UC Berkeley JSP/Center for the Study of Law and Society Faculty Working Papers Title Some Well-Aged Wines for the "New Norms" Bottles: Implications of Social Psychology for Law and Economics Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3m13w0vm Authors Feldman, Yuval MacCoun, Robert J. Publication Date 2003 eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Feldman&MacCoun - 1/16 /03 - 1 SomeWell -AgedWinesforthe“NewNorms”Bottles: ImplicationsofSocialPsychologyforLawandEconomics YuvalFeldmanandRobertJ.MacCoun* Abstract In the last decade, the study of social norms has become a major focus of theory and research in law a nd economics. Surprisingly, this "new norms" literature has almost completelyignoreddecadesofsystematictheory,experimentation,andfieldresearchon normative processes by social psychologists. We demonstrate that there are multiple mechanisms by which normative influence operates, each with its own principles and consequences. We also identify a host of situational and dispositional (individual - difference)moderatorsthateitherattenuateoramplifytheeffectsofnormativeinfluence sources. Finally,weshowthattheinternalizationprocessismuchlessmysteriousthan some have suggested; it can occur through any of several well -studied processes. By taking these theoretical distinctions and moderators into account, the new norms literature wil l necessarily become more complex, but not necessarily chaotic or incoherent. Becausethesecomplexitiesarefactsofsociallife,acknowledgingthemwill allow the new norms theorist to improve their predictions and hence their norm - managementimplicatio ns. *Theorderofauthorshipisalphabetical.JurisprudenceandSocialPolicyProgram,SchoolofLaw, UniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley, 2240PiedmontAvenue,Berkeley,CA94720 -2150.Anearlydraft waspresentedataConferenceonthelawandeconomicofirrationalbehavior,November1 -2,2002, GeorgeMasonUniversity,Virginia. Feldman&MacCoun - 1/16 /03 - 2 I. Introduction FollowingElickson’sbook,OrderWithoutLaw,1lawandeconomicscholarshave taken the leading role in the legal scholarship of social norms. Dozens of papers have beenwrittenonvarietyoftopics,showingtheimportanceoftakingnormsintoaccount when studying the effect of legislation on people’s behavior. 2 Given the amount of review papers and symposiums, which have analyzed the current and potential contribution of the new norm -scholarship on legal scholarship, we will not attem pt to conduct a full review of the various ideas developed by scholars working in this scholarship. Scholarsofthelawandeconomicsofnorms(henceforth,“LENscholars”)have proposed various theoretical mechanisms. Ellickson has relied on the concept of reciprocity and reputation,3 citing it as the main reason that people engage in norms, hence arguing that norms could govern efficiently in close -knit groups or when reputations could be monitored. Following the reputation rationale, Posner 4 has argued thatnormsserveasameansofsignalingtoothersone’slowdiscountrateandthatthey could, therefore, serve as good business parties. Moving to a less instrumental and materialistic account of norms, McAdams argues that people’s primary motivation for following norms stems from their need for others’ approval to maintain their self - esteem. 5 Cooter goes even further, arguing that, ultimately, self -enforcing mechanisms areonlyensuredwhenpeopleinternalizethenorm. 6 1 SeeRobertC.Ellickson, OrderWithoutLaw:HowNeighbo rsSettleDisputes 9(Harv .Univ . Press ,1991 ) (“Orderwithoutlaw”) 2Forrecentvolumesdedicatedtothistopicsee ,forexample, Symposium,Law,Economics,and Norms ,144U.Pa.L.Rev.1643(1996); Symposium,TheLegalConstructionofNorms ,86Va. L.Rev. 1577(2000); Symposium,SocialNorms,SocialMeaning,andtheEconomicAnalysisofLaw ,27J.Legal Stud.537(1998).SeeCooter ,CornellL.Rev, citedat note 43 at906 : “Thedemonstratedimportanceof socialnorms tolawandtheavailabilityofanalyticaltechniquesfromeconomicshavecausedarenaissance inlegalscholarshiponsocialnorms .” 3 Elickson, OrderWithoutLaw , citedinnote 1; Seealso RobertM.Axelrod, Theevolutiono f cooperation (BasicBooks ,1984) ;Bernstein ,JofLegalStudies , citedin note 24 . 4 ThisisthegeneralthemeofEricPosner, LawandSocialNorms (Harv .Univ .Press , 2000 ). 5 RichardH.McAdams. TheOrigin,Development,and RegulationofNorms .96(2)Mich.LRev 338(1997) .Forapsychologicalreviewsee,RoyF.Baumeister&MarkLeary, TheNeedtoBelong: Feldman&MacCoun - 1/16 /03 - 3 The motivation for writing this p aper thus sprang from the fact that, in many cases,thisemergingliteratureistacklingquestionsverysimilartothosethathavebeen discussedbysocialpsychologistsforthepastseventyyears. 7MostLENscholarsappear torecognizethatsocialnormsh avebeenanalyzedbyothersocialscientists(especiallyby sociologists),butsuchanalysesarerarelyexaminedexplicitly,andearliernon-economic effortsareoftendismissedinpassingasprimitiveoratleastpre -scientific.Asaresult, this new lit erature has almost completely ignored decades 8 of systematic theory, experimentation,andfieldresearchonnormativeprocessesbysocialpsychologists. 9We find this omission to be especially puzzling when considering the great visibility of cognitivepsy chologyintheeconomicanalysisoflaw,anareaknownasbehaviorallaw andeconomics. 10 DesireforInterpersonalAttachmentsasaFundamentalHumanMotivation ,117(3)Psych.Bull.497 -529 (1995) 6 Robert D. Cooter , DoGoodLawsMakeGoodCitizens?AnEconomicAnalysis ofInternalized Norm s,86(8)VA.L.Rev.1577 (2000) 7WearehardlythefirsttotakeLENscholarshiptotaskforcasualscholarship.See TraceyL. Meares, CommentariesOnEricPosner'sLaw AndSocialNorms: Signaling,Legitimacy, andCompliance: AComment onPosner'sLawAndSocialNormsAndCriminalLawPolicy ,36U.Rich.L.Rev.407,408 (2002) . MarkTushnet, "EverythingOldisNewAgain":EarlyReflectionsonthe"NewChicagoSchool," 1998Wisc.L.Rev.579at584 . 8 Asamatteroffact,whilearguingthatpsychologistshavestudiednormsforlongerperiods comparedtoeconomists,itisappropriatetoadmitthatthesociology’sinterestinsocialnormsprecededthe thatofsocialpsych ologists (e.g.Durkh eim,aboutthecreationofnormsandcustomsbygroups ). PsychosocialexperimentalresearchgoesbacktotheexperimentsconductedbySherifin1936 see Muzafer Sherif , ThePsychology ofSocialNorms (HarperandRow ,1966, originallyp ublishedin1936 ).Aswellas thefieldresearchconductedbyNewcombinBenmingtonCollegein1943 see TheodoreMNewcomb, PersonalityAndSocialChange;AttitudeFormationInAStudentCommunity , (Dryden , 1943).These studiesarethemostwell -knownear lyworksofsocialpsychologistsintheareaofsocialnorms.Naturally thefocusofpsychologists(unlikethatofsociologists)wasmorefocusedonunderstandingthebehavioral processesunderlyingtheeffectsofnormsratherthanexploringthecontento rareasinwhichnormsare created. 9 EvencriticalscholarsofthenewL&Eapproachtosocialnormsdonottendtofindthelackof psychologytobeproblematic.Forexample Mitchell, TorontoL.Rev. citedin note 18 , at page 179, arguesthat :“formallytheprovinceofanthropologists,sociologists,economistsandphilosophers,lawyers havebeguntoattempttounderstandthenormsplayinorderingsocietyandsocialgroupsoutsidethesphere ofthenormspromulgatedbythest ate .” 10 DanielKahneman&AmosTversky, Choices,Values,AndFrames .39(4)Am .Psych .341 (1984);AmosTversky & DanielKahneman , TheFraming ofDecisions andThePsychology ofChoice .211 Science453(1981) . Feldman&MacCoun - 1/16 /03 - 4 Of course, historical precedence does not give one discipline sufficient justification to criticizeorpatronizemodelsdevelopedbyotherdisciplines.Wedonot contendthateconomicpsychologicalmodelsshouldreplaceeconomicmodels –indeed, existing psychological accounts have important limitations -- but that recent law and economics accounts of social norms would benefit from taking into account relevant princi ples and findings from social psychology. We will show that psychologists have alreadydevelopedelaborateandempiricallybasedanswersformanyofthequestionsthat lawandeconomicscholarsaredealingwithtoday. Our discussion of relevant findings wi ll be organized around three questions. First, how do norms operate? Some LEN scholars have recognized that a few basic normative influence processes, but we will show that social psychology has detailed numerousnormativemechanismsindetail.Second,when donormsoperate?Wewill identifyanumberofrobustgeneralizationsaboutclassesofsituationalanddispositional (individual -difference) factors that moderate 11 the norm -behavior relationship. Third, howdoesinternalizationoccur?LENscholars havetreatedthisquestionasacomplete enigma, but we will identify several well -understood processes by which actors internalizenormativemessages. Of course, we acknowledge at the outset that LEN scholars are concerned with importantquestionsthats ocialpsychologistshavelargelyignored.Forexample,cana rational choice model of human behavior explain why would people follow social norms? 12 Under what circumstances could norms govern efficiently, and when would stateinterventionberequired?To whatextentdonormsmediatetheeffectoflegislation 11Amoderatorisavariablethatdetermines themagnitudeorvalenceofarelationshipbetweentwoother variables,amplifying,attenuating,reversingorplacingboundaryconditionsonmoresimplistictheoretical principles.SeeReubenM.Baron&DavidAKenny. TheModerator -MediatorVariableDisti nctionIn SocialPsychologicalResearch:Conceptual,Strategic,andStatisticalConsiderations .51(6)J.Personality &Soc.Psych.1173(1986) 12 RobertSugden, NormativeExpectations:Thesimultaneousevolutionofinstitutionsandnorms . inAvnerBen -Ner &LouisPutermanEds , EconomicsValuesandOrganization 73 (CambridgeUniv. Press, 1998