ZUHUR / TADROS: EGYPT’S CONSPIRACY DISCOURSE EGYPT’S CONSPIRACY DISCOURSE: LIBERALS, COPTS AND ISLAMISTS Sherifa Zuhur and Marlyn Tadros Dr. Zuhur, a visiting scholar at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of California, Berkeley, was a research professor of national security at the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College from 2004 to 2009. Dr. Tadros is a research affiliate at the Middle East Center of Northeastern University and professor of Web Development and Interactive Media at the Arts Institute of New England. dward Said’s concept of oriental- dered behavior not necessarily present in a ism was developed from his per- society like Egypt? Or might it ameliorate ception of the role of scholarship Western ills: anomie, materialism, lack of in the West’s exploitation of the compassion, a quest to control valuable EEast for the purpose of conquest and the resources and militarism? maintenance of political power. It was not Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit have simply a construct of Eastern inferiority defined occidentalism as anti-Westernism, versus Western superiority. Hassan Hanafi, anti-modernism and anti-colonialism, trac- chair of philosophy at Cairo University, ing it to scholars of the Romantic Group first encouraged a “science of occidental- or the Buddhist Hegelian Kyoto school ism” to counter orientalist studies.1 How- meeting in 1942.3 There are many similari- ever, as Syrian philosopher Sadiq al-Azm ties between this Asian political antipathy has suggested, one must heed Said’s to the West and types emerging in Egypt. warning to the subjects and victims of However, occidentalism, like orientalism, orientalism against the dangers of apply- is also a means of rendering the Other as ing the readily available structures, styles exotic, desirable and permeable. It may not and ontological biases of orientalism upon always be part of a political agenda. Robert themselves and others.2 That would result Woltering has also described occidentalism in orientalism in reverse, or the internaliz- in Egypt primarily in terms of responses to ing of orientalist political intentions. colonialism, equating the “West” with the Is occidentalism a means of perceiv- term4 and concerning himself with the con- ing the West as territory for ideological or nections between discourse about the West political conquest, since it is the source and power. Following the 2014 onslaught of Eastern domination? Can it be free of on Gaza, there was a new call for an occi- neocolonialist underpinnings, given a dentalist news service, linked to increasing discourse of romanticized logic and or- global support of Palestinian grievances, © 2015, The Authors Middle East Policy © 2015, Middle East Policy Council 109 Zuhur and Tadros.indd 109 8/28/2015 1:33:37 PM MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXII, NO. 3, FALL 2015 that could counter the anti-Arab, anti-Mus- tian body politic. The Muslim Brotherhood lim media effort of the U.S.-based MEM- constructed itself as an alternative to a RI5 by exposing the actions and attitudes monolithic and imperialist West. Decades of Israel and the United States.6 beyond its founding, according to its inter- We will focus, in the context of nal charter, a woman or a Christian could Egypt’s policies, on some examples of not serve as president, and women were the conspiracism that developed during barred from the Brotherhood’s leadership, and after the January 25, 2011 revolution. as part of its interpretation of shariah.7 Diverse religious and political movements Yet the movement also expressed Oc- used rhetorical devices and conspiracy cidentalism as part of a strategy to oppose theories to mobilize people during elec- the “Islamophobia” of the government tions in Egypt and thereafter. This reso- and the military, reflected in propaganda nated widely due to social media. against the group in the Nasser era. Due to Conspiracist discourse in the media the Brotherhood’s attempt to assassinate solidified public support for the Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser and his government when it was challenged by subsequent imprisonment of their leaders, Western and opposition media, particu- movement figures hated him and reviled larly after July 3, 2013, when President his policies, especially his support for the Mohamed Morsi was deposed. Attacks “communist” Eastern bloc. The deal struck were also waged by certain actors on civil between the movement and President society, terming its members “Western Anwar Sadat in 1971 to counterbalance pawns;” civil society itself used the same his leftist and Nasserist critics involved concept in the initial stages of the January the Brothers’ promise to forgo violence 25 Revolution. Throughout, occidentalism and the pursuit of a full-blown political and orientalism-in-reverse reverberated party. Following Sadat’s assassination by in popular discourse, revealing uncertain- radical Islamists of the Islamic Jihad, the ties in the self-image and worldview of movement began to pursue parliamentary Egyptians. positions in defiance of that agreement, but only as part of coalitions with other SOME ORIGINS OF opposition parties or by running individu- OCCIDENTALISM als as independents. The political aspira- Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin tions of the movement were obvious, but The Muslim Brotherhood movement — were dashed by repressive regime tactics al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin — was established in 2005. by Hassan al-Banna in 1928 to counter the pervasive influence of Western thought Liberal Occidentalism and ideas, particularly on youth. It wielded Liberalism evolved in Egypt between anti-Western rhetoric, decrying “Western” the state’s partial independence in 1919 concepts of democracy and, eventually, the and the coup known as the Revolution of rule of secular law. Instead, it promoted 1952. The movement embraced rational- the concept of shura (consultation) and the ist scientific thought while dusting off and implementation of shariah to the degree elevating indigenous architectural, artistic tolerable by the Western-influenced Egyp- and craft forms. What was Egyptian was 110 Zuhur and Tadros.indd 110 8/28/2015 1:33:37 PM ZUHUR / TADROS: EGYPT’S CONSPIRACY DISCOURSE prized, idealized and given value, some- Soviets, leading to the eventual assassina- times alongside Western practices, fashions tion of Sadat in 1981. and customs. In part, state sponsorship of Since 1972, Copts have been attacked the arts, literature and television influenced with some regularity by Egyptian Mus- this process.8 lims, and the Egyptian state has failed to Intellectual versions of liberalism were protect them. The infamous al-Khanka in- affected by Arabism (one of us was taught cident of 1972, in which a dispute over the and hired to teach “Arab history” and to transformation of a building into the prem- define Arab anthropology, Arab cultural ises of the Holy Bible Organization turned studies and Arab political theory). Not all into a full-blown sectarian clash, resulted of these ideas or themes were inimical to in the formation of a fact-finding mission the West; rather, they were portrayed as commissioned by Sadat to pinpoint causes alternatives. Some parts of liberal occi- of such strife. The mission’s Oteifi Report dentalism were also influenced by Islamic said it was investigating, among other history, themes and idealizations without things, “how far [such incidents] threaten necessarily promoting a state governed by national unity under the current sensitive religious law. circumstances that we are passing through, in our fight against the Zionist enemy and ANTAGONISMS international imperialism.”9 The report For over three decades, the Muslim outlined three primary sources of sectarian Brotherhood had antagonistic relations to strife: the licensing for building churches, some degree with Egypt’s Copts and with Christian missionary work and, finally, the liberals who fit into two of the conspiracy spread of Islamic religious books attack- theories we explore. ing Christianity and vice versa. The report Egypt’s Coptic minority has, paradoxi- recommended that the church present the cally (since Copts are not Western, but the government with an annual plan for build- original Egyptians), been intertwined with ing churches, in order to acquire immedi- occidentalism in various conspiracy theo- ate licensing whenever possible and gave ries and tensions with the Muslim Broth- a set of recommendations to avoid such erhood. Upon coming to power in 1970, incidents in the future. However, none of Sadat immediately released the Brother- the report’s recommendations were ad- hood members who had been imprisoned opted, and problems continued to escalate. during the previous regime. Many of them Indeed, Sadat, ten years later, in a 1981 returned from exile, having fled during speech, accused Pope Shenouda of “want- Nasser’s rule to affluent Arab countries, ing to be a leader for personal gains” and amassing enough wealth to later have a of inciting strife. He was removed from strong impact on Egypt’s economy. On the office, and a committee was appointed to other hand, Sadat arrested and imprisoned handle the affairs of the church.10 both leftists and Nasserists. Even though, The pope was tried before a panel or perhaps because of, Sadat’s Western established in 1980 by Sadat known as the orientation, the resurgence of the Brother- Morals Court, under the Law Protecting hood coincided with a rise in conservatism Morality from Shameful Actions. Con- and fundamentalism vehemently opposed sisting of judges and public figures, the to the West, no less than it had been to the “court” was more political than legislative. 111 Zuhur and Tadros.indd 111 8/28/2015 1:33:37 PM MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XXII, NO. 3, FALL 2015 It condemned the pope and exiled him to against tourists. His policy backfired; when the Wadi al-Natrun monastery. Soon after news of the dialogue and his compromis- Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the Morals ing actions reached the press, he was fired Court itself was abolished and the pope from his position.