University of Amsterdam MA Middle Eastern Studies Secular Democratic Fear A critical assessment of the actions and considerations of secularists in contemporary Tunisia and Egypt Thomas Bartels Student no. 10548866 Master’s Thesis Supervisor: dr. R.A.F.L (Robbert) Woltering Second Reader: dr. M. (Mariwan) Kanie July 2017 Abstract When analyzing Middle Eastern politics, most scholars and journalists focus on the region’s Islamists. The Arab Spring protests and the following Islamist ascendance to power in Egypt and Tunisia gave scholars and journalists the chance to test Islamists’ democratic intentions. “Secularists” are often seen as the simple opposite of these Islamists and gain less attention as a result. Western suspicion towards Islam and the strong theoretical ideas connected to “modernization theory” both contribute to the assumption that secular actors are pro-democratic. However, actors that are dubbed secular have dominated authoritarian politics in the region since the emergence of modern nation-states. This study shows how the self-identification of being “secular” can sometimes lead to undemocratic behavior, when secularists fear the outcomes of democratic procedures more than the authoritarian alternative. In this study, this phenomenon is called “secular democratic fear”. Through interviews conducted in Cairo and Tunis in May and June 2017 and an analysis of statements and actions of secular political actors as documented in scholarly and journalistic literature, this study concludes that the power of secular democratic fear has influenced the events in both countries to a large extent. In Egypt, it eventually led to the end of a short democratic period. Indeed, this authoritarian comeback has been supported by secular political actors that claim to be pro-democracy and their choices seem to be largely influenced by the phenomenon of “secular democratic fear” as described in this study. The potent force of this fear can be explained by the fact that secularists in both Tunisia and Egypt understand secularism as connected to “who they are”, more so than to the believe in a certain secular institutional arrangement. It makes the struggle with Islamists into an existential struggle. Therefore, when trying to understand the power and influence of secularism in the region, one ought to focus on the empirical reality of how “secularists” behave and rationalize their behavior, not on the “textbook definition” of secularism. Even more, the conceptual mess around secularism has made the concept a rather “empty” one and the Islamist-secularist dichotomy a false one; however, the subjective meaning that is given to secularism nevertheless makes the power of the concept very real. Secularism, therefore, deserves more attention in itself, and not just as the simple antithesis of “Islamism”. 2 A Word of Gratitude Before everything else, I would like to thank all those that have made this thesis possible: My supervisor, dr. Robbert Woltering, for a formative year. All my interviewees, who found time in their busy schedules to patiently answer all my questions. Thank you for contributing to my research, especially considering the sensitive political climate some find themselves in. I hope for easier times. Yasseen Montasser, Andrew Luther, Waleed Zayed, Salma Mustafa, Iris Kolman, Mohamed Soliman, Ahmed Karam Kamel, Nada Bahgat, Mona Mohy, Donia Elhassan, Hossam Shoab, Oussema Abbes and Safae el Khannoussi el Bouidrini. Thanks to all of you for the unlimited support, the time and the friendship. Finally, a special thanks to Rana Abbawi, the First Secretary of the Dutch Embassy in Cairo, willing to invest time in my safety. To the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in Tunis, in particular Mouna Khezami, for the information she provided. To Koert Debeuf, for providing the first entrance into the Egyptian political scene. 3 List of Contents Abstract 2 A Word of Gratitude 3 List of Contents 4 Introduction 6 1. Theoretical Framework 9 1.1. Secularization, modernization and democratization 9 1.2. Indications of a different relationship 12 1.3. Secularism’s variations in practice 15 1.4. A critical approach to the concept 16 2. Research Framework 18 2.1. Conceptualizing Secularism 18 2.2. Method 19 3. Secularism in the Arab World 20 3.1. The Early Nahda Period 20 3.2. The Time of Nationalism 22 3.3. The Time of Authoritarianism 25 3.4. Conclusion 28 4. A Secular Spring? 29 4.1. The Coming of a Tunisian Spring 29 4.2. Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution 30 4.3. Early stirrings in Egypt 34 4.4. The January 25 Revolution 36 4.5. Conclusion 40 5. Post-Ben Ali Tunisia 42 5.1. Activists and revolutionaries 42 5.2. Secular political parties 43 4 5.2.1. Old Parties 43 5.2.2. New political parties 45 5.3. Secular civil society 52 5.4. Conclusion 53 6. Post-Mubarak Egypt 56 6.1. Activists and Revolutionaries 56 6.2. Secular political parties 62 6.2.1. The SCAF 62 6.2.2. Loyal political parties 64 6.2.3. Oppositional political parties 66 6.3. Conclusion 70 Conclusion 72 Literature 75 5 Introduction Western analysts usually try to discern the level of religiosity, or more specifically: “Islamicness”, when they focus on political actors in the Middle East. Are they “Islamists”? Are they “moderate”, or rather “radical” in their Islam? When this “Islamicness” is at its lowest, they are dubbed “secular”. From this classification, then, many assumptions follow; indeed, “Islam” is seen as an important causal variable. Violence, conflict, authoritarianism, they can supposedly all be explained by focusing on the role of Islam. Especially the discussion on the relation between Islam and democracy is a recurrent one.1 When Islam turns into “Islamism”, the debate gets even more heated. The question whether political Islam and democracy are compatible might very well be the most asked question among people that have any interest in modern Middle Eastern politics. However, there is much less attention for the “secular” of the Middle East, the opposite of the “religious” in this supposed religious-secular binary. Besides the fact that, in general, there has been more attention for the “religious” than for the “irreligious” in scholarly literature,2 there is also a specific bias against research on secularists within Middle Eastern studies. Stacey Gutkowski argues that particularly after the 9/11 attacks in 2001, a rather uncritical evaluation of secularism in the region has become dominant.3 Since the emergence of political Islam, the presumption that secular politicians are somehow more pragmatic and more trustworthy as partners for the West has prevailed. This fixation on Islam has led to a lack of research on dynamics within “secular” political groups in the region, exactly because they are inherently “moderate” in their Islam.4 Besides being moderate, the theoretical background of secularism also contributes to associations with modernity and democracy. This theoretical foundation stems from the classic “modernization theory”, that, although often criticized, still influences much of political and social theorizing on sociological changes in the world today.5 The strong presence of this idea in Western scholarship makes it even more counter intuitive to critically focus on the role of secular actors in the Middle East. 1 Francis Fukuyama, "History is still going our way," Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2001; Bernard Lewis, Faith and power: religion and politics in the Middle East, Oxford University Press, 2010. 2 Frank Pasquale, "Unbelief and irreligion, empirical studyfu and neglect of," In The New Encyclopedia of Unbelief, ed. T. Flynn (Prometheus, 2007). 760—766. 3 Stacey Gutkowski, “It’s not all about Islam: misreading secular politics in the Middle East,” Open Democracy, April 25, 2015, accessed on May 2, 2017. 4 Gutkwoski, “It’s not all about Islam” 5 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide (Cambridge University Press, 2011): 1. 6 However, paradoxically, actors that are dubbed secular by the Western commentator are the ones that have been leading authoritarian systems in Middle Eastern politics grossly since the emergence of modern nation-states. Because the Western security agenda focusses on Islam only from the perspective of “moderation”, and on secularism as inherently “moderate”, condemnation of authoritarian brutality of secular actors has sometimes remained marginal.6 When in 2011, seemingly out of nowhere, both president Zine Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt were ousted by a popular uprising, all scholars of the Middle East as well as political leaders were taken by surprise.7 The normative believe in the trustworthiness of secular political actors once more came to light when journalists and scholars used the term Arab “Spring” when the uprisings seemed to be secular, but suddenly spoke about the coming of an Islamist “Winter” when Islamists won popular elections in both Tunisia and Egypt.8 Writing in 2017, six years have passed since the seemingly imperishable regimes of Tunisia and Egypt were both toppled, and a lot has happened since. Where both countries followed a similar path until their own variants of mainstream Islamists had been democratically elected, the countries have moved in different directions after these first Islamist-led governments saw their end. Where Tunisia developed into the first Arab country in more than three decades to receive a ranking of 3 or better for political rights on the Freedom House scale, Egypt has sunken to a score of 6 after the military regime has consolidated its power after toppling the Islamists.9 Whereas the actions of both the Islamists of Tunisia and Egypt have been critically examined, how new and old secularist parties have responded to the events has received less attention.10 This study will focus on the actions of secular political actors in Tunisia and Egypt after and during the Arab Spring.