INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent npon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zed) Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 TRIUMPH OF THE NULL THE WAR WITHIN THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND 1933 - 1945 VOLUME I DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Geoffrey P. Megargee, M.A. The Ohio State University 1998 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Williamson Murray, Adviser Professor Allan R. Millett Professor Alan Beyerchen Department of Histo UMI Number: 9911233 UMI Microform 9911233 Copyright 1999, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Geoffrey P. Megargee 1998 ABSTRACT The myth persists in the popular mind--due in part to the deliberate postwar efforts of some former Wehrmacht officers-- that the German high command's only failings occurred at the very top. According to this view, Adolf Hitler and a few men in his immediate circle, including Wilhelm Keitel and Alfred Jodi, led Germany to ruin, despite the superiority of the German army and against the consistent opposition of the General Staff. That latter organization has gone down in history as a monolithic, highly professional and anti-Nazi entity that planned campaigns with machine-like efficiency even while it abhorred the regime it served. Despite the command's obvious importance, however, and despite the wealth of primary and secondary materials on the Third Reich, its military and the Second World War, there has as yet been no comprehensive organizational study of the German command system. This study attempts to fill that gap by examining all the myriad overlapping factors that affected the structure and functioning of that system--the personalities, the conflicting and cooperating interests, traditions, practices and ii beliefs, as well as outside circumstances and events--using a combination of secondary literature and primary sources, including unpublished documents culled during two years of research at the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv in Freiburg, Germany. The sources reveal a picture of the high command that is thoroughly at odds with the popular myth. While Hitler remains the central figure in the decision to go to war and in many of the high command's strategic and operational decisions, his subordinates in the General Staff deser^/e a large portion of the responsibility for the war's instigation, nature and outcome. Also, the study reveals that the command was anything but a carefully designed, unitair/ structure. Its organization and functioning were the logical extension of more than a century of bureaucratic infighting. In the Second World War the Germans' high command system mirrored the characteristics of their wider war effort: efficiency and skill at the bottom that fell prey to chaos and incompetence at the top. Ill Dedicated to Ann Mohan Megargee 1922 - 1991 Dr. Charles Burdick 1927 - 1998 IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This study could quite simply never have reached comple­ tion without the help of a great many people. Pride of place must go to the late Dr. Charles Burdick, who suggested the topic for a Masters thesis, guided my first stumbling efforts, and continued to be a source of advice and encouragement until his death this year. My adviser at The Ohio State University, Dr. Williamson Murray, encouraged me to turn the thesis into a dissertation, honed my analytical skills, helped me to improve my writing, and provided a wealth of good advice on sources and interpretations. I am also especially grateful to Dr. Jürgen Porter of the Militàrgeschicht1iches Forschungsamt in Potsdam for the invaluable help he has given me over the years as well as for the hospitality and friendship he has extended to me during my trips to Germany. The same is true for Professor Dr. Bernd Martin of the A.lbert-Ludwigs-Universitàt Freiburg, who sponsored me for my Fulbright grant, allowed me to attend his weekly colloquium for graduate students, and tolerated my halt­ ing attempts at academic German. I would also like to thank the many professors and colleagues who have contributed to the work in a variety of ways: Allan R. Millett, Alan Beyerchen, John Guilmartin, Wilhelm Deist, Manfred Messerschmidt, Dennis Showalter, Oliver Griffin, Russell Hart, Kelly McFall, Richard Megargee, David Zabecki, Mark Grimsley, Heinrich Schwendemann, and Christian Hartmann. My sincere thanks also to the Fulbright-Kommission in Bonn and the United State Information Agency for the Fulbright grant that supported my research in Freiburg. The staff at the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv in Freiburg was of immense help during my time there; they truly establish a standard by which we should measure all such institutions. Thanks as well to Dr. Rolf-Dieter Müller and Dr. Hans-Erich Volkmann of the Militâr- geschichtliches Forschungsamt in Potsdam, who invited me to a conference on the Wehrmacht in September 1997 at which I picked up many valuable insights. The staff of the Ohio State University Libraries has always been courteous, helpful and knowledgeable. I would also like to thank the Department of History at The Ohio State University, both for the Graduate Associateship that made my studies possible and for the Ruth Higgins Research Fellowship that facilitated the completion of this work. Special thanks goes to General a.D. Johann Adolf Graf Kielmansegg and General a.D. Ulrich de Maizière for taking the time to meet with me and answer questions about their service VI with the General Staff. Both men provided invaluable background material that was available nowhere else. A host of others have helped in innumerable ways, often without even knowing. To my friends in Germany and the United States, thank you. Last, but really most: my thanks go to my father, Anthony Scherer Megargee, who inspired the twin loves of history and language that have brought me this far. These people deserve a great deal of the credit for whatever is good in this work. The errors are mine alone. V I 1 VITA November 4, 195 9 Born, Kingston, New York 1989 ......... M.A. History, San Jose State Univ. 1991-present Graduate Teaching Associate The Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS 1. Geoffrey P. Megargee, "Triumph of the Null. Structure and Conflict in the Command of German Land Forces, 1939-1945." War in History 4(1) (1997), 60-30. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History VI11 TABLE OF CONTENTS Volume I : A b s c r a c c .................................................... ii D e d i c a c i o n ................................................. iv Acknowledgmen.es............................................. v Vita viii Lise of Abbreviaeions .................................... xi Ineroduceion ............................................... 1 Chapeers: 1. The Developmene of ehe German Command Syseem eo 1933 13 2. Expansion and Debace, January 1933 eo November 1937 70 3. Converging Trends, November 1937 eo March 1939 123 4 . The Onsee of War and ehe Inieial Viceories, March 1939 eo June 1940 192 5. New Direceions, New Problems, June 1940 eo June 1941 238 6. Milieary Intelligence and ehe Planning for "Barbarossa" .................................... 279 7. Logiseics, Personnel and "Barbarossa" .............. 317 IX Volume 11 : 8. The Syseem Ac Work: A Week in the Life of Che High C o m m a n d ................................. 3 74 9. 1942: The Lasc Grasp ................................... 447 10. A Command Divided Against Itself, January 1943 co July 1944..... ........................ 500 11. Collapse, July 1944 co May 1945 552 12. Conclusion ........................................... 596 Appendix A: A Note on the Documents ......................... 606 Bibliography ............................................... 608 I n d e x ........................................................ 648 .1ST OF ABBREVIATIONS The reader should be aware chac in practice some abbreviations varied from document to document, e.g. WFA might be W.F.A., gK.Chefs might be gK.Ch. or g.Kdos. Chefs., and so on. A b t . Abteilung: branch (also used for 'battalion'