The Importance of Aristotle to Design Thinking James Wang Introduction The importance of Aristotle to the teaching and practice of design is that recourse to his theories of reason, imagination, and practical intellect allow us to justify design activity in two fundamental ways. First, according to Aristotle’s concept of technē as knowing by making, design should be regarded as a rational activity in and of itself. Although design is intricately linked to technology, and technology is, by definition, utilitarian, design is still first and foremost a matter of working with formal causes to transform them into final causes. In this respect, designers need not allow their activity to be appropriated by social activists, or even worse, by consumers. Moreover, Aristotle offers a cogent account of the way that imagination supports, assists, and even enables reason in the working of both the theoretical intellect and the practical intellect. This realization does much to validate imagination as a concept worthy of attention in academic research and discourse. The second way that Aristotle’s theories justify design activity is by defending the puzzling reluctance of many designers to commit themselves fully to the service of communitarian ethics in regard to social justice and environmental sustainability. According to Aristotle’s theory of the practical intellect, makers—those who work with technē—are concerned only with the excellence of mak- ing, in contrast with doers—those who work prudentially to estab- lish justice and who are very concerned about public values and social effects. The critics of design want designers to be doers, too; but because designers are essentially makers, transforming them- selves into public servants is often difficult, if not impossible. Two Problems A recurring issue of design theory, in regard to both pedagogy and practice, is the problem of understanding the epistemology of design. Design is generally believed to be an activity that involves creativity. Further, creativity is believed to operate through imagi- nation. The trouble is that scholars have never been totally con- vincing in their attempts to account for either imagination in particular or creativity in general. In this regard, design theory © 2013 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 4 DesignIssues: Volume 29, Number 2 Spring 2013 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DESI_a_00206 by guest on 01 October 2021 parallels art theory, or aesthetics—a branch of philosophy that is notoriously contentious. Architects, for example, have long regarded their work as a form of art, while design engineers tend to disparage such a claim and insist that design is a rational activity more than it is an imaginative activity. Nonetheless, at a crucial point in the design process, whether a building or an industrial product is being developed, creativity happens, and the project moves on to completion (or it does not happen, and the project is eventually scrapped). A theoretical understanding of design as an intellectual activity, therefore, would seem to be most welcome and useful. A second problem currently troublesome in the discipline of design is its response to the arguments of various proponents of communitarian ethics; Linda Groat, for example, argues that designers should operate with much a greater cultural sensitivity and a firmer commitment to ecological sustainability.1 The fact is that, although design faculties and student bodies have been agreeable in principle to operating with such progressive social values and goals in mind, in actual practice they have not always been as forthcoming as the activists for social justice would like.2 Why? The answer clearly is not as simple as suggesting that architects and design engineers lack a proper social conscience. The reason that designers sometimes seem to be lukewarm about the social impact of their work resides more in the intellectual realm than in the moral one. Something in creativity itself appears to be intrinsically resistant to thinking in terms of social effects. If this source of resistance could be identified, design teachers and practitioners would, again, very likely welcome and use this information. One Solution A better understanding of both these conundrums may be located in the writings of the earliest philosophers in ancient Greece— particularly in the teachings of Aristotle. This connection should not be as surprising as it first may sound. Alfred North White- head’s famous dictum that all Western civilization is a series of footnotes to Plato and Aristotle remains true, even in the Digital Age. Of primary interest to design theory and pedagogy is Aristo- tle’s definition of design implicit in his concept of technē. This term 1 Linda Groat, “The Architect as Artist or is also the source of our word “technology,” which is significant Scientist? A Modest Proposal for the Architect-as-Cultivator,” in Culture – because design is usually understood as the essence of technologi- Meaning – Architecture, ed. K. D. Moore cal invention. Moreover, Aristotle’s concept of technē is the source (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, of what we call “art, after ars” which is Medieval Latin’s translation 2000), 129. of Aristotle’s term. At its core, technē means “making,” but it also 2 For example, J. Kabo and C. Baillie, means “knowing,” thus relating the term to the Latin term scientia “Seeing Through the Lens of Social or “science.” Ultimately, technē means “knowing by making,” and Justice: A Threshold for Engineering,” European Journal of Engineering Aristotle contrasts technē with epistēmē or “knowing by thinking” Education 34, no. 4 (2009): 317. DesignIssues: Volume 29, Number 2 Spring 2013 5 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DESI_a_00206 by guest on 01 October 2021 (i.e., thinking rationally). The difference is that technē can know only contingent reality because it is limited to sensation, memory, and imagination; whereas, epistēmē can know necessary reality, because it is only limited by the universal and eternal rules of logic.3 For Aristotle, making is less important than theorizing. This belief would eventually be overturned in the modern world, explicitly by elevating imagination to an eminence superior to rea- son. The modern revolution in the conception of imagination is based on the argument of the great poets of the Romantic Age, along with the philosophers Kant and Nietzsche, that imagination is a mental power that allows humans to apprehend reality directly, without the aid of reason. Nevertheless, Aristotle also has a lot to say about imagination, or what he calls fantasia, and it is the contention of this paper that Aristotle’s commentary on imagina- tion goes a long way toward accounting for design creativity. The problem of explaining the epistemology of design in such a way as to at least partially de-mystify it, and thereby make it more acceptable to the rationalist pedagogical paradigm of the university, presents a difficult task to anyone who believes in the importance of knowing by making—whether one is concerned with art or with technology. A few years ago, Donald Schön, stand- ing on the shoulders of John Dewey, did much to validate creativ- ity as a legitimate academic enterprise with his advancement of the concept of “reflection-in-action,” based on a confidence in the tacit knowledge of knowing by doing.4 But Schön did not investigate the nature of imagination as the core activity of creativity, thus leaving “designerly thinking,” as Nigel Cross calls it, still in the dark.5 This 3 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 981a24–981b9. same darkness is where Stefani Ledewitz says that designers must 4 Donald Schön, The Reflective Practi- “leap” to be creative.6 Nonetheless, remembering Aristotle’s teach- tioner: How Professionals Think in Action ing does shine some light on the way that imagination works with (New York: Basic Books, 1983); “The Architectural Studio as an Exemplar of reason in the design process, making creativity more accessible to Education for Reflection-in-Action,” rational investigation and therefore more respectable academically. Journal of Architectural Education 38, The problem of persuading design teachers, students, and no. 1 (1984): 2-9; Educating the Reflective practitioners to include cultural sensitivity and environmental Practitioner (New York: Basic Books, concern—in fact, to be good communitarian ethicists—as part of 1987); and “Designing: Rules, Types and Words,” Design Studies 9, no. 3 (1988): their thinking in the design process would appear to be an entirely 181-90. John Dewey’s works include practical matter. In a sense, we might say that designers simply Experience and Nature (New York: need to be re-educated, so that architects will not be so dreamy Dover, 1929); Art as Experience (New and engineers will not be so focused on solving problems, and York: Perigree, 1934); and Experience and both will learn to be more socially conscious. And yet attempts Education (New York: Collier/McMillan, to achieve such changes have often failed. Part of the problem in 1938). 5 Nigel Cross, “Designerly Ways of the university is the difficulty of introducing more humanities Knowing: Design Discipline Versus courses into an already packed curriculum. The better strategy Design Science,” Design Issues 17, might be to try to understand why designers are the way they are no. 3 (2001): 50. and why they act the way they act. In other words, rather than first 6 Stephani Ledewitz, “Models of Design trying to convince designers to work with an awareness of com- in Studio Teaching,” Journal of Architectural Education 38, no. 2 munitarian ethics, we might start by trying to understand their (1985): 5. apparent reluctance to do so, and even their intransigence, despite 6 DesignIssues: Volume 29, Number 2 Spring 2013 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DESI_a_00206 by guest on 01 October 2021 their agreement with the call for change.