THE AL-QA'IDA NETWORK AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION By Jonathan Spyer* The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by Middle Eastern terrorist groups is one of the world's worst nightmares, albeit a more credible one in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Finding evidence, however, of such groups' plans or efforts in this direction is difficult. This article assesses the available information on the motives and capabilities of these organizations, and especially the al-Qa'ida network, to carry out such attacks. (This article was originally written for a project and conference on "Countering Threats in the Era of Mass Destruction: Accounts from the Middle East and Europe," co-sponsored by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy.) The use of weapons of mass destruction groups are considered to have developed (WMD) by a terrorist organization is one some non-conventional capability, albeit of the central threat scenarios currently of a limited and primitive nature. These facing democracies around the world. include: the Kurdish PKK, which experts The seriousness of the danger posed by consider to have weaponized Sarin nerve militant Islamist terror groups has been gas;(3) Hamas, which has coated apparent since the attacks of September fragments placed in bombs with 11, 2001. While evidence has been pesticides and poisons; and a number of unearthed of attempts by a number of U.S. "Patriot" groups, who have Islamist groups to acquire a non- experimented with various rudimentary conventional capability,(1) it is generally biological devices.(4) accepted that the al-Qa'ida network poses A number of key questions arise in the principle threat regarding the considering the issue of al-Qa'ida and employment of weapons of mass WMD: To what extent has it succeeded destruction by Islamist terrorists. In order in gaining access to the materials to understand the nature and dimensions necessary for the preparation of weapons of the threat, arriving at a correct of mass destruction? To what extent does understanding of the nature of al-Qa'ida-- it possess the necessary technical both in terms of its structure and in terms expertise required in the preparation of of the ideas driving and underlying its such weapons? Which state actors might activity--is therefore crucial. Equally be identified as potential or actual sources important is the sober analysis of the of support and assistance in its efforts to available evidence detailing attempts by acquire such weapons? How does the use the network to obtain a non-conventional of such weapons fit in with the strategy weapons capability, and observation of of al-Qa'ida? Finally, why, given the the more general patterns of use of WMD clear evidence that the network has by insurgent and terrorist groups. invested with some success in efforts to To date, the sole clearly documented obtain, for example, a rudimentary example of a terrorist use of WMD biological capability, have there as yet resulting in fatalities was that of the Sarin been no examples of successful terror gas attack in the Tokyo subway, attacks carried out by al-Qa'ida operatives perpetrated by the Aum Shinrikyo group using WMD? in Japan in 1995.(2) A number of terrorist Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) 29 Jonathan Spyer Is it indeed, as Eliza Manningham- name of the new network was taken from Buller, director of Britain's MI5 put it, the writings of Azzam (who was killed by only a "matter of time" before such an a car bomb in 1989).(9) But the driving attack takes place?(5) Have measures force behind its foundation was bin taken by Western law enforcement and Ladin. intelligence agencies proven sufficient to For bin Ladin and his closest cohorts, foil al-Qa'ida's ambitions in this area? Or, the Afghan experience is a "founding conversely, has al-Qa'ida deliberately myth" whose intensity and central lesson held back from the employment of such is best captured in his own words: "Those means of destruction for reasons relating who carried out the jihad in Afghanistan to the role of terrorist violence in the did more than was expected of them network's overall strategy? because with very meager capacities they destroyed the largest military force (the AL-QA'IDA: IDEA AND Soviet Army) and in so doing removed ORGANIZATION from our minds this notion of stronger The origins of al-Qa'ida as both idea nations. We believe that America is and organization are to be found in the weaker than Russia."(10) units of Arab volunteers that took part in The Arab fighters thus drew from their the war against the USSR in Afghanistan Afghan experience the conviction that in the 1980s. Usama bin Ladin, founder through strength of will and dedication along with the Palestinian Muslim their success could be replicated Brotherhood activist Abdallah Azzam of elsewhere. When bin Ladin returned to the Maktab al-Khalimat (the Afghan Saudi Arabia in 1989, it was to a hero's Service Bureau or MAK), was a prime welcome. As a son of one of the mover in recruiting and organizing these kingdom's wealthiest families, who had fighters.(6) Utilizing his family's wealth, nevertheless freely embraced the role of bin Ladin established training camps for mujahid, he was widely seen as Arab volunteers, constructed essential embodying those qualities of militant roads and tunnels, contributed large sums piety and incorruptibility which the of money, compensated the families of kingdom professed itself to uphold. wounded fighters, and apparently also Bin Ladin rapidly became a key personally participated in important Islamist opponent to the regime, military engagements.(7) however, criticizing its venality and MAK was one of seven recognized alleged subordination to the West. His principal mujahideen organizations criticisms notwithstanding, he offered the involved in the fight against the Soviets. support of his fighters to the kingdom As such, bin Ladin may have benefited when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in from aid afforded the mujahedeen by the 1990. His offer was rebuffed, and instead, CIA at this time.(8) As victory drew near bin Ladin witnessed the inflow of a large in the late 1980s, however, bin Ladin and U.S. force to Saudi Arabia, tasked to Azzam parted ways. While Azzam protect the kingdom from invasion. More wished to continue the focus on than any other, it was this issue of the Afghanistan, bin Ladin now wanted to American military presence in the Gulf use the Afghan experience and that formed the focus of bin Ladin's rage infrastructure to continue the jihad in at the West, and set him on the road that other countries. In 1988, al-Qa'ida al- would lead to his later notoriety. As bin sulbah (the solid base) was founded, as an Ladin wrote, "Since God laid down the organizational structure intended to Arabian peninsula, created its desert and maintain the links between the "Afghan surrounded it with its seas, no calamity Arabs" for further jihad operations after has ever befallen it like these Crusader the conclusion of the Afghan war. The hosts that have spread in it like locusts, 30 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) The Al-Qa'ida Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction crowing its soil, eating its fruits and regime requested in May 1996 that bin destroying its verdure."(11) Ladin leave Sudanese soil. The latter Bin Ladin's resentment of the Western complied with the request, and was able military presence in the Hijaz has deep to set up his base once more in roots in Islam and Islamic history. An Afghanistan.(14) infidel military presence in the heartland of Islam--the attacks by Reynold of CHANGE AND EVOLUTION IN AL- Chatillon on Muslim convoys in the QA'IDA Hijaz--was the precipitating factor in In the course of the 1990s, both al- Salah al-Din's declaration of jihad against Qa'ida's organizational base and the idea the Crusaders.(12) Bin Ladin sought to that drove it underwent considerable emulate historical precedent by change and development. From an mobilizing his network of Afghan Arabs. organization whose primary concern had Increasingly, the focus of his attacks been the presence of infidel forces in would be less on the Saudi regime, which Saudi Arabia, al-Qa'ida from the mid- had supposedly failed in its duty by 1990s onward began to stress much allowing the infidels into the "land of the broader themes and grievances. Also two holy places." Rather, as the 1990s from an organization that had been built progressed, bin Ladin's target became the around the core of Arab veterans of the United States itself, as well as the broader Afghan war, al-Qa'ida began to expand to Western world. form a linking network, bringing together As a result of his declarations and radical Islamist organizations in many activities against the Saudi regime, bin different parts of the world.(15) Ladin's Saudi citizenship was revoked in By metamorphosing into a network, April 1994 and he was forced to leave the al-Qa'ida became a facilitating element country. He found a willing host in the for carrying out attacks that were planned Islamist regime of Umar al-Bashir in and perpetrated by militants who were Sudan, to where he repaired with his not organizationally connected to bin family and a large group of followers. In Ladin in any permanent, hierarchical Sudan, he set about creating an economic structure. To this effect, the network infrastructure which would provide developed a flexible, multi-faceted employment and activity for large modus operandi, establishing safehouses, numbers of his Afghan Arabs, many of places of residence and training camps in whom preferred to continue their lives Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan and Yemen within the framework of jihad rather than in the course of the 1990s.