Migracijske i etnicke teme 17 (2001), 1- 2:87-102 UDK: 323.1 (=915.7)(560) Pregledni rad Primljeno: 15 . 03.2001. Simon Haddad Faculty ofPolitical Science, Public Administration and Diplomacy Notre Dame University, Lebanon [email protected] THE KURDS IN TURKEY: CONTEXT AND CURRENT STATUS SUMMARY The paper proposes to examine two variables in connection with the Kurdish presence in Tur­ key: 1) the intensity of expression of Kurdish nationalism, and 2) repercussions of the Kurdish ques­ tion on Turkey. Three components pertaining to the Kurdish case in Turkey were constmcted from the literature: distinct cultural identity, political demands and socio-economic development. The pa­ per concludes that despite radical shifts on both sides, it is still questionable whether a solution to the enduring conflict could be reached in the near future. KEY WORDS: Kurds, nationalism, Turkey, political demands, socio-economic development, cultural rights, repression 1. Introduction Estimated at a population of 25 million, the Kurds are the largest nation in the world without its own state. They are an ancient and etlmically distinct people who have developed a common identity over the past 2,000 years. Bulloch and Morris (1992) consider that the ethnic composition ofthe Kurds is the result of mi­ xing with both Indo-European and pre-Iranian tribes. The Muslim conquest ofKur­ distan in the 7111 century introduced Islam among the Kurds and emphasized their political role. They have lived for thousands of years in an area, referred to on maps for centuries as Kurdistan, and which straddles the borders of Turkey,' 'Iran, Iraq, Syria and the former Soviet Union. Though none of the above-mentioned states has welcomed the prospect of an independent state for the Kurds, none has tried harder than Turkey to eliminate Kurdish identity. The history of the sizable Kurdish com­ munity in Turkey, where they comprise over 20 percent of the Turkish population (Dunn, 1995: 74), is an ancient chronicle oftragedies, massacres and atrocities. The founder of modem Turkey, Kemal Atatiirk, after exploiting the Kurds for years to fight and defend the Republic against external enemies, enacted a con­ stitution 70 years ago, which denied the existence of distinct cultural sub-groups in Turkey. All religious or ethnic identities other than the Turkish were seen as a chal- 87 Simon Haddad: The Kurds in Turkey ... , Migracijske i etnicke teme 17 (2001), 1-2: 87-102 lenge to the state. As a result, the Kurds were referred to as "Mountain Turks" and the area known Kurdistan became known as southern Anatolia. The Treaty of Sevres (1920), which had anticipated a Kurdish independent state, was never ratified. Un­ til the Gulf War in 1991, the situation of the Kurds remained unchanged. Twelve million Kurds live in Turkey today, but Kurdish cultural and political expression is officially banned. As an unwanted minority, the Kurds have been ignored, discri­ minated against, deported and persecuted by Turkish authorities. The history of the Kurds in Turkey is a history of war, repression, a history of small victories and great losses. The world paid little attention to the Kurdish catastrophe in Turkey, to the hopelessness and to the spectacular struggle of a people for basic rights and autonomy. This paper intends to investigate two primary variables, which are believed to influence the situation of the Kurds in Turkey. These concern: 1) the intensity of expression of Kurdish nationalism, 2) repercussions of the Kurdish question on Turkey. I intend to trace the evolution ofKurdish nationalism and to examine whe­ ther it was capable of making cultural, political and socio-economic demands. Cor­ respondingly, has the strong Turkish nationalism prevented Kurds from attaining their demands? Furthurmore, have recent political developments in Turkey impro­ ved the status of the Kurds in Turkey? True, international pressure to promote Kurdish rights and Turkey's desire to join the European Community have played a part in softening Turkish repression of the Kurds. Yet, as this paper concludes, the likelihood of a solution to the crisis is still remote, as the demands of both sides seem mutually exclusive. istanbul 0 RUSSIA Kurdish Ethnic Areas Ankar'l:,' : in the Near East TURKMENISTAN Konya 0 TURKEY 0 Mashhad LEBANON\ SYRIA / 0 ·...;t Dam ascus .>-- IZRAEL ' IRAN i i ·' ·, ., IRAQ : _/ JORDAN ' ., \} .... - EGYPT• / -- SAUDI ARABIA ............ --........ i " '··...... -~-·· -·· , KUWAIT 88 Simon Haddad: The Kurds in Turkey ... , Migracijske i etnicke teme 17 (200 I), 1-2: 87- 102 2. The emergence of Kurdish nationalism The first expression of Kurdish nationalism occurred during the 19th century when the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a process of centralization. Until then, the Kurdish Emirates had enjoyed virtual autonomy. The Kurds fell under Ottoman rule as early as the 16th century, but due to a special arrangement they were orga­ nized into Emirates (principalities) enjoying a remarkable degree of autonomy, al­ though subordinated to Istanbul (Yegen, 1996: 217). Attempts by the Ottomans to tighten their grip on the Kurdish Emirates provoked intennittent Kurdish uprisings (1808- 1839), all of which were unsuccessful: they lacked the support of the majority of the population (i.e. unlike European nationalism) and especially the participation of a strong administrative and political bourgeois class. In addition, Kurdish leaders were drawn into internal power struggles instead of being committed to the esta­ blishment of an independent Kurdish state. By the end of the 19th century, the primary result of Ottoman modernization was the erosion of decentralised aspects of Ottoman politics and hence the abolish­ ment of the Emirates, which had constituted a communal and organizational bond uni­ ting Kurdish tribes. This development resulted in tribal confrontations that the cen­ tral authorities failed to regulate (Yegen, 1996: 219). The situation provided for the appearance of new actors in Kurdish politics: the sheikhs. These tribal leaders played a central role in Kurdish rebellions, namely sheikh Ubeidullab's revolt in the 1870's, which aimed at establishing an independent Kurdish entity, is referred to as the first national uprising of the Kurds (Hazen, 1997: 56). The rebellion was ultimate­ ly crushed with the aid of regional and international powers (Randal, 1997: 156). In the second half of the 19th century the Kurds, just as other nationalities in the Ottoman Empire, were affected by nationalist sentiment. Kurdish intellectuals began to form secret societies aiming either at some form of decentralized admini­ stration of the Kurdish provinces, or full independence from the Ottoman Empire (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett, 1991: 55). However, in a basically tribal and rural society such activities were bound to fail without the backing of powerful tribes and strong leaders who could organize sufficient manpower in order to generate political change. The Young Turks' revolt in 1908 had first pledged to preserve equal rights for all ethnic groups residing within the Empire, but ended by banning all non-Turkish forms of cultural and political expression (Jamil, 1993):· The Ottoman Empire's engagement in World War I had adverse repef~us­ sions on the Kurds. Officially the war was waged against external enemies, but in practical tenns it was also directed against local enemies; i.e.'the non-Turkish spea­ king peoples in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans exploited the Kurds' religious feeling by describing the war as a holy war. They encouraged them to contribute and defend the empire against non-believers, hence provoking some Kurdish tribes to participate in the massacre of more than one million Armenians in the period 1915- 1916. Kurdish losses were also not negligible - 7000 were killed in that war (Michalowski, 1991 ). 89 Si m on Haddad: The Kurds in Turkey ... , Migracijske i etnicke teme 17 (200 l ), l-2: 87-l 02 After WWI, the Kurds were presented with an opportunity to form their own nation-state. Yet their efforts were fruitless. Neither the Treaty of Sevres (1920) nor the Lausanne Conference (1923) succeeded in securing an independent Kurdish state. After the establishment of the New Republic in 1923, the Kurds were conti­ nuously subjected to oppression by Atatlirk and his successors. 3. The Kurds in Turkey: a problematic existence The history of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey is really the history of the war between two nationalisms: Kurdish and Kemalist. Ever since the founding of modem Turkey in 1923, Kurds in Turkish Kurdistan were systematically repressed, perse­ cuted and fought against. The aggressive Turkish nationalism launched by Atatlirk, the "father of the Turks", and maintained by successive rulers, was until today the basis of Ankara's policy towards the Kurds. Atati.irk adopted a policy of assimilation or turkification, with the principal aim to abolish the Kurdish language and replace it by the Turkish. This objective is still today imaged as a "cultural mission", since Turkey considers Kurdish nationalism a challenge to the Kemalist vision. 3.1 The Atati.irk regime With the birth of the modem Republic of Turkey, the Caliphate was abolished; religious orders were abolished, history was written to suit the needs of the new state, the "Arabic alphabet" was discarded in favour of a Western one and a new dress code was adopted. After jettisoning the multi-ethnic character of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish government embarked on a radical nationalist programme that intended to redefine the Turk, the new citizen of the nation, and to help in the turkicization of non-Turkish minorities. The new nationalist ideology was unlike i.he Ottoman Em­ pire's, that had relied upon a more encompassing Islamic theme. According to Caglar Keyder (1997: 42), it was "defensive in nature where the nation was supposed to express homogeneity deriving from ethnic unity, and this unity would be expressed in a single voice". The Turkish Republic of Atatiirk was not only a secular state, it also.