Journal oj Semantics 11:311-363 © N.I.S. Foundation (1994) Topicalization, Scrambling, and Argument Scope in German: Integrating Semantic and Syntactic Information ANATOLI STRIGIN Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jos/article/11/4/311/1640111 by guest on 01 October 2021 Max-Planck Research Group 'Structural Grammar', Berlin Abstract The paper proposes an explanation of some argument scope phenomena in German in terms of interaction of syntactic and semantic information. On the assumption that lexical semantics of a verb induces a hierarchical ordering on its arguments, it is proposed that this hierarchy together with the mapping of the hierarchy to syntactic structure define a basic scope con- figuration. The mapping is controlled both by syntactic and by semantic information. Another hypothesis proposes that changes in the syntactic structure caused by topicalization and scrambling extend the mapping by assigning a specific role to the traces of the moved DPs. The traces can either have the semantic type of DPs or the type of individuals. This typing ambiguity yields two options: either the DP is semantically reconstructed into its original argument position, or the domain of the mapping of verbal arguments is extended. The options correspond to the narrow and the wide scopes of an argument, scope being expressed at the level of Discourse Representation Structures. This treatment of German facts is more restrictive than the ones based on Cooper storage, Logical Form, or Flexible Type Assignment, o INTRODUCTION: SCOPE ASSIGNMENT AT THE LEVEL OF SEMANTIC FORM o. 1 A brief review of the subject matter The phenomenon of scope in natural language as it is understood in this paper is due to dependencies between mental constructs—semantic representations. The dependencies which are of interest in this sense reflect dependencies of verifiability conditions for representations corresponding to propositional structures. In other words, they define what may be called truth-conditional scope. The main aim of the paper is to provide a technical outline of a theory of how argument scope is computed in this framework for a small fragment of German. An argument in the context of this paper is simply a determiner phrase (DP) which is assigned a 0-role by some syntactic constituent. The term argument scope refers to the dependencies in propositional representations introduced by arguments; that is to say, in the case, of some first order sentence of the form predicate (a, b) with two individual constants a and b, possible 312 Topicalizarion, Scrambling, and Argument Scope in German interpretations of b can be required to depend on those of a inasmuch as any mapping of [a, b) to a model which is allowed to vary in letting b denote different individuals must observe some fixed interpretation of a, but a can vary irrespective of b, e.g. if it is required that for every embedding/ of a into some model M there must be an embedding £ oft into M with the additional requirement that£ should agree with/wrt. a. I take this to be the core case of argument scope, and the question usually asked in this connection is which Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jos/article/11/4/311/1640111 by guest on 01 October 2021 factors determine it. There are a number of treatments of argument scope, both in model theoretic semantics, e.g. Cooper (1983), Hendriks (1990), and in representa- tional theories, e.g. May (1977, 1985). There is also a recent proposal in the framework of Discourse Representation Theory, DRT, by Reyle (1993); Frank & Reyle (1992). This introduction is devoted to motivating yet another attempt to formulate mechanisms and principles of argument scope assignment. Since both semantic means and syntactic factors of scope assignment are reasonably well understood, the emphasis of any such attempt should be on the ways these two aspects are interrelated. To explain where exactly the emphasis of the present proposal lies, I will start by briefly reviewing some theories, beginning with the representational theory which has the widest currency: May's theory of scope determination at the level of Logical Form with the rule of Quantifier Raising (May 1977, 1985, 1991). According to May (1991), any language has its logical form—the representa- tion of the form of the logical terms of a language. May characterizes logical terms as those expressions of the language which have, in some sense, invariant meanings. Their fixed meanings (i.e. those aspects of their meanings which are not lexical) arise from their being interpreted by general semantic rules. Thus, the rules for quantifiers have pattern-matching preconditions for their applica- tion which require the distinction between a sentence and a sentential function. This requires, in turn, that the mechanisms of interpretation be able to dis- tinguish free occurrences of variables from bound occurrences, hence the notion of binding. Binding requires the notion of scope, so scope in the sense of May is the domain of binding. A logical form is then a representation of those formal properties which are required to ensure proper application of the general semantic rules. A level of linguistic representation will be (a representa- tion of) logical form only if it manifests these properties. May argues that there is a syntactic level of representation, LF, and his central claim, an empirical discovery, is that the part of the grammar which deals with the syntax provides enough structure at LF for general semantic rules to use in the truth definition. This makes introduction of any other representational means for the purpose superfluous. Argument scope is defined at LF by the c-command configuration of syntactic representations of arguments arising after the application of the rule of Quantifier Raising (QR), which is a particular instance of the syntactic Anatoli Strigin 313 rule known as 'move a'. The configuration of c-command between arguments is claimed to provide enough information for the application of the recursive rules. Thus the sentence Everyone admires someone is claimed to be scope ambiguous due to the fact that (i) (1) [s someone; [s everyonej [s e-t admires ?;]]] is a structure of symmetrical c-command between the two quantified deter- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jos/article/11/4/311/1640111 by guest on 01 October 2021 miner phrases someone and everyone which permits different orderings of the iterative application of the semantic quantifier clauses. Both DPs have been moved from their respective positions by the rule QR, and adjoined to an S node (bracketed expressions are used to denote uninterpreted syntactic structures). Note that binding here is effected by syntactic constituents. Similarly, domains of binding, as well as sentential functions and free variables, are syntactically defined. If, however, Logical Form is equipped with ^.-abstraction, and semantic types as in Williams (1977) (I am not quite sure about Williams 1986), I prefer to consider these proposals at a level of semantic representation rather than at a purely syntactic level which is subject to semantic constraints. In other words, I consider semantically motivated types of expression and the presence of a semantic binding operation (like ^.-abstraction or some equivalent of it) to be jointly characteristic of a semantic rather than a syntactic level of representation, though inasmuch as the word 'semantic' does not refer to any object of a non-representational character in this context, some researchers see it as more appropriate to consider any such representation level as syntax. There are arguments against the syntactic level of LF (see Berman & Hestvik 1991 for a recent critical survey of arguments for and against LF). In particular, it was claimed that the rule QR is not the right device to produce the relevant configurations. For example, QR presumably also predicts scope ambiguities in (2) many cellists played few variations which it does not seem to show. Such behaviour is typical of quantified DPs based on determiners which differ in their logical properties from someone or everyone. LF is too permissive here. Furthermore, some authors (e.g. Frey 1993) have argued that argument scope in German is implicitly represented at S-structure (see also Diesing 1992), and claimed that LF predictions for German are incorrect in a number of cases. The qualification 'implicitly' indicates that relative scope of quantifiers must be calculated from S-structure in German, and is not described by a simple pattern. Inasmuch as this claim is supported, the role of LF as a language-inde- pendent level of representation is dubious. The work of Frey will be reviewed in more detail later. 314 Topicalization, Scrambling, and Argument Scope in German Objections against QR, and against LF, in general stimulated the search for alternative means to represent relative scope of quantified DPs. One of the best known is the device of quantifier storage (Cooper 1983), which is a purely semantic means of dealing with the problem. Purely semantic here is meant to characterize any approach which assumes no special level of representation for scope, no syntactic ambiguity to reflect scope ambiguity, and in general no constraining influence of syntax on scope configuration over and above provid- Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/jos/article/11/4/311/1640111 by guest on 01 October 2021 ing some constituent structure, but which tries to manipulate model theoretic constructs. The version developed in Cherchia (1988) makes provisions for some syntactic constraints. It should be noted that quantifier storage produces an impression of being not quite as explanatory as Logical Form. The following illustration is the one adapted from Chierchia (1988). The essence of Cooper's technique is a discontinuous operation of variable binding using a special information structure which stores interpretations of quantified phrases and their binding indices.