CHILDREN AND FAMILIES The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that EDUCATION AND THE ARTS helps improve policy and decisionmaking through ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT research and analysis. HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE This electronic document was made available from INFRASTRUCTURE AND www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND TRANSPORTATION Corporation. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS LAW AND BUSINESS NATIONAL SECURITY Skip all front matter: Jump to Page 16 POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY Support RAND Purchase this document TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY Browse Reports & Bookstore Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. JOHN F. SCHANK • CESSE IP • FRANK W. LACROIX • ROBERT E. MURPHY MARK V. ARENA • KRISTY N. KAMARCK • GORDON T. LEE LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE VOLUME II Lessons from the U.S. Navy’s Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia Submarine Programs Prepared for the United States Navy Approved for public release; distribution unlimited NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Navy. The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. Library of Congress Control Number: 2011939404 ISBN: 978-0-8330-5896-6 The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (http://www.rand.org/publications/ permissions.html). Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: [email protected] Preface The successful conduct of large, complex design and construction pro- grams requires personnel with unique skills and capabilities supple- mented with practical experience in their areas of expertise. This is especially true for the design and construction of new nuclear powered submarines. Unique design and engineering skills must be nurtured and sustained and program managers at all levels must be trained and educated to create the pool of knowledge and experience to conduct a successful program.1 In the past, the growth and sustainment of key technical and management personnel in the submarine community was facilitated through numerous sequential design and acquisition programs. Personnel participated in one or more programs, gaining experience to be the leaders in future programs. Due to increases in the operational lives of submarines and the constrained defense budgets faced by most nations, new submarine programs are occurring less frequently. There are now substantial gaps between new programs, providing fewer opportunities for personnel to gain the experience needed to manage complex processes and make informed decisions. Future managers of new programs may not have the benefit of learning from the challenges faced and the issues solved in past programs. Recognizing the importance of past experience for successful program management, the Program Executive Officer for Submarines asked the RAND Corporation to develop a set of lessons learned from previous submarine programs that could help inform future program 1 See Schank et al., 2005a; Schank et al., 2007. iii iv Learning from Experience, Volume II managers. This volume describes the important lessons from the Ohio, Seawolf, and Virginia programs. Separate volumes in the series provide lessons from the United Kingdom and Australian submarine programs and a summary of the lessons learned from all three programs: • MG-1128/1-NAVY, Learning from Experience, Volume I: Lessons from the Submarine Programs of the United States, United King- dom, and Australia • MG-1128/3-NAVY, Learning from Experience, Volume III: Lessons from the United Kingdom’s Astute Submarine Program • MG-1128/4-NAVY, Learning from Experience, Volume IV: Lessons from Australia’s Collins Submarine Program. This research was conducted within the Acquisition and Technol- ogy Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Com- batant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community. For more information on the Acquisition and Technology Policy Center, see http://www.rand.org/nsrd/ndri/centers/atp.html or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures ............................................................................. ix Tables .............................................................................. xi Summary .........................................................................xiii Acknowledgments ............................................................xxvii Abbreviations ...................................................................xxix CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 1 Organization of This Document ................................................. 3 CHAPTER TWO U.S. Nuclear Submarines Up to Ohio ......................................... 5 Historical Lessons in Submarine Acquisition ................................... 8 CHAPTER THREE Ohio Case Study .................................................................11 Background ........................................................................11 Setting the Requirements ........................................................15 Acquisition Strategy ..............................................................18 Designing and Building the Ohio-Class Submarines .........................21 New Facilities................................................................... 23 Workforce Issues ................................................................25 Quality Control Issues ........................................................ 26 Government-Furnished Equipment ......................................... 27 Design Changes .................................................................29 v vi Learning from Experience, Volume II Areas of Schedule Delays and Cost Growth .................................. 30 Schedule Delays ................................................................ 30 Cost Growth .....................................................................32 Life-Cycle Issues .................................................................. 34 Conversions to SSGN ............................................................35 Lessons from the Ohio Program ................................................ 36 CHAPTER FOUR Seawolf Case Study ............................................................. 43 Background ....................................................................... 43 Setting the Requirements ....................................................... 44 Acquisition Strategy ............................................................. 46 Designing and Building the Seawolf-Class Submarines ..................... 48 Facility and Workforce Issues .................................................51 Quality Control Issues .........................................................51 Government- and Contractor-Furnished Equipment .......................52 Design Changes .................................................................52 Areas of Schedule Delays and Cost Growth ..................................53 Life-Cycle