INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE RUSSIA AND THE DILEMMAS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT Edited by Alexei Arbatov, Vladimir Dvorkin and Sergey Oznobishchev Moscow IMEMO RAN 2012 УДК 327.37(470) ББК 66.4 (2 Рос) Rus 95 Authors: Alexei Arbatov (I.4, I.5; II.4; III.2, III.3; IV.2; V.1, V.2; VI.4, VI.9), Vladimir Baranovsky (VI.10), Vladimir Dvorkin (I.1, I.2; II.2; III.1; IV.1; VI.1, VI.8), Anatoly Dyakov (V.4), Victor Yesin (VI.6), Raymond Jeanloz (VI.2), Edward Ifft (VI.5), Sergey Oznobishchev (I.3; II.3; III.4; IV.2), Alexander Pikaev (I.3; IV.3, IV.6), Jules Silberberg (II. 1), Viktor Slipchenko (V.3), Peter Topychkanov (IV.7), Malcolm Chalmers (VI.3), James Acton (VI.7). Rus 95 Russia and the Dilemmas of Nuclear Disarmament / Eds. A.G. Arbatov, V.Z.Dvorkin, S.K.Oznobishchev. – M.: IMEMO RAN, 2012. – 264 p. ISBN 978-5-9535-0330-3 This book embraces the topics analyzed under the joint project implemented by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Inc. (NTI) and titled “Russia and the Deep Nuclear Disarmament”. This research report was commissioned by the Nuclear Security Project (NSP) of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). For more information see the NSP website at http://www.nuclear security.org. The views expressed in this paper are entirely the authors' own and not those of the IMEMO or NSP. The book is intended for specialists in international relations and security and the public in general. To view IMEMO RAN publications, please visit our website at http://www.imemo.ru ISBN 978-5-9535-0330-3 © IMEMO RAN, 2012 CONTENTS PREFACE ....................................................................................................................7 INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................11 PART I. STRATEGIC STABILITY AFTER THE COLD WAR I.1. Strategic stability in the cold war era...............................................................13 I.2. Factors affecting strategic stability ..................................................................17 I.3. Destabilizing factors in the new environment..................................................23 I.4. Russia’s perceptions of the United States military policy................................25 I.5. China and stability............................................................................................27 PART II. СONTEMPORARY NUCLEAR DOCTRINES II.1. US nuclear posture review 2010.....................................................................41 II.2. Russia’s nuclear strategy ................................................................................45 II.3. Evolution of NATO nuclear doctrine .............................................................50 II.4. Comparative analysis of modern nuclear doctrines ........................................58 PART III. NON-NUCLEAR FACTORS OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT III.1. Prospects for cooperation between Russia and US on ballistic missile defense..............................................................................................65 III.2. Strategic offensive conventional weapons ....................................................72 III.3. Space weapons...............................................................................................82 III.4. Nonarmament of space..................................................................................88 PART IV. REGIONAL PROBLEMS OF DISARMAMENT IV.1. Russia and NATO after the cold war ............................................................95 IV.2. European security: searching for a new architecture...................................103 IV.3. Non-strategic nuclear weapons ...................................................................109 IV.4. Russia, NATO and BMD programs ............................................................119 IV.5. NATO and the prospects of the CFE Treaty ...............................................123 IV.6. Third nuclear states .....................................................................................131 IV.7. Middle and Far East, South Asia.................................................................135 PART V. NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION V.1. Dialectics of disarmament and non-proliferation .........................................146 V.2. Issues of strengthening the NPT...................................................................155 V.3. Prohibition of nuclear tests ...........................................................................162 V.4. Nuclear warheads and weapon-grade materials ...........................................170 6 CONTENTS PART VI. PROSPECTS FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE VI.1. Transforming nuclear deterrence through cooperation in BMD .................179 VI.2. Prospects of cooperative BMD and nuclear deterrence ..............................182 VI.3. Cooperation on BMD: possibility not panacea ...........................................185 VI.4. Mutual renunciation of the launch-on-warning concept .............................192 VI.5. Reducing the operational readiness of ballistic missiles ............................200 VI.6. Transforming nuclear deterrence through transparency..............................206 VI.7. Transparency and strategic stability............................................................210 VI.8. The Prague START Treaty and the prospects of further arms reductions.....218 VI.9. The powers' foreign and military policy as a factor of disarmament ..........223 VI.10. Ensuring peace and stability on the way to nuclear disarmament.............235 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................242 ATTACHMENTS Attachment 1.Articles of the prominent public figures of USA and Russia.........251 Attachment 2. Table. Variants of military doctrine. Role of nuclear weapons.......259 ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................260 PREFACE This book outlines the main results of the joint project implemented by IMEMO RAN and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) in 2010-2011. Its principal objective was to provide expert analysis of opportunities for transition to deep nuclear disarmament and the major obstacles to that. In Russia and the US, as well as in other P-5 states a belief has been widely spread that only nuclear weapons continue to reliably guarantee national security. Unfortunately, this viewpoint is also shared by the so-called new nuclear-weapon states, i.e. countries that have acquired nuclear weapons in different ways in the recent ten years, and the nations that are only striving for it. Meanwhile, several important considerations make the universal character of these conventional truths seem quite doubtful. Now that the Cold War is over, with the current globalization and increasing global interdependency (to which the current economy crisis has been yet another illustration), nuclear deterrence seems to prevent the threats of the past, the 20th century threats. That is to say, it prevents deliberate nuclear or massive conventional attacks of major powers or their alliances against each other. This threat is now extremely low in its prob- ability and significance. At the same time, nuclear deterrence does not address the real threats of modern times, such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, ethnic and religious conflicts, to say nothing of the issues related to climate, environment, illegal migration, epi- demics, trans-border crime, etc. As to the dependence of Russia’s security on nuclear weapons, this concept also seems to be rather superficial in practice. It should be remembered that by the time the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Soviet Union collapsed, Mos- cow had 5 to 7 times more nuclear weapons than today’s Russia. One has to have no faith at all in the Russian people to regard nuclear weapons (most of which are a Soviet legacy) as the sole attribute of Russia as a great power. This would imply an assumption that Russia is non-competitive either in terms of economy, re- search and development innovations, or in terms of improving the citizens’ well- being and political life, as well as in terms of advanced general-purpose forces and conventional arms. In the changing politico-military environment, the perception of strategic stability has significantly expanded as compared to the Cold War era in view of new threats and destabilizing factors. The essence of today’s and future strategic stability requires major adjustment. The contributors to the project have devel- oped and discussed in this book a whole set of pertinent suggestions. 8 PREFACE The signing of a new START Treaty has become an important milestone on the way towards further arms reductions and limitations. This is obviously an im- portant event both in terms of unprecedentedly low levels set forth for the strate- gic weapons of the parties and in terms of the two powers’ resuming the legal co- operation in this area that was suspended for more than a decade. The recent history vividly demonstrates that the processes related to nego- tiations and agreements on nuclear disarmament between Russia and the US should be continuous and consistent. Deadlocks and standstills in the negotiations inevitably lead to the loss of mutual understanding