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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES CSC 30 / CCEM 30 EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS Fine Wine, New Label: Effects-Based Operations By Maj R.M. Haskins This paper was written by a student attending La présente étude a été rédigée par un stagiaire the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of one du Collège des Forces canadiennes pour of the requirements of the Course of Studies. satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. The paper is a scholastic document, and thus L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au contains facts and opinions which the author cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and correct for que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas policy or the opinion of any agency, including nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un the Government of Canada and the Canadian organisme quelconque, y compris le Department of National Defence. This paper gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la may not be released, quoted or copied except Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu de with the express permission of the Canadian diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette étude Department of National Defence. sans la permission expresse du ministère de la Défense nationale. Haskins 1 Abstract The concept of effects-based operations (EBO) has generated much hyperbole and marketing, with some analysts contending that doctrine published before EBO was akin to the Ptolemaic version of the universe, which saw the ancients believing that the Earth was at the centre of the universe. This paper demonstrates that characterizing EBO as new or revolutionary doctrine is to ignore historic examples of EBO such the Combined Bomber Offensive in the Second World War. It also shows the error in denying a close association that EBO shares with well-established principles of war such as selection and maintenance of the aim and economy of effort. Finally, it shows that the Law of Armed Conflict is replete with principles and examples which demand care and attention be paid to weapons selection and effects in operations. It concludes that EBO is neither radical nor new, but that in view of new technologies and weapons available to effects-based planners, better intelligence will be required. ________________________________________________________________________ In a paper written for the United States Air War College, Lieutenant Colonel Allen W. Batschelet proposes a definition for effects-based operations stating that they “represent the identification and engagement of an enemy’s vulnerabilities and strengths in a unified, focused manner, and uses all available assets to produce specific effects consistent with the commander’s intent.”1 In a strategic-level definition, the United States’ Joint Forces Command glossary offers the following definition: Effects-Based Operations (EBO): A process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or "effect" on the enemy, through the synergistic, multiplicative, and 1 Lieutenant Colonel Allen W. Batschelet. “Effects-Based Operations: A New Operational Model?” (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks. 2002) 5. Available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/effect-based-ops/ebo.pdf. Internet; accessed 29 April 2004 Haskins 2 cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.2 Perhaps most simply put, effects-based operations are those which focus on the “effect” one is trying to exert on the enemy, which use all means available and appropriate, and which do not necessarily seek to meet the enemy in a force-on-force battle. Effects-based operations may be able to force an enemy to comply with ones will, without necessarily destroying fielded forces. These kind of operations seem to some to evoke a more cognitive and intellectual approach to combat, and this focus on “effects” contrasts with “objective” based operations, which for many officers will conjure up non- manoeuvrist visions of attrition and annihilation. In the rush to adopt doctrine, simulation, war fighting, training and perhaps marketing philosophies relevant to the latest and most successful technologies, one of the trendy “revolutions” in recent thinking has been Effects-Based Operations. Many analysts, technologists, and academics, have written about the revolutionary changes that effects-based operations will and must have on the conduct and nature of warfare and military forces. In fact, according to the RAND Corporation, effects-based operations pose a “grand challenge” to defence analysts, and “current methods of analysis and 2 Joint Forces Command. “Joint Forces Command Glossary” (United States Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, VA.) Available at http://www.jfcom.mil/about/glossary.htm#E Internet: accessed 25 Apr 2004 Haskins 3 modeling are inadequate.” Furthermore, meeting “the challenge will require changes of mindset, new theories and methods,” and will take years to adapt to.3 In the rush to evangelize the concept, there is even some muddling and melding of concepts such as Rapid Dominance, and Parallel Operations with the Effects-Based Operations concept. According to Major General David Deptula, the wunderkind architect of many Desert Storm successes in 19914, “Effects-based operations have the potential to reduce the force requirements, casualties, duration of conflict, forward basing, and deployment of forces previously required to prevail in war. In short, the parallel approach changes the basic character of war.”5 Some smug proponents of effects-based operations compare non-believers to the unenlightened ancients, and compare “pre-EBO” doctrine to the Ptolemaic view of the universe, while holding their effects-based doctrine out as equally as revolutionary as Copernicus’ suggestion that Earth was not the center of the universe.6 3 Paul K. Davis, “Effects-Based Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge for the Analytical Community.” (Copyright held by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. 2001) page xiii. Available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1477/MR1477.sum.pdf . Internet; accessed 27 April 2004. 4 According to the current biography posted at http://www.af.mil/bios/bio_print.asp?bioID=5213&page=1 the then Lieutenant-Colonel Deptula was from August 1990 - March 1991, the “Principal Offensive Air Campaign Planner for the Director of Campaign Plans, Operation Desert Shield, and Director, Iraq Target Planning Group, Operation Desert Storm, Joint Force Air Component Command, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia” 5 Brigadier General David Deptula, “Effects-Based Operations: A Change in the Nature of Warfare”. (Aerospace Education Foundation, Arlington VA, 2002) 25. Available at http://www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf . Internet accessed 25 April 2004 6 Ibid. 17 Haskins 4 However, notwithstanding the enthusiastic cheerleading and fervour of some writers, it is my assertion that to characterize Effects-Based Operations as a revolutionary military doctrine is to be ignorant of our past, well-established principles of war, and the Law of Armed Conflict. This paper will demonstrate that effects-based operations are not new or revolutionary by offering historic examples of effects-based operations in both the air, and maritime environments. Further, the paper will link effects-based operations to well- established principles of war,7 showing that even though the concept may be labeled differently, it is a familiar wine with which most officers’ palates will be immediately familiar. The paper will also show that familiar principles underpinning the Law of Armed Conflict have encouraged EBO-like operations for quite some time. Finally, the paper will conclude that although effects-based operations are not new, due to the precision of the weapons now being employed in effects-based operations, there is a requirement for a greater understanding of an enemy, his culture, and his infrastructure systems. What this paper will not do is engage in a lengthy treatise on effects-based operations themselves. The paper will neither contest nor seek to show that new technology is enabling more rapid dominance in some environments or concentrate on demonstrating that parallel attack with precision weapons is allowing a greater breadth of simultaneous attacks using fewer resources. These precepts are not critical to, nor are 7 Canadian principles of war may be found at B-GJ-005-500/FP-000 CF Operational Planning Process 2002-11-06 (Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 2003) 1-6, 1-7. Available at http://www.dnd.ca/dcds/jointDoc/docs/opsPlanProcess_e.pdf. Internet; accessed 28 April 2004 Haskins 5 they necessarily component parts of, effects-based operations. What the paper does aim to do is to dispel much of the single-minded hyperbole that effects-based operations are new, that they are revolutionary, and that massive changes to our fundamental philosophies will be required to adapt to this alledgedly new and improved method of warfare. Notwithstanding the many modern effects-based zealots, there are also many who believe that we have been conducting effects-based operations for quite some time.