tl^ •••(•••••it^p" Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2008 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/britishcampaigns02dane • ;.' . / CLIVEDEN LIBRARY Shelf Ct-^^'^IM^ Number -r^ Date taJL^L- ? '\\aldopf ASTOR lancy BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN THE NEARER EAST WORKS BY EDMUND DANE BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN THE NEARER EAST. VOL. I. THE DAYS OF ADVER- SITY. BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN THE NEARER EAST. VOL. IL THE TIDE OF VICTORY. BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN AFRICA AND THE PACIFIC. 1914-1918. LONDON: RODDER AND STOUOHTON BRITISH CAMPAIGNS IN THE NEARER EAST 4 1 9 — I 9 I 8 1 From the Outbreak of War with Turkey to the Armistice WITH 30 MAPS AND PLANS RY EDMUND DANE Military the Correspondent of "Westminster Gazette''' : Author of ** Hacking Through Belgium,'' ''The Battle of the Rivers," " The Battles in Flanders " &'(. VOL. II THE TIDE OF VICTORY HODDER AND STOUGHTON LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO MCMXIX PREFACE When in recognition of his priceless services in Syria Field Marshal Allenby, early in October 1919, was honoured with the Freedom' of the City of London, his operations were spoken of as a classic example of the military art. The description was just. It is, however, a description applicable with equal justice to the operations of General Maude, and his successor General Marshall, in Mesopotamia, to the operations in the Balkans under the supreme command of General Franchet d'Esperey, and to the strategy and tactics, alike in defence and attack, directed by General Diaz in Italy. In Mesopotamia and in Syria the main burden was borne by British troops ; in the Balkans and in Italy they played a part subordinate indeed, but useful to the Allies and honourable to their o\vn renown in arms. It was fortunate for the Allies opposed to the Pan- Germanic Confederacy that in all these theatres of hostilities they discovered and entrusted their affairs in the field to leaders of genius. The dictum that it is generals who win or lose battles is one the Great War has but served increasingly to confirm. And the reason is not far to seek. The methods of a man of genius are always sane and simple. More surely than men of less calibre he follows the line of least resistance, and, certain in his judgment and clear as to his aims, applies his mind to those details of preparation and adminis- tration which spell endurance, efficiency, and sustained moral. East as well as West the Allies had to deal with a skilful, resourceful, and above all determined foe. viii PREFACE They not only as time went on better appreciated the supreme value of leadership in war, but the necessity, not less indispensable, of complete preparation and sound administration. The lesson of the Days of Adversity was the danger of entrusting rather to mechanism than to mind, and the failure which attends crudity and haste. By 1916, and not a little owing to the serious checks met with in the East, that lesson had been brought home. Then, slowly at first, but steadily, the tide turned. Here the flow of the tide is followed in the succession of events. The first decisive breach in the hostile front occurred in Mesopotamia. It was emphasised by the Turkish-German debacle in Syria. Then in quick succession came the Bulgarian rout in the Balkans and the Austrian overthrow in Italy. The wind-up was Marshall's brilliant victory at Kalaat Shergat. Various personal and other narratives of one or another of these campaigns have appeared, and few are without their interest. The aim in these pages has been to set out faithfully the teachings which the campaigns embody and to elucidate their relationship, and the reader must judge as to how far that aim has been ful- filled. K. D. London, Oct. 1919. ——- CONTENTS CHAPTER I PASF, THE SALONICA AND EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGNS OF 1916 1 Strategical reasons for the Allied occupation of Salonica Belated attempt to aid Serbia—The role of Bulgaria German influences at Athens—Proposed Allied junction with the Serbian army impracticable—Organisation of the Salonica position—Repulse of the Bulgarians—Situation at the beginning of 1916—Surrender of the Struma pass Enforcement of Greek demobilisation—Formation of a Greek Pro\asional Government in Macedonia and the islands—Abdication of Constantino—The Allied autumn offensive of 1916—Capture of Kamakchalan and Monastir —Political and strategical consequences—Xhe Senussi of _Spllum—His hostility—War declared against him—Opera Jtions on the Westein Egyptian frontier—Action at Beit JHLussein—Battle of Gebel Medwa—Defeat of the Senussi's forces at Halazin—British advance upon Solium and jeo.ccupation of that place—The exploit of the Armoured Car Detachment—Close of the Western Egyptian campa|ign —Renewal of enemy attacks in Sinai—The second German- Turkish Expedition—Battle at Mahemdia. CHAPTER II THE RECAPTURE OF KUT AND THE TAKING OF BAGDAD 23 Sir Stanley Maude appointed to the Mesopotamia Command Decides upon an offensive—Reasons for it—The prepara- tions—British Staff and Administrative work—Improve- ment of the River Transport and other Services—Movement of Reinforcements up the Tigris—Enemy's coimter-measures —Strength of the defences rovmd Kut—Maude's strategy British cross the Shatt-el-Hai—Threat to the Turkish right- rear—Bombardment at Sanna-i-yat—Enemy defences east of the Hai captured—Defences astride of the Hai stormed Assault on the Dahri bend defences— British attacks at —— CONTENTS PAC4E Sanna-i-yat—Enemy's dilemma—Capture of the Shumran bend, the key of Kut—Turks evacuate the town—The British pursuit—Destruction of the enemy's river flotilla British advance to Zana—Advance to Ctesiphon—The Diala reached, March 7, 1917—Change in British tactics The defence out-manoeuvred— Bagdad railway terminus occupied—Crossing of the Diala—Turkish retreat—British defensive crippled. entry into Bagdad (March 1 1 )—Turkish CHAPTER III MESOPOTAMIA CAMPAIGN AFTER THE CAPTURE OF BAGDAD 48 Efiects of the Turkish reverses—Arab rising in the Yemen C4eneral Maude's energetic measures—Advance up the Tigris—Cobbe's victory at Mushadiya—Advance along the Diala—Bakuba occupied—Marshall's operations on the Euphrates and capture of Feludja—Action on the Jebel Hamrin ridge—^Turkish reaction—Combined movement against Deltawa—Maude's successful stratagem—Turks defeated—British victory at Istabulat—Capture of Samarra —The health and efficiency of the army—First operations against Ramadie—Why indecisive—Second Expedition Battle of Ramadie—Capture of the Turkish force—Cavalry dash to Mendali—Results of British administration in Mesopotamia—Maude's death at Bagdad. CHAPTER IV THE CAMPAIGN IN SYRIA : JANUARY TO OCTOBER, 1917 68 Offensive in support of Mesopotamia operations—Battle of El Arish—British advance to Rafa—Physical featiures of south- em Syria—Turkish defences in Palestine—Haste of the British preparations—First British attack upon Gaza Reasons for its defeat—Plans of General Allenby—Their daring—Naval co-operation—Three months of preparation —Mastery of the physical difficulties of Sinai—The water problem—Increase of the British Expeditionary Force Enemy's counter-moves. CHAPTER V THE VICTORIES OF BEERSHEBA AND GAZA . 88 General Allenby's turning movement—The counter-projects of von Falkenhayn—British bombardment of Gaza defences —— CONTENTS xi PAOE German Staff outwitted—The Beersheba defences—The British assault—Its complete success—Daring charge of AustraHon Light Horse—Enemy panic and failure to des- troy the wells—Dash of the turning movement—British attack at Gaza—Rapid advance from Beersheba—Opera- tions at Tel Kuweilfe—Breach of the hostile fortified front Advance to Sheria—Enemy evacuation of Gaza—State of tlie town—Skill and boldness of the British movements. CHAPTER VI THE TAKIXG OF JERUSALEM 98 Military aims of the British pursuit—Struggle of the Turks to escape capture—Combat at Wadi Hesi—Gallantry of the Lowland Division—Combats at Hu.j —Notable work of Irish troops—Convergence of the British thrusts—Intrepid charge of Yeomanry—Transport and water difficulties—Attempted enemy reaction—Battle of El Kubab—Capture of Jaffa Movement from the coast upon Jerusalem—Fighting in the passes—A battle in a fog—Seizure of the Nebi Samwal ridge —Rapidity and effect of the British moves—Plan of opera- tions round Jerusalem—Gallantry of the 60th and 74th Divi- sions—Defences west of the city taken—March of the Welsh Division from Hebron—Turkish measures against the Jews—Enemy panic—Last acts of the Turks in Jerusa- lem—Evacuation scenes—The surrender—Mob loots the Turkish barracks—General Allenby's entry—A curious prophecy—Popular rejoicings—Military effects of the fall of Jerusalem. CHAPTER VII THE GERMAN-TURKISH REACTION IN SYRIA . 113 Position in Syria at the end of 1917—German-Turkish measures of separation—General Allenby strikes first—Attack north of Jaffa—German-Turkish counter-move against Jerusalem —The most obstinate battle of the Campaign—Causes of the enemy's failure—British operations east of Jordan—The capture of Jericho—Value of capacity in command—Opera- tions of the Arab forces—The Britisli raid on Ammam Difficulties at the Jordan fords—Battle at Ammam—Non- success of the British project—Advance of the IVth Turkish Army lo the Jordan—New British plans—The checks at Shumet Nimrin and Es Salt—Disintegration of the British Expeditionary Force—Effects of the changes. —— xii CONTENTS CHAPTER VIII PAGE THE TURKISH OVERTHROW 134 Re-or<^anisation of the British forces—Strengths of the com- batants—The Hnes of the new British offensive—Reasons for the scheme—Its boldness—German-Turkish precautions General Allenby's ruses—Opening of the attack on the hos- tile right—Rupture of the enemy's front—The dash north of the Mounted troops—Combat at El Lejjun—Capture of El Fule, and of the enemy headquarters at Nazareth Flight of Liman von Sandars—Occupation of Beisan—^The enemy forces west of Jordan entrapped—Efforts of the Vllth Turkish Army to get out—The British converging pressure—The Turkish debdcle.