party, and of politics in general, convinced the Italian ambassador, Francesco Lequio, of the need for the immediate sacking of the Falange’s general secretary, José Luis Arrese.46 However, the Fascist diplomat was frustrated in this since Arrese, like other veteran Falangists, managed to hang onto his position: first by betraying his former protector, Serrano Súñer, and then, after Serrano’s fall from power in September 1942, by completely bending the Falange to the wishes of the dictator. In later Francoist mythology, Franco was to be portrayed as the prudent leader who prevented his pro-German foreign minister, Serrano, from throwing himself into the Nazis’ arms.47 Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 405

3. Epilogue: The Timely Myth of Peace, 1943–45

Between the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1944, the Axis’ successive defeats were to reawaken fears and myths born of the Civil War. For broad sectors of the working class, these victories, especially the Soviet ones, were celebrated because they were viewed as a vindication of sorts, and a threat to the dictatorship. In February 1943 in Vizcaya, one could feel the satisfaction at the Anglo-American victories even among executives, foremen and managers of large companies — evidence of the extent to which the New State’s excesses and poor management had alienated even these sectors.48 Nonetheless, among the upper class and the non-liberal middle classes, the Allied advance generally meant a renewed threat of revolution. Some of them anxiously sought signs that the western Allies would guarantee that this would not happen. Even the Germans, according to the American ambassador Carlton Hayes, assumed that their support among these groups was almost nil and that at least 80 per cent of Spaniards were pro- Allies.49 These conservative fears were reinforced by events in Italy: the fall of Mussolini in June 1943; the spiral of violence and confusion which enveloped the Italian peninsula with the failure of the British-sponsored monarchist restoration; the German invasion; the unexpectedly strong uprisings from the Left; and the parallel outbreaks of a civil war and a war of national liberation.50 The possibility that the fate of Italian fascism could be repeated in Spain in the case of the Falange spread panic throughout the latter in August 1943. Even in the secretariat of the party,

some people were frankly frightened; they did not want to leave behind certain papers which they held, some wanted to tear them up; others commented on the current impossibility of taking refuge in bordering countries, etc. [while] the working masses are fully satisfied . . . These people ‘got off on’ these events, so to speak. Their expectations were high, their desire for revenge even higher, their certainty of a communist victory was boundless, and all this makes clear the need to keep them under specially close watch and to be constantly on guard against their ideas and agendas. We cannot be too vigilant in this pursuit.51

The successive Axis defeats and the chaos left in their wake only sharpened a key dilemma amongst conservatives. On the one hand stood the possible advantages of a monarchist restora- 406 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 tion at the hands of the Allies, and on the other, all the risks of uncovering the passions and dreams which had been smothered at the end of the Civil War. Faced with this uncertainty, the prestige, security and loyalty offered by the Caudillo represented the best guarantee of their interests, since it was for many the best defence against possible chaos and social upheaval.52 As the police reported in September from Melilla where, with the Allied troops just a few kilometres away, the threat of war was very close:

[The class of] merchants and industrialists, which in those parts is neither monarchist nor leftist nor Falangist (the idea of the Falange means little there) but rather desirous of order and a sense of authority, have confidence that Your Excellency [Franco] will be able to rescue the country from the catastrophe — and there are some who do use this term — foreboded, according to them, mainly by the Allied victories.53 The political balance born of the Civil War could only be broken by armed conflict. And that was exactly what the majority of Spaniards, Right and Left, apolitical and politicized, agreed to reject. Unless the Allies decided to ‘liberate’ Spain as well, the dictatorship could withstand the defeat of the Axis. As US Ambassador Carlton Hayes pointed out in March 1943, the possibility that Spain might be involved in a war had led almost all segments of Spanish society to support Franco, in the hope that Spain would remain on the edge of the international conflict. The key to this support, said Hayes, was that despite the dictator’s gestures in favour of the Germans, the people ‘felt’ that Franco was headed towards neutrality.54 This stubborn clinging to peace guaranteed by Franco, no matter how miserable, cannot be understood without taking into account the deep pessimism about the future which characterized not only the Spaniards but also foreign observers.55 And yet, with his usual negative view of Spaniards, Ambassador Hoare was so convinced that the country would end up in such chaos that he recommended the Allies should abstain from getting too involved in the ‘traditional’ confusion and bitterness of Spanish internal politics.56 The foresee- able though not yet certain end of the war led Hoare, like many other British Conservatives, to worry about the future impact of a communist victory. According to him, such a prospect terrified the neutral majority of Spanish popular opinion, in part manipulated by German propaganda and its Francoist imitators. In this sense, the best guarantee of security which the US and Great Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 407

Britain could offer Spain would be for them to deliver the decisive blow against the Germans, one which would make people forget the Soviet victories, seen by moderate Spaniards as a catastrophe.57 Notwithstanding Hoare and others, the Soviets got as far as Berlin, a clear threat to Franco but still remote from Madrid because a fortunate convergence of circumstances and opportunism had saved Franco from sharing the fate of so many other petty dictators who allied, or were forced to ally, themselves with Hitler. That combination of circumstances would mean that the dynamics of Spanish politics would take a very different path from that of Western Europe. In Spain, freedom and order would continue to be oppose each other, whereas most of Western Europe was to have the strength of arms and time on its side. There was to be neither another Spanish Civil War — the atavis- tic catastrophe imagined by British and American diplomats and feared by the majority of Spaniards — nor the restoration of the monarchy, nor a return to democracy. A few workers in Barcelona and the Basque country celebrated the Allied victory on 8 May 1945, the day of the Nazi surrender, with spontaneous strikes in transportation and in factories, repeating the perform- ance with the Allied victory over Japan in August, but these were only isolated gestures. It was their way of saluting the liberation of Europe: a liberation which would not reach Spain, where Franco’s peace — the peace of hunger and daily fears — was beginning to wait patiently for the East–West conflict to make good its 1939 victory. The violence with which it was achieved, the resentment it left in Spanish society, and the privileges it safe- guarded, were at that time more powerful than any possible agenda for political change. The fear of the future had won, and with it, Franco: a head of state who founded his regime on brutal division of the country. But Francoism’s political victory was also born of the unpopularity of party politics after the terrible experience of the Civil War and the subsequent failure of the opposition to unite and destroy the dictatorship. With this delegitimization of politics as an instrument of change, and encouraged by the regime itself, apathy and conformism were to seize hold of Spanish society and dominate the political sphere for many years. The certainty that political change meant more violence overshadowed any con- sideration of the possible advantages it might bring. Moral judge- 408 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 ments about the regime were dissociated from political action. Dissent was thus silenced or, if one prefers, neutralized, while the regime could count on the consensus of its supporters to maintain it. Franco had saved himself by not being able to fulfil his desire for war. The Spaniards were now forced to survive three decades more of his Peace.

Notes

1. For an analysis of the material destruction caused by the Civil War in com- parison with that caused by the Second World War, see Jordi Catalán, La economía española y la Segunda Guerra Mundial (Barcelona 1995), 54–5. 2. For the most recent data on political repression during this period see Santos Juliá, ed., Víctimas de la Guerra Civil (Madrid 1999). For issues around the historical memory of the Civil War, see Palomar Aguilar Fernández, La memoria histórica de la Guerra Civil Española, 1936–1939 (Madrid 1995). 3. For example, see the fears and vain hopes of peace among Germans on the eve of the attack on Poland in Ian Kershaw, Hitler. 1936–45. Nemesis (London 2000), 200–24. On pacifist attitudes among Spaniards, see Francisco Sevillano Calero, Ecos de papel. La opinión de los españoles en la época de Franco (Madrid 2000), 52–3. 4. Examples include: Carlton Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain (New York 1945); Emmet Hughes, Report from Spain (New York 1947); Willard Beaulac, Franco: Silent Ally in World War II (Carbondale 1986); François Pietri, Mes années d’Espagne (Paris 1954); Pedro Theotonio Pereira, Memórias postos em que servi e algunas recordaçoes pessoais, 2 Vols. (Lisbon 1973); and without any doubt the most famous, Viscount of Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), Ambassador on Special Mission (London 1946). 5. For an analysis of the term, see Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich. Bavaria 1933–1945 (Oxford 1984). 6. For an overview of formative factors under Franco, see Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, Las políticas de la Victoria. La consolidación del Nuevo Estado franquista (Madrid 2000). 7. In this respect we ought to contrast the ‘consensus’ (the term is debatable) achieved in fascist Italy in the early 1930s with the rapid and (in hindsight) tragic fall of Mussolini. For the former, see Renzo de Felice, Mussolini il Duce. Gli anni del consenso, 1929–1936 (Turin 1974). For the evolution of the image of the dictator and his regime, Luisa Passerini, Fascism in Popular Memory. The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working Class (Cambridge 1987). 8. In present-day Catalonia, the nationalist right has reclaimed the past of many important people from the Francoist period, ‘discovering’ that they had always worked for Catalonia and even for democracy, something which almost nobody realised at the time. Ignasi Riera, Los catalanes de Franco (Barcelona 1998), 29–30. 9. For the Seville area, see for example Alfonso Lazo, Retrato de fascismo rural en Sevilla (Sevilla 1998), 33–7, 40. In any case, Lazo’s work suffers from Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 409 important gaps, beginning with the limitations of his documentation, which is neither broad nor complete. Rafael Quirosa-Cheyrouze’s Católicos, monárquicos y fascistas en Almería durante la Segunda República (Almería 1999) is a good study, with plenty of statistical information on working-class recruitment by right wing parties. 10. Geoff Eley, From Unification to Nazism. Reinterpreting the German Past (Boston 1986), 269–71. 11. With respect to changes in political attitude among Spaniards during the Civil War, see the solid work by Ángel Bahamonde and Javier Cervera, Así terminó la Guerra Civil (Madrid 2000), 233–56. 12. For Navarre, see Martin Blinkhorn, Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931–1939 (Cambridge 1975). Fortunately, despite a now very widespread view of a Basque Country conquered by ‘foreign’ Francoism, some very useful studies are demon- strating how these views, drawn from a very ideologized reading of current politics, are a poor match for the complex world of loyalties, political cultures and social changes of the Navarro-Basque zone in the 1930s and 1940s, beginning with the anti-democratic and anti-modern feelings held by broad sectors of the peasantry, and of the nationalist, Carlist and españolista middle classes. See, for example, Javier Ugarte Tellería, La nueva Covadonga insurgente. Orígenes sociales y culturales de la sublevación de 1936 en Navarra y el País Vasco (Madrid 1998); José Javier Díaz Freire, La República y el porvenir. Culturas políticas en Vizcaya durante la Segunda República (San Sebastián 1993) and Aurora Villanueva, El carlismo navarro durante el primer franquismo (Madrid 1998). 13. Counsellor of Portuguese Legation in Spain to Foreign Ministry, 14 April 1939. Dez Anos de Política Externa, 1936–1947, Vol. II (Lisbon 1973), 264–5. 14. Italian Ambassador Gambara to Madrid, to foreign minister, Count Ciano, 26 December 1939, I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani [hereafter DDI] Vol. II (Roma 1965), 556–7. 15. Carolyn P. Boyd, Historia, Patria, Politics. History and National Identity in Spain, 1875–1975 (Princeton 1997) offers a magnificent study of the Spanish Right’s historical vision. 16. The ‘bible’ of Spanish imperialism at the time was José María de Areilza y Fernando María Castiella’s Reivindicaciones de España (Madrid 1941). 17. Sir M. Peterson to Viscount Halifax, 16 May 1940, Public Record Office [hereafter PRO] Foreign Office [hereafter FO] 425/417/58. 18. Paul Preston, Franco. A Biography (London 1993), 393–400, presents a detailed analysis of this interview from the Spanish point of view. For the German point of view, see Kershaw, Hitler, 329–30. 19. For a complete treatment of Franco and his entourage’s ambitions and state of opinion at the time of the Hendaye interview, see Preston, Franco, 374–400. 20. Chargé d’affaires, Madrid, Zoppi, to Count Ciano, 24 June 1940, DDI Vol. IV, 83. Even in France, sunken in defeat, the armistice was greeted with relief. Philippe Burrin, La France à l’heure allemande, 1940–1944 (Paris 1995), 39–40. 21. Memorandum, British Consulate, Seville, 23 August 1940. PRO FO 371/24508. 22. This communist line sought to conceal the strategic, political and territorial benefits which the Soviet dictator had received in the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. For most Spanish communists, isolated and despised, jailed or in exile, this was doubtless the most difficult period of their political life, to the extent to which 410 European History Quarterly Vol. 32 No. 3 many left the party in protest. Hartmut Heine, La oposición política al franquismo. De 1939 a 1952 (Barcelona 1983), 95–104. 23. Memorandum, British Consulate, Seville, 23 July 1940. PRO FO 371/ 24508. 24. German ambassador in Spain to Foreign Ministry, 14 April 1940. Docu- ments on German Foreign Policy [hereafter DGFP] Vol. IX (Washington 1950), 574–6. 25. Ambiente del puerto de Barcelona, 19 December 1940. Documentos in- éditos para la historia del generalísimo Franco [hereafter DIHGF] Vol. II (Madrid 1992), 462–3. 26. Antonio Cazorla Sánchez, Las políticas de la Victoria. La consolidación del Nuevo Estado franquista, 1938–1953 (Madrid 2000), 23–5, 31, 213, 214. 27. Memorandum by Mr Malley after his visit to the University College of the Escorial, 15 November 1940. PRO FO 425/427/152–5. 28. Pesimista informe de la DGS, 16 January 1941. DIHGF Vol. II-2, 19–22. 29. Sir Samuel Hoare to Anthony Eden, 16 January 1941. PRO FO 425/418. 30. Gran descontento contra la Falange en Barcelona, 5–1941. DIHGF Vol. II- 2, 137–9. 31. Carme Molinero and Pere Ysás, El régim franquista. Feixismo, moder- nització i consens (Gerona 1992), 72–7. 32. Requena, Información varia, 22 April 1942. DIHGF V. III, 342, 344–49. 33. In the cradle of Spanish fascism, Valladolid, the police estimated in June 1941 that of the workers at the Northern Spain Railway Workshop, some 60 per cent hoped for the war to end with an Allied victory, while the ‘more marxist elements, former members of the UGT and CNT, were more freely and openly politically active at work than a few months earlier, due to the increased possibility of doing so’. Información interior. Valladolid, 10 June 1941. DIHGF Vol. II-2, 181. 34. Report on tour by Wing Commander and Mrs James. Stayed at Seville, San Lucar, Arcos, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Tangier, Málaga, Almería, Cartagena and near Albacete. 28 January 1941. PRO FO 371/26896. 35. Sir Samuel Hoare to Anthony Eden, 30 January 1941. PRO FO 425/418/ 12–13. 36. Position in the Iberian Peninsula, 21 March 1941. PRO FO 371/26896. 37. Ambassador in Spain to German Foreign Minister, 6 February 1941. DGFP, Vol. XII, 36–7. 38. British Consulate, Málaga, 23 July 1941. PRO FO 371/26891. 39. Report on Local Conditions in Barcelona District, 16 August 1941. PRO FO 371/26891. 40. British Consulate, Seville, 30 July 1941. PRO FO 371/26891. 41. British Consulate, Seville, 20 November 1941. PRO FO 371/26891. 42. León. Situación de la provincia en el aspecto político, May 1942. DIHGF Vol. III, 516–22. 43. San Sebastián. Repatriación de voluntarios, 25 April 1942. DIHGF Vol. III, 345–7. 44. Sir Samuel Hoare to Anthony Eden, 24 February 1942. PRO FO 371/ 31234. 45. Información interior. Barcelona, 5 February 1942. DIHGF Vol. III, 249– 52. Cazorla, Surviving Franco’s Peace 411

46. Italian ambassador to Madrid, Lequio, to Count Ciano, April 1942. DDI Vol. VIII, 522–4. 47. Ramón Serrano Súñer, Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la Historia como fue. Memorias (Barcelona 1977). 48. Bilbao, 20 February 1943. DIHGF Vol. IV, 161–2. 49. Ramón Garriga, La España de Franco, Vol. I (Madrid 1976), 110; Carlton Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, 44–5. 50. Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy. Politics and Society, 1943– 1988 (London 1990), 39–71. 51. Informes acerca de la repercusión de la caída de Italia en medios políticos españoles, 17 August 1943. DIHGF Vol. IV, 366–74. 52. British Consulate, Seville, 23 November 1942. PRO FO 371/31239. 53. Informe sobre la situación en Marruecos, 3 September 1943. DIHGF Vol. IV, 393–7. 54. Memorandum from Ambassador Hayes in Spain to the US Secretary of State, 30 March 1943. Foreign Relations of the United States (1954ff.), Europe Vol. II, 366–74. 55. And this despite the fact that he was conscious of the obvious lack of deci- siveness on the part of these generals and the skill with which Franco manipulated their differences and weaknesses, as would be demonstrated when a combined action on their part, similar to the one which had caused Mussolini’s fall, was dismantled in September of that year. Paul Preston, Franco, 498–501. 56. Sir Samuel Hoare to Anthony Eden, 30 March 1944. PRO FO 371/39675. 57. Ibid.

Antonio Cazorla Sánchez is Assistant Pro- fessor of History at York University, Ontario, Canada. Her most recent book is Las Políticas de la Victoria: La Consolidación del Nerevo Esta do Franquista, 1938–1953 (Madrid 2000). She is currently working on a social history of Franco’s Spain.