Notes and References Chapter 1 Eden minute 2 July 1944 I'H O F0371/40696/U5407 (documents are at the Public Record Office, London. unless stated otherwise); War Cabi· net Paper (44)436 'Soviet Policy in Europe' 9 August 1944 CAB66/S3 (hereaft er cited as WI' with year, number and date); $tettinius report of mission to Britain, 7-29 Apri l 1944 Foreign Relalil)lIS or 1111' United SIMes 1944 (hereafter FRUS with year) vol. Ill, 10-11 ; K.G. Ross, Toreign Of· fi ce Attitudes to the Soviet Union 1941-45', 'Qumlll or CQlltempQf(lry His/ory,16 (1981), 538. Z W.S. Churchill, Till: Second World Wllr (London, 1948-54) vol. 3, 346, vol. 6, 250, 367-74. 3 D.C. Watt, 'Britain and the Historiography of the Yalta Conference and the Cold War', Diplomalic History. 13 (1989), 89; r.M. Carroll, 'A nglo. American Relations and the Origins of the Cold War: The New Perspective', OIl1(1(/j(1Il JOllmal o{ Hislory, 24 (1989), 206; G. Gorodetsky, SlIIflord Cripps' Miss ioll 10 Mosco w 1940-42 (Cambridge, 1984), idem, 'The Origins of the Cold War: Stalin, Churchill and the Formation of the Grand Alii· ance', TIl(' Russiall Rrvkw, 47 (1988), 145-70. 4 Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps, 96, 138-9, 164. 5 N. Tolstoy, Stalin's Secret W(If (London, 1983),287-8,338; S. de Mowbray, 'Soviet Deception &: the Onset of the Cold War. British Documents for 1943 - A lesson in Manipulation', EIICQllllter, 63 (1984), 16; J. ChaTlnl ey, ClllIrchi/J. Thr End o{Glory (London, 1993),455,467,612; A. Glees, Tile Secrets o{ Ihe Service: British Intellig('llce fwd COlIIlIIUllisl SUhlWsiQII 1939-5 1 (London, 1987), 51. 6 L Kettenacker, 'The Anglo·Soviet Alliance and the Problem of Germany, 1941 - 45 ' , luumal o{ Contemporary History, 17 (1982), 446; J,M. Lewis, C/wllgillg Dirrclioll. iMlisl1 Military Plallllillg {or l'osHvar Strategic /Je{eIlCt', 1942--47 (l ondon, 1988), 337; D. Fraser, A/(lIIhrooke (London, 1982), 450. 7 E. Barker, Clwrc/lill ami Edell at War (London, 1978), 221, 287, 291; W.M. McNeill, Amerim, Britaill a//(I Russia. Tllf'ir Cooperatiun (///(I Conflict 1941--46 (london, 1953), 536; M. Kitchen, Britisll Po/icy Towards I/Ie Soviet Union durillglhe SecolUl World War (London, 1986),271; V. Rothwell, Brilllill ami tlte Cold War, 1941-47 (London, 1982),4. 8 R. Cecil, review of Glees, Searls, in Intelligence (lnd Natioll(l/ Security, 3 (1988),342; T.H. Anderson, Tile United Stllles, Great Bri/llin (lnd Ille Cold War, 1944-47 (Columbia, MO, 1981), 182. 9 Lewis, C/wnging Direction, 139 note 95; Ross, 'Foreign Office', 528; Rothwell, Brilllill, 14 . 10 M. Kit chen, 'Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Sec­ ond World War', Hislor;m/loufl/al, 30 (1 987), 424-5; L. Aronsen and 172 Noles (/lid Referellces 173 M. Kitchen, Tile Origins o{/he Cold War ill COmp(If(l/iI'e Persp«liI't' (London, 1988), 86; Charmley, Clwrcilill, 507-8; Rothwell, Brilaill, 104. 11 Warner minutes 17 February 1942 F0371 /32876/N927, 30 August 1943 F0954/26A. 12 J.M. Lee, T/l1' C/lllrc/lill Coalitioll (London, 1980), 169. 13 The Government was anxious to prevent the left reaping any benefit from having been correct about the resilience of the USSR, but the 'stealing the thunder' campaign. which involved taking over the or­ ganisation of pro-Soviet events, also se rved the purpose of making the Government (especially its Conservative members) appear supportive of the USSR and thereby quieten criticism. The fO often regretted the uncritical pro-Soviet fervour, but there was no doubt that it was or­ chestrated by the Ministry of Information, MIS and Special Branch, who checked the credentials of all pro-Soviet organisations and ensured the non-Communist ones were favoured, Parker to Monckton IS July 1941, Home I'olicy Committee (HPC) meeting 4 September 1941 , INFI/ 676; P.M. H. Bell, la/III Bli/l a/1(/ 1/11' BI'(I(. Brillsll Pllvlic Opillioll, ForriSII Policy a/1(/ tlw Sovil't Ullioll, /941-45 (London. 1990), 42-5.56-66; M. Balfour. Prop"S(IIIt/a ill War 1939-45: Orgallist/tioIlS, Policies alld Polilics ill Britaill Will Germally (London, 19 79), 228-30. 14 D. Yergin, Siml/erni I'eace. Tile Or;sillS o{ tile CQ/d War (/lid tile NatiOllal SeCII,;t}' Stale (ll oston, 1977), Chapters I and 2. Chapter 2 f .S . Northedge and A. Wells, Brilaill a/1(/ Soviet Commullism. Tile Impact of a Revolutioll (London, 1982), 50-3. 62-73; R. Manne, 'The f-oreign Office and the Failure of Anglo-Soviet Rapprochement', lOI/(/Ial o{COI/­ lempvmry History, 16 (1981 ),736-7. 2 D. Lammers. 'Fascism, Communism and the Foreign Office 1937-39', lOllmal O{Colltl'lIJporary History, 6/3 (1971), 68; F. McLynn, Fitzroy M(ICleoll (London, 1992),26, 41 -3,51. 3 Neither of these important officia ls has been subject to biographical study. Th ey were both born in 1884, and had been in the FO since before the !=i rst World War. Charles Webster described Sargent as hav­ ing the views of the ro of around 1910, Webster diary 3 February 1946, BI.PES. Roderick Barclay found him 'cy nical. pessimistic and unconstructive, though very likeable'. Jebb thought him brilliant, bu t pessimistic and inclined to debunk theorisations. He had not se rved overseas since 1919. Cadogan was, again according to Jebb, cautious, conventional, 'clearly shy and repressed emotionally', and a methodi· cal worker not given to the more pa ss ionate viewpoints of his predecessor, Vansiltart. R. Barclay, Ernest Bevin mulille Foreign Office (London, 1975), 83; Lord Gladwyn, Tile MellJoirs of Lord Gladwyn (London, 1972), 70, 73; Bruce Lockhart diary \3 April 1943, in K. Yo ung, ed. , Tile Diaries of Sir Robert Bmce Lockhart, 1939-65 (London, 1980). 4 K. feiling, Tile Li{e of Neville C/Ulmbl'flaill (London, 1970), 425; Halifax comments to Dominions Ministers 1 November 1939 CAB 99/1; War 174 Notes ami Referellces Cabinet Minutes (hereafter cited as WM with the year, meeting number and date) WM(39)43rd 9 October 1939 CA B 65/2. 5 Collier memorandum 31 January 1940 F0371/24845/NI360; Sargent minute 24 March 1940 F0371/24843/N3363; Maclean pa per, 'I'ossi­ bilities of Allied Action Against the Caucasus' (draft) ud(undated) March 1940 F0371/24846/N3698; Kirkman and Hammond minutes 6 March 1940 W0208/1754; WM(40)66th 12 March 1940 CAB65/6. 6 Sargent memorandum 'The future direction of Soviet policy' 14 March 1940 F0371/24843/N3S38; M. Gilbert, Fillest HOllr. WillStOIl Chllrcllill 1939-41 (London, 1983), 49, 98, 100-1; Churchill conversation with Welles 12 March 1940 FRUSI940:I, 84. 7 Seeds to Halifax 21 March 1939 F0371/23061/C3968; J. Haslam, Tile Suy;et UII;OIl alld IIII' Struss/e for Col/ect;\'/' Security ;11 Europe 19.13-39 (London, 1984), 230. Gottfried Niedhart makes the important point that for the British the USSR occupied a peripheral position; there was underlying anti-Bolshevism, but no policy-makers built their policy around it; indeed the USSR was usually ig nored, at least until 1939, 'British Attitudes and Policies towards the Soviet Union and International Communism, 1933-9', in W. Mommsen and 1.. Kettenacker, eds, The F(lscist C/w//ellge 1/1111 tilt' Policy of Appel/semelll (London, 1983), 291; C. Keeble, Britain (1/1(/ IIII' Soyiet Ullioll, 1917-/989 (London, 1990), Chapler 6. 8 Collier to lIutler 18 March 1940 F0371/24846/N3313; Halifax, Full1ess of Duys (l.ondon, 1957), 207; d. Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps, 96. 9 Sargent memorandum 14 March 1940 F0371/24843/N3538. 10 Sargent memorandum 'Possibilities of further Soviet-German collabo­ ration' 17 July 1940 F0371/24852/N6029; circular to HM Representatives (HMRR), South-Eastern Europe 5 September 1940 F0371/24902lR7463; Sargent minute 28June 1940 F0371/24844/N5853. Lothian, Ambassador to the US, told Welles that the IIritish Government supported Cripps' view that the Soviets were increasingly apprehenSive regarding German victories, 18 June 1940 State Department rapers, US National Archives, College rark, Maryland, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG59) 711.61/739. II Maclean minute 25 May 1940, NID report 'Soviet Intentions in North East Europe' 20 June 1940, FO to Cripps 14 June 1940 F0371/24844/ N570!, N5808; Halifax conversation with Ambassador Kennedy 21 June 1940 1'0371/24761/NS862; Rose minute 26 July 1940 F0371/24968/ R675 I. 12 FO to Cripps 14 June 1940 F0371/24844/N5808. 13 Clutton minute 22 February 1941 F0371/29778/RI452; 1'0 to HMRR S. E.. Europe 28 February 1941 F0371/297791R211O. 14 Dominions Office to Smuts I November 1940 F0371/24845/N7046. IS FO to Cripps 2 December 1940 F0371/24848/N7348; Maclean sum­ mary 24 November 1940 F0371/24853/N7Z79; 2 Collier minutes 31 January 1941 F0371/29463/N373; comments on Cripps despatch 26 January 1941 F0371/29S00/N947; WM(41)20th Confidential Annexe (CA) 24 February 1941 CAB65/21. 16 The belief that Germany would not attack the USSR was built more on estimates of German aims and interests, and the Soviet desire to NQles llIul Re{crt'l/ces 175 avoid war, than on concepts of the natural affinity of Germany and the USSR: see Cavendish-Bentinck minute 27 March 1941 F0371 /26518/ C2919, cf. Gorodetsky, Stafford Cripps, 112- 14, and idem, 'Churchill's Warning',981. 17 Maclean minute 12 October 1940 F0371/24852/N6922: Halifax to Cripps 27 November 1940 1:0371/24848/N7323; Burgin memorandum 5 March 1941 1'0371/29498/N951. 18 Report by Wavell AIR2/l911; Martel conversation with Liddell Hart 6 October 1936 Liddell Hart papers, Liddell Hart Centre (LHC) LHII/l936; J.