The Royal United Services Institute he launch of HMS Astute and the renewal of Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent have Tfocused attention on the UK Submarine Industrial Base. Consistent with the Defence Industrial Strategy, the industrial base is in the process of re-structuring to provide an affordable, sustainable defence capability. This Whitehall Report seeks to explore some of the challenges facing the organizations responsible for the design, build, support and disposal of Britain’s nuclear powered submarines, the most complex weapons platform in the UK armed forces. This report begins with an analysis of the role and importance of Whitehall Report 3-07 submarines in UK defence policy. Subsequently, the report analyzes Ministry of Defence and industry from a comprehensive and forward-looking perspective, taking into account the operational requirements for future submarine classes, industrial structure, Artful developments in contracting strategy and questions of emerging technology. Beyond : Government and Industry Roles in Britain’s Future Submarine Design, Build and Support Gavin Ireland The Royal United Services Institute Whitehall Report 3-07 Beyond Artful: Government and Industry Roles in Britain’s Future Submarine Design, Build and Support Gavin Ireland SPONSORED BY: www.rusi.org First Published 2007 © The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or other- wise, without prior permission of the Royal United Services Institute. Whitehall Report Series ISSN 1750-9432 Series Editor: Dr Terence McNamee Assistant Editor: Victoria Shin Most Whitehall Reports are available as part of a membership package, or individually at £10.00 plus p&p (£1.00 in the UK/£2.00 overseas). Orders should be sent to the Membership Administrator, RUSI Membership Office, South Park Road, Macclesfield, SK11 6SH, United Kingdom and cheques made payable to RUSI. Orders can also be made via the website or by quoting credit card details via email to: [email protected] For more details, visit our website: www.rusi.org Front cover image: The Royal Navy nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) HMS Turbulent at sea. © Crown copyright/Ministry of Defence, image from www.photos.mod.uk. Reproduced with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. Back cover image: The Royal Navy SSN HMS Trafalgar sailing from Devonport. Photo by DML LW. Printed in Great Britain by Stephen Austin & Sons Ltd. for the Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET, UK RUSI is a Registered Charity (No. 210639) The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone and do not represent the views of RUSI or any institution to which the author is associated. Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to Dr Lee Willett, Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2ET, United Kingdom, or via email to [email protected] iii List of Acronyms ASMIPT Attack Submarines Integrated Project Team ASuW Anti-Surface Warfare ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare ATTAC Availability Transformation, Tornado Aircraft Contract BAES BAE Systems BNS Babcock Naval Services CFA Contracting for Availability COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf CVF Carrier Vehicular Future (Future Aircraft Carrier) DACP Defence Acquisition Change Programme DE&S Defence Equipment and Support DEC(UWE) Director Equipment Capability (Underwater Effects) DG Nuclear Director General Nuclear DG Sub Director General Submarine DIS Defence Industrial Strategy DLO Defence Logistics Organization DLoD Defence Line of Development DML Devonport Management Limited DPA Defence Procurement Agency DTI Department of Trade and Industry DTS Defence Technology Strategy EB Electric Boat EIPT Equipment Integrated Project Team FRPS Flotilla Reactor Plant Support Contract GIUK Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom HCDC House of Commons Defence Committee HVAC&R Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning and Refrigeration IAW Indicators and Warning IPT Integrated Project Team ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JV Joint Venture KSF Key Supplier Forum LTCA Long Term Collaboration Agreement MARS Maritime Afloat Reach and Sustainability MIS Maritime Industrial Strategy MoD Ministry of Defence NSRP Nuclear Steam-Raising Plant PFG Pricing and Forecasting Group PPP Public-Private Partnership R&T Research and Technology RAMP Revalidation and Assisted Maintenance Period RC Reactor Compartment iv RCS Replacement Combat System SAM Submarine Acquisition Modernization SDR Strategic Defence Review SF Special Forces SIB Submarine Industrial Base SLoC Sea Line of Communication SME Small/Medium Enterprise SPO Submarine Programme Offer SSBN Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear SSBN-F Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear – Future SSK Ship Submersible Conventional SSMG Submarine Support Management Group SSN Ship Submersible Nuclear SUBIPT Submarine Support Integrated Project Team TLAM Tomahawk Land Attack Missile TLCM Through-life Capability Management TSS-D Transforming Submarine Support - Design UK United Kingdom US United States WHLS Weapons Handling and Launch System v Acknowledgements This Whitehall Report was written while the author was a full-time staff member, on secondment for seven months from October 2006 until May 2007, in the Military Sciences Department at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. The author would like to thank Lee Willett (Head, Maritime Studies Programme) and Michael Codner (Director, Military Sciences) at RUSI, and Martin Pulford and Tim Chittenden at BAE Systems for making this Whitehall Report pos- sible. The author also thanks Sandy Morris at ABN Amro, the UK Ministry of Defence, those across the submarine defence industrial base, and those from Government departments, whose profes- sional and personal opinions contributed to this study. Author Gavin Ireland was, for a seven-month secondment during which this report was written, a Researcher in the Military Sciences Department, RUSI. He was seconded to RUSI from BAE Systems Submarine Solutions, where he is on the graduate development scheme. During his time at RUSI, he also co-authored RUSI’s Whitehall Report, ‘The United Kingdom’s Independent Strategic Nuclear Deterrent’, and contributed articles to RUSI Defence Systems and the RUSI Newsbrief. He holds an MA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of St Andrews and an MA in Defence and Security Analysis from the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at Lancaster University where he wrote his postgraduate dissertation on the role of the nuclear scientific com- plex in shaping emerging US nuclear weapons policy. His particular areas of interest are in the main- tenance of the UK defence industrial base, the role of technology in shaping operations and the transfer of technology and working practices between defence and the motorsport industry. Beyond Artful: Government and Industry Roles in Britain’s Future Submarine Design, Build and Support Introduction On 8 June 2007, the nuclear powered attack pure strategy and more a sort of country submarine (SSN) HMS Astute was rolled out dance in which tricky political and industrial for launch. HMS Astute was the first British steps must be made at precisely the right submarine to go in the water since 1998, intervals.4 when HMS Vengeance, the Vanguard class The decision to proceed with a succes- deterrent submarine was launched, and the sor to the Vanguard class was also important first SSN since the Trafalgar class boat HMS for the Royal Navy’s continued operation of Triumph was launched in 1991. HMS Astute’s nuclear powered attack submarines (SSNs) as launch, and the recent debate on the renewal the build programmes for SSNs and SSBNs of Britain’s strategic nuclear deterrent, has are mutually interdependent. Had the deci- focused public and political attention on the sion been taken to renounce a submarine- future of the UK Submarine Industrial Base based nuclear deterrent, the maintenance of (SIB). In terms of the UK’s strategic deter- a nuclear submarine capability in the UK rent, the Government policy – supported by would most likely have become unviable5 as Parliament following a vote on 14 March an absence of future orders could have jeop- 2007 – approved concept work for the succes- ardized the submarine build and support sor to the current fleet of Vanguard class infrastructure. Whilst a fourth Astute class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines submarine could have been produced, the (SSBNs).1 Often to the exclusion of wider likely departure of key skilled workers from policy debate, industrial issues formed a cen- the doomed enterprise may have ensured tral point around which the discussion that the third Astute class boat, HMS Artful, revolved, with focus ranging from the pro- would be the last nuclear powered subma- posed seventeen year timescale for the pro- rine to be built in the UK. duction of a new SSBN (hereafter referred to But of course the SSN does not exist as SSBN-F2), to the technical and regulatory solely to sustain industrial capacity. As this challenges inherent in supporting the report discusses, the role of the SSN in Vanguard class beyond a thirty year service Britain’s execution of defence and security life.3 As one commentator observed, ‘the policy is uniquely important, but often future of Trident