Changing Patterns of Acceptance. International Criminal Justice after the Rwandan Genocide Content 1 Introduction 2 International Criminal Justice in Rwanda Patrick Rowanda and Susanne Buckley-Zistel 3 International Criminal Justice in the Rwandan Public Eye: a Necessity with Many Downsides 4 Conclusion 5 Bibliography Changing Patterns of Acceptance. International Criminal Justice after the Rwandan Genocide Changing Patterns of Acceptance. International Criminal Justice after the Rwandan Genocide Patrick Rowanda1 and Susanne Buckley-Zistel2 1. Introduction On 7 April 1994, after an attack on an aircraft carrying the then President of Rwanda Juvénal Habyarimana, a killing machine moved into action in an attempt to extinguish all Tutsi in the Central African country, Rwanda. In just 100 days, about 800,000 Tutsi, as well as a number of Hutu political opponents, were murdered by Hutu militias, government troops and Hutu community members. In many ways, the Rwandan genocide remains an unprecedented example of violence and terror at the end of the 20th century. Although tragic, the Rwandan genocide did not happen in a vacuum, but in the midst of a democratisation process following a four-year insurgency by the Tutsi-led Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A) of General Paul Kagame, now President of Rwanda. Sparked by the insurgency and the subsequent pressure of the international community to share power and to allow democratic multi-party elections, Habyarimana’s people incited nation-wide violence and hate through spreading fear of a Tutsi victory and the ensuing suppression of all Hutu. Given the history of the country in which violence against the Tutsi had occurred before, these hate discourses fell on fertile ground, leading even family members to turn against each other. Three mechanisms which draw on international criminal justice (ICJ) principles have been applied to deal with the genocide crimes, and which will be discussed in this chapter: the UN ad- hoc International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); the national Rwandan courts who prosecute genocide crimes on the basis of an Organic Law by which principles of international criminal justice were included in national legislation; and foreign courts in third countries which prosecute genocide suspects on the basis of the principle of universal jurisdiction. While all three mechanisms are important, this work refers mainly to the ICTR. This chapter is part of a broader research project on the acceptance of international criminal justice in situation countries, carried out at the International Nuremberg Principles Academy from 2015-2017.3 The idea of researching acceptance is ‘to move beyond the mere reception of international criminal justice, such as the passive acknowledgement of its processes, to a more active reception or approval by various actor groups’ (Buckley-Zistel 2016a, 1). Acceptance is 1 The author’s real name has been changed due to security concerns. The author is a Rwandan national currently studying for a PhD. 2 Susanne Buckley-Zistel is Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at the Center for Conflict Studies, Philipps University Marburg in Germany. 3 International Nuremberg Principles Academy. Accessed 12 May 2017. https://www.nurembergacademy.org/resources/acceptance-online-platform/overview/. 1 Changing Patterns of Acceptance. International Criminal Justice after the Rwandan Genocide hence defined ‘as the agreement, either expressly or by conduct, to the principles of international criminal justice in one or more of its forms (legal systems, institutions, or processes)’ (ibid.). This incorporates a range of responses from recognising, to giving consent, to expressing outright approval. Its insights of this particular chapter are based on original data collected by the author in Rwanda over the course of two months in 2016, and follow the acceptance methodology which underlies the project (Buckley-Zistel 2016b). The research focuses on the changing patterns of acceptance of international criminal justice over time due to the conflicting expectations of different actor groups in response to the legal redress, and it answers the following research questions: o What different International Criminal Justice mechanisms are used to deal with the legacy of the 1994 genocide and how are they used? o What are the expectations of actors with regard to these mechanisms? o How are these mechanisms accepted? The data for this research is drawn from interviews and two focus group discussions with various actors including government officials, experts in different capacities, community representatives, civil society organisations and political parties. Interview sessions for local communities involved ordinary citizens and community representatives. The civil society interviewees can be divided into three groups: religious leaders, journalists and national NGOs (in headquarters or decentralised branches). The latter were mainly active in human rights, women rights and peace building. In total, more than 70 people were consulted. This chapter first explains the three different retributive justice mechanisms which draw on principles of international criminal justice. It then presents the findings of the data collection in order to, finally, draw some conclusions. In essence, it concludes that there was a strong level of acceptance of ICJ shortly after the genocide, with much hope placed in the ICTR in particular. Over time, though, there has been disillusionment if not frustration and outright anger by different actor groups as their high expectations were not met, leading to a change in patters of acceptance. 2. International Criminal Justice in Rwanda To prosecute crimes committed during the genocide, three facets of international criminal justice have emerged: prosecution by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), prosecution by national courts in Rwanda, and prosecution by foreign courts in third countries in which genocide suspects are residing after their flight from Rwanda after the violence. 2.1 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Shortly after the genocide, the United Nations Security Council set up the ICTR in Resolution 955 to ‘prosecute persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international 2 Changing Patterns of Acceptance. International Criminal Justice after the Rwandan Genocide humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994’.4 The Resolution stipules that the ICTR should ‘contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace’ and to deter further violations of international humanitarian law.5 The establishment of the ICTR followed an initial request by the post-genocide Rwandan government in a letter to the UN Security Council shortly after the end of the violence in 1994 (Barria and Roper 2005, 354), an initiative which was subsequently taken up by various UN committees. Since Rwanda was heavily damaged by war and genocide, but also to guarantee impartiality and fair trials, the UN decided to locate the tribunal in the Tanzanian city of Arusha. The ICTR operated from 1995 to 2015 and indicted 93 people for genocide (as defined by the 1948 UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide), crimes against humanity and war crimes (as defined by Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention). The tribunal consisted of four chambers with a total of 16 judges as well as nine ad litem judges. Of the 93 individuals indicted, 62 were convicted, 14 acquitted and 10 referred to national courts.6 After almost two decades, the tribunal issued its last judgment in 2012, and now only deals with appeal cases. It was officially closed on 31 December 2015 with the Residual Mechanism taking over much of its operations.7 The ICTR has contributed to the development of international criminal justice in a number of ways. It has aided the definition of genocide by acknowledging that rape and sexual violence may constitute crimes of genocide, it has recognised the role of the media in inciting genocide, and held that the Geneva Conventions are also applicable to civilians (rather than only military personnel) as perpetrators of war crimes. The court also destroyed the notion of sovereign immunity since it prosecuted former leaders for atrocities committed while in office (Jallow 2008). A number of criticisms have been raised against the tribunal, including its costs, the length of the trials, and its selection of accused (Eltringham 2014). In addition, the geographic distance to Rwandans, for whom justice should be served, has been viewed with scepticism. In response, the tribunal set up an outreach programme to facilitate a better understanding of its work and to enhance its confidence amongst Rwandans (Peskin 2005). Its brief was to disseminate information locally and to provide communication and training for the Rwandan media and for legal professionals. However, the main point of contention regarding the ICTR relates to the selection of the accused. Despite the fact that the genocide was committed against the Tutsi, allegations abound that Hutu also became targets of violence and retaliation. Paul Kagame, leader of the Tutsi rebel group Rwandan Patriot Army/Front and now President of the country, was particularly targeted due to his command responsibility. In 1999, the then Prosecutor Carla del Ponte 4 United Nations Security Council. S/RES/955. 8 November 1994. 5 United Nations