Militia and Insurgency Violence: The Politics of Sectarianism in Iraq Omar Aziz 260212841 Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec, Canada August 2018 A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts © Omar Aziz Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... v Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Research Puzzle .......................................................................................................................... 1 Relevance of the Study: Transcending the Sunni-Shiite Dichotomy .......................................... 1 The Outline ................................................................................................................................. 3 Chapter 1 ......................................................................................................................................... 5 The Literature.............................................................................................................................. 5 The Iraqi Context Briefly ........................................................................................................ 5 Why do people rebel? ............................................................................................................. 6 The Causes of Sectarian Conflict .......................................................................................... 12 Peacebuilding in post conflict fragile societies ..................................................................... 16 What is violence and why do people use it? ......................................................................... 18 The Dominant Theory on Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Objectives and Tactics ....... 18 Methodology and its Weakness ................................................................................................ 27 The Methodology .................................................................................................................. 27 The Problem with the Methodology ..................................................................................... 29 Chapter 2 ....................................................................................................................................... 31 The Objectives of ISIS, PMF, and JRTN ................................................................................. 31 ISIS’ Objective...................................................................................................................... 31 PMF’s Objective ................................................................................................................... 32 JRTN’s Objective.................................................................................................................. 34 Where do the PMF, ISIS and JRTN operate and why is it important? ................................. 35 Analysis..................................................................................................................................... 36 Violence against civilians ..................................................................................................... 36 Remote Violence ................................................................................................................... 43 Battles which lead to gaining of territory ............................................................................. 47 Strategic Developments ........................................................................................................ 48 Headquarters or base established .......................................................................................... 50 Battles no change of territory ................................................................................................ 50 Non-violent transfer of territory ............................................................................................ 52 ii JRTN ..................................................................................................................................... 52 A note on the data ................................................................................................................. 53 A note of the appendices ....................................................................................................... 53 Chapter 3 ....................................................................................................................................... 54 Political Developments that Challenge the Sectarian Explanation of the Conflict .................. 54 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 60 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 63 Appendix A ................................................................................................................................... 83 Empirical findings of violence perpetrated ISIS ....................................................................... 83 Violence against civilians ..................................................................................................... 83 Remote Violence ................................................................................................................... 85 Battle ISIS overtakes territory .............................................................................................. 88 Headquarters or base established .......................................................................................... 88 Strategic Development .......................................................................................................... 89 Battle no change of territory ................................................................................................. 95 Non-Violent Transfer of Territory ........................................................................................ 98 Appendix B ................................................................................................................................... 99 Empirical findings of violence utilized by the PMF ................................................................. 99 Violence against Civilians .................................................................................................... 99 Remote Violence ................................................................................................................. 100 Battle PMF overtakes territory............................................................................................ 101 Headquarters or base established: ....................................................................................... 107 Strategic Developments ...................................................................................................... 108 Battle no change of territory ............................................................................................... 111 Non-Violent Transfer of Territory ...................................................................................... 113 Appendix C ................................................................................................................................. 116 The data on the violence by JRTN .......................................................................................... 116 iii Abstract The central research question this thesis addresses is the following: In cases where the state is weak, to what extent do sectarian identities explain the diverging and often converging objectives and strategies of various sectarian militant groups vying for political power and territorial control? In order to answer this question, this study focuses on the case of contemporary Iraq. The main argument of this thesis is that sectarian identities alone play little role in defining and determining the political objectives and military strategies pursued by various sectarian affiliated groups. I argue instead that it is the motivation of greed, which largely influences the behavior of many of the main actors in the Iraq conflict. However, I also argue throughout this study that while greed is a key motivation of the leaders of militant organizations, the rank and file members are largely driven by political, economic and social grievances. Consequently, as I demonstrate in this study sectarian politics is an outcome rather than the primary cause of the dynamics of violence in Iraq. More specifically, it is the presence of a state that is weak in political legitimacy as well as bureaucratic and military strength which has resulted in the politicization of sectarian identities in ways that have exacerbated forms of violence in the country.1 As such this thesis concludes that the ongoing conflict in Iraq is primarily a political struggle rather than a conflict over sectarian identity and culture and, moreover, differences in sectarian affiliation is not the most salient variable that explains