chapter 8 The Copenhagen Secretariat Pechmann, Shelley and Walter returned to a country that was in turmoil. Unemployment had increased in Germany from 8.5 to nearly 30 percent in 1932 while industrial production dropped by more than 40 percent. The nsdap had won a landslide victory in the July 1932 national elections and the party became the biggest one in parliament. The kpd, too, had won seats. Street fights between paramilitary units of the nsdap, spd and kpd paralysed public space. Violent clashes between the sa and the communists in Altona on 17 July 1932 resulted in 18 people dead, 16 of them by police bullets. The “Altonaer Blutsonntag” (Altona Bloody Sunday) triggered the German Chancellor Franz von Papen to declare a state of emergency on 20 July, dismissed the Prussian spd- led government of Otto Braun, and put Prussia under direct administra- tion of the federal government. New national elections followed in November 1932 with some losses for the nsdap and a slight increase of the kpd. The political crisis further escalated in December when President Hindenburg dis- missed Chancellor von Papen and replaced him with Defence Minister Kurt von Schleicher. However, von Schleicher’s ambitions to build up a coalition with the left- wing of the Nazi Party failed. Unable to form a coalition gov- ernment, von Schleicher resigned on 28 January 1933, and Hindenburg nom- inated Adolf Hitler as Chancellor of Germany on 30 January 1933. The German Parliament was dissolved the following day, and new elections were called for March 5. Neither the Comintern nor the kpd identified the national socialists to be their main enemy. In their view, the rationale of the ‘Class- Against- Class’- doctrine rightly identified the ‘social fascists’, the spd and its auxiliary organ- isations as well as the social democratic trade union leaders, to be their first target. According to communist logic, the “masses of the working class” would rally behind the kpd once the “treachery” of the spd had been revealed. The workers were called to form a ‘United front from below’ against the capitalist exploiters and their lackeys, the ‘social fascists’, any cooperation between the communists and social democrats was not on the agenda.1 1 See further Bernhard H. Bayerlein, “Deutscher Kommunismus und transnationaler Stalinismus – Komintern, kpd und Sowjetunion 1929–1943,” in Deutschland, Russland, Komintern. I. Überblicke, Analysen, Diskussionen, ed. Hermann Weber, Jakov Drabkin, Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Aleksandr Galkin (Berlin/ Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 225– 400. © Holger Weiss, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004463288_012 This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY 4.0 license. Holger Weiss - 9789004463288 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 09:26:04PM via free access 334 Chapter 8 The operations of ish Secretariat and the rilu Berlin Bureau were at first unaffected by the political turmoil in Germany. Focus was rather on recent developments in the Netherlands, on agitation among colonial sea- men, and the impending danger of a new World War. The two first issues were good news: Colonial seamen had launched an “uprising” on board the Dutch armoured vessel De Zeven Provincien. Although it failed, the rilu Berlin Bureau interpreted the uprising as a clear sign of the rising anti- imperialist mood among the Dutch colonial subjects, and ordered the Dutch revolution- ary trade union opposition to deepen its anti- colonial agitation and propa- ganda. Most importantly, the ish Secretariat called the Dutch revolutionary trade union opposition to launch a campaign in support of the 130 Malay and 32 Dutch seamen who were threatened by death sentence for mutiny,2 and published a call for an international support campaign.3 In addition, Shelley ordered in early February 1933 the Dutch section and the Rotterdam Interclub to organise a boycott and a campaign in support of the crew on board four Greek vessels in Rotterdam.4 The Hamburg Interclub, in turn, alerted its liaison persons on board vessels (Bordvertrauensleute) about an impending attack on the Einheitsverband by the shipowners, urged them to be ready for the next fight for the betterment of working conditions, and called them to organise ship cells and ship committees on board their vessels.5 The impending war danger, in turn, was the renewed tension in the Far East and – most important, according to Shelley – the increase of military ship- ments to Japan from England, France, the Scandinavian countries, and the USA. This was depressing reading about the failure of the communists to block or boycott the shipments, and Shelley urged the ish sections and Interclubs to reinforce their vigilance committees and harbour watches, and to organise mass demonstrations and mass protests especially against Japanese freighters 2 Brief an die rgo Hollands, 2[?] .2.1933, 534/ 6/ 62, 8– 10, rgaspi. 3 “Internationale Solidarität mit der Besatzung der ’Zeven Provincien’,” Rote Wacht 4, no. 2 (February 1933). In fact, the international campaign had been sanctioned by the ecci, see Aktionsprogram in Beziehung zum Aufstand in der holländischen Flotte Indonesiens, dated 13.2.1933, supplement to Protokoll (B) Nr. 294 der ausserordentlichen Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. ekki vom 11.2.1933, 495/ 4/ 230, 4– 5, rgaspi. 4 Shelley to “Chers camarades” at “La Conéderation génerale du travail unitaire, Athènes,” [Hamburg] 3.2.1933, 534/ 6/ 86, 186, rgaspi; Pamphlet: Aan de Rotterdamsche Havenarbeiders, 534/ 6/ 86, 188, rgaspi; Mimeographed call: Strike on Greek ships! Not one seamen as black- leg on board of this ships, 534/ 6/ 86, 189, rgaspi. 5 Richard Krebs, Merkblatt für Bordvertauensleute, no date, transcript enclosed in file of the Nachrichtensammelstelle Reichsministerium des Inneren, dated Berlin 25.2.1933, R 31.758_ Bd. 43, paaa. Holger Weiss - 9789004463288 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 09:26:04PM via free access The Copenhagen Secretariat 335 and Japanese imperialism.6 Shelley’s instructions was a response to Moscow’s criticism of the lukewarm anti- war efforts by the communist parties and organ- isations and the futile attempts to boycott the transport of war equipment to Japan.7 The ish Secretariat reacted promptly, and Albert Walter published a call to “maritime transport workers of the world,” claiming that the Japanese imperialists were heading towards the borders of the Soviet Union and that military equipment was loaded in British, French, German, Scandinavian and US American ports for transport to Japan: Block the shipments, form vigi- lance groups, and stop Japanese imperialism!8 It turned out to be Walter’s last proclamation. Besides, the situation in Germany also raised concern. Not totally unaware of the rising tide of Nazism in Germany, the rilu Berlin Bureau called its sections to launch an international anti-fascist campaign “on the basis of the broad- est united front tactic from below.” The slogans of the campaign, it ordered, were to protest against the recent development in Germany: Against fascism in Germany, against the bloody terror of the fascists against the working class and the working people, against the declaring illegal of the rgo and kpd, against the national chauvinism of the German Hitler- Papen government, and against the growing danger of war which, the rilu reminded, in the first place was directed against the Soviet Union.9 1 Evacuating Hamburg German public space constituted an uneven battleground for parties on the extreme Right and Left in February 1933. The Prussian Ministry of Interior was headed by a member of the nsdap who deployed the Nazi Storm Troops (Sturmabteilung, sa) as auxiliary police forces to quell communist activities. On 23 February, police and sa troops occupied the headquarters of the kpd in 6 Shelley “an die führenden Genossen der Sektionen der ish und Interklubs,” [Hamburg] 30.1.1933, 534/ 5/ 236, 9, rgaspi. 7 “Kriget i Fjärran Östern och kommunisternas uppgifter i kampen mot det imperialistiska kriget och interventionen mot Sovjet- Unionen. Resolution till kamrat Okanos referat,” in Det internationella läget och Kominternsektionernas uppgifter (Stockholm: Arbetarkultur, 1933), available at marxistarkiv.se. 8 An alle Wassertransportarbeiter aller Länder!, declaration signed by Albert Walter and the ish Executive Committee, Hamburg January 1933, säpo Äldre Aktsystemet 294 viii C 3 Interklubb och Röd Marin, Pärm 2, sna. 9 European Secretariat of the Red International of Labour Unions, Letter to “Dear comrades,” 3.2.1933, 534/ 4/ 460, 256, rgaspi. A copy of the letter is filed in 534/ 6/ 142, rgaspi. Holger Weiss - 9789004463288 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 09:26:04PM via free access 336 Chapter 8 Berlin, the Karl-Liebknecht- Haus; on 27 February, the Reichstag building was set on fire. Hitler accused the communists for the blast, declared a state of emergency “as defensive measure against communist acts of violence endan- gering the state” which unleashed an attack by the state against the kpd and its organisations. Assisted by its Nazi auxiliary police forces, the police arrested thousands of communists, including party leader Ernst Thälmann, in an attempt to crush the organisational apparatus of the KPD. Those who escaped the onslaught went underground or left the country. The assault against the kpd affected the Comintern and rilu bureaus in Germany as well. The police attacks in Berlin on 23 February were also directed against the offices of the West European Bureau, the League Against Imperialism and the rilu Berlin Bureau. However, while the police arrested the Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov – not knowing that he was ‘Neptun’, the head of the West European Bureau – on February 28, the members of the two other units managed to escape and went underground. The crackdown on the communist apparatus in Weimer Germany had been anticipated for years. The Cominern and rilu headquarters had reminded the German Party and its affiliated organisations as well as the var- ious international units such as the ish to prepare for illegality.