University of Tennessee, Knoxville TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 8-2013 RELIGION AND CONFLICT: WHAT EXPLAINS THE PUZZLING CASE OF “ISLAMIC VIOLENCE” AND ISLAMIST PARTY MODERATION? Suveyda Karakaya [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Karakaya, Suveyda, "RELIGION AND CONFLICT: WHAT EXPLAINS THE PUZZLING CASE OF “ISLAMIC VIOLENCE” AND ISLAMIST PARTY MODERATION?. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2013. https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/2441 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. To the Graduate Council: I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Suveyda Karakaya entitled "RELIGION AND CONFLICT: WHAT EXPLAINS THE PUZZLING CASE OF “ISLAMIC VIOLENCE” AND ISLAMIST PARTY MODERATION?." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science. Brandon Prins, Major Professor We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: Wonjae Hwang, Ian Down, Youshaa Patel Accepted for the Council: Carolyn R. Hodges Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School (Original signatures are on file with official studentecor r ds.) RELIGION AND CONFLICT: WHAT EXPLAINS THE PUZZLING CASE OF “ISLAMIC VIOLENCE” AND ISLAMIST PARTY MODERATION? A Dissertation Presented for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree The University of Tennessee, Knoxville Suveyda Karakaya August 2013 © by Suveyda Karakaya, 2013 All rights reserved ii This dissertation is dedicated to my husband Mahmut and my beautiful daughter Zeynep Neda. iii Acknowledgements I am grateful to many people that made this work possible. Though I cannot thank all of the numerous people who have contributed to this experience, a few deserve select mention. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Brandon Prins. He always enlightened my path with his patient guidance, encouragement and careful assessment. Also, I would like to thank my committee members Dr. Ian Down, Dr. Wonjae Hwang, and Dr. Youshaa Patel. Their advice and counsel have been of equal importance. I greatly appreciate their time and input to this dissertation. Furthermore I would also like to acknowledge with much appreciation the crucial role of Dr Ahmet Kuru, Dr Kadir Yildirim, and Dr Renat Shaykutdinov, who patiently reviewed initial drafts of this dissertation and provided very useful suggestions. Within the Political Science Department, I owe many thanks to my fellow graduate students, Amanda Sanford and Nurgul Aitalieva, who were always willing to help me. Last but not least, I would like to express my greatest gratitude to my husband Mahmut, who had been through the same challenging process, and earned his PhD degree just two years ago. You taught me so much about sacrifice, self-discipline, patience, and compromise. Finishing this dissertation would be a dream without your never-ending love, encouragement, and support. I feel very lucky and privileged to have you. iv Abstract Despite considerable interest in the relationship between Islam and political violence, there is little systematic empirical research that explores the intra-state conflict proneness of Muslim- majority states. Existing studies either offer inconclusive evidence of a relationship or suffer from methodological flaws. If we analyze the proportion of countries with large Muslim populations that experience domestic armed conflicts, Muslim-majority states do in fact stand out. What explains the prevalence of political violence in the Muslim world and to what extent does religion play a role in promoting violence? Under which conditions ethno-political organizations opt for violent strategies to achieve their political goals? Under which conditions Islamist parties denounce violence and shift from radical to moderate, pragmatist positions? These questions are yet to be fully addressed. In an attempt to fill a gap in the extant literature, this dissertation investigates the empirical nexus between Islam and political violence/nonviolence by specifically focusing on the incidence of domestic armed conflict, group-level political violence (such as insurgency, terrorism, and genocide), and party moderation. I explore the role of religion and Islamist ideology in driving political violence in the first two quantitative chapters whereas the qualitative chapter focuses on Islamist party moderation. I argue that religion alone does not necessarily make countries more or less conflict- prone. Socio-economic and political conditions usually determine the decision to resort to violence or alternatively to renounce violence and to moderate. Higher prevalence of repressive regimes, poverty, and youth bulges make Muslim-plurality countries very vulnerable to domestic conflict. The overall findings indicate that, contrary to suggestions and claims in the literature, neither religious fractionalization nor Islam promotes political violence once socio-economic and political factors are taken into account. Muslim-plurality states are indeed disproportionately v involved in domestic armed conflict, but these states are also characterized by lower GDP per capita, oil dependency, state repression, autocracy, and youth bulges, all of which correlate strongly with domestic armed conflict. Moreover, the analysis of Islamist parties suggest that Islamist parties respond to societal changes, renounce violence and moderate their radical ideologies when they are given a chance to participate in the political system. vi Table of Contents I. Chapter 1 a. Introduction………………………………………………………….……………1 b. Reference List……………………………………………………………………11 II. Chapter 2 a. The Puzzling Case of “Islamic Violence”: What Explains Prevalence of Domestic Armed Conflict in the Muslim World?.................................................13 b. Reference List……………………………………………………………………44 c. Appendix 1: List of Tables………...……………………………………….……51 d. Appendix 2: List of Figures……………………………………………………...60 III. Chapter 3: a. Ethno-political Organizations in the Middle East: When Do They Opt for Violence?..............................................................................................................61 b. Reference List……………………………………………………………………86 c. Appendix 1: List of Tables………...……………………………………….……89 d. Appendix 2: List of Figures………………………………………………….…..94 e. Appendix 3: Description of Variables…………………………………………...96 IV. Chapter 4 a. De-radicalization and Moderation of Islamist Parties…….………………..….101 b. Reference List……………………………………...…………………………...136 c. Appendix 1: List of Tables………...…………………..…………………….…142 d. Appendix 2: List of Interviewees………………………………………………144 V. Chapter 5 a. Conclusion…………………………………………………….....……………..145 b. Reference List…………………………………………………………………..158 VI. Vita………………………………………………………………………………….159 vii List of Tables Table Page 2.1 Summary of Variables……………………………………………………………………….51 2.2 Summary of Descriptive Statistics in Muslim-plurality and other countries…………..........52 2.3 Bivariate Regressions………………………………………………………….……………..53 2.4 Risk of Domestic Armed Conflict (1981-2009………………………………………………54 2.5 Correlation of Independent Variables………………………………………………………..55 2.6 Random-Effects Model………………………………………………………………………56 2.7 Relogit Model………………………………………………………………………………..57 2.8 Regressions with Muslim Proportion……………………………………………………….58 2.9 List of Domestic Armed Conflict……………………………………………...…………….59 3.1 Correlation of Independent Variables……………………………………………………….89 3.2 Summary of Variables……………………………………………………………………….90 3.3 Summary of Descriptive Statistics…………………………………………………………...91 3.4 Logistic Regression on Use of Violence by Ethno-political Organizations (1980-2004)…. .92 3.5 Alternative Model Specifications……………………………………………………………93 4.1 Arguments on Islamist Moderation in the Literature………………………………………142 4.2 Summary of Cases………………………………………………………………………….143 viii List of Figures Figure Page 2.1 Repression and the Predicted Probability of Intra-state Conflict…………………………....60 3.1 Probability of Violence in Autocratic and Non-Autocratic Countries………………………94 3.2 Youth Bulges and Predicted Probability of Use of Violence………………………………..95 ix CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1 In December 2010, a Tunisian vegetable peddler burned himself to death as a protest after his cart is taken away by police. This incident created a spillover effect of violent and nonviolent protests in many Middle Eastern countries, and initiated the Arab Spring. So far, the Arab Spring successfully toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya while the protests in Syria transformed into a bloody civil war. Both academicians and policy makers are wondering about the causes of these ongoing protests and the cycle of violence in the Middle East. In fact, it is not uncommon to see politically oriented violence in the Middle East, as well as in other parts of the Muslim world. While some scholars argue that unfavorable socio-economic and political conditions such as state repression, income inequality, and unemployment are driving violence in the