THOMAS HILL GREEN AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS: An Internal Critique. By Mr. Colin Tyler B.A. (Hons.), M.A. (Ebor) Submitted as a Requirement of the DPhil in Politics University of York Department of Politics January, 1996 Abstract. This thesis presents an internal critique of the philosophical system of Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) emphasizing his ethical and political thought. The Introduction questions recent allegations that Green's assumptions make his thought irrelevant in modem circumstances. His methodology is sketched and shown to be separable from his Christianity. Chapter one examines the role of consciousness in knowing. The specifically religious aspects of "the eternal consciousness" are shown to be dispensable. Chapter two examines his theory of the will. That he runs two mutually exclusive theories simultaneously undermines the system's coherence. Neo-Aristotelianism entails voluntarism whereas spiritual determinism rejects it, raising serious questions about the status of Green's ethical thought. The chapter concludes by noting that Green follows the neo-Aristotelian line fairly consistently in his moral and political writings. Chapter three sets out Green's "relational organicist" social theory, committing him to conceive the true good as a common good. Several objections are defeated, before the issue of social fragmentation is introduced. Chapter four examines conscientious agency and social criticism, defending Green from charges of vagueness. His belief in progress is shown to be unwarranted. Chapter five examines his political philosophy, beginning with the links between recognition, rights and the exclusion of certain entities from the sphere of rights. His theory of "the state" is shown to be compatible with cultural pluralism. Democracy, state intervention and civil disobedience are considered. Doubts are raised about how far Green's theory of the state actually allows him to avoid authoritarianism. The implications for his political philosophy of the spiritual determinist theory of the will are sketched. Chapter six examines Green's conception of the natural right to private property, emphasizing its contextual preconditions. His principles are shown to be compatible with radical reforms of the economic system. The Conclusion argues that, for all its faults, Green's system remains valuable when developing ethical and political philosophy. 2 Contents Abstract ............................................................ 2 Contents ........................................................... 3 Dedication . .. 6 Preface ............................................................. 7 Disclaimer . 7 Acknowledgements ................................................... 8 Declaration. 9 INTRODUCTION .................................................. 10 1. Introduction.. 10 2. An Outline of Green's 'Question' and Method ................... 12 3. The Religious Basis of Green's Philosophy. .................... 16 KNOWLEDGE AS SELF-REALISATION ................................ 19 1. Introduction . 19 2. Green's Starting-Point .................................... 21 3. Green's Idealism, and the Problem of Sensations ................ 23 4. Experience and Relations .................................. 26 5. Knowledge and the Eternal Consciousness ..................... 35 6. Conclusion ............................................. 40 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, VOLUNTARISM AND THE WILL ............... 42 1. Introduction ............................................ 42 2. Aristotle's Theory of Moral Agency .......................... 4-4- 3. Green's Concept of 'Distinctively Human Action' ................ 48 3 4. Positive Freedom as Autonomy ............................. 57 5. The 'Determinist'/' Indeterminist' Debate ...................... 65 6. Green's Spiritual Determinism and the Self-Realisation of the Eternal Consciousness .......................................... 67 7. The Collapse of Moral Responsibility ......................... 73 8. Conclusion.. 77 RELATIONAL ORGANICISM AND THE COMMON GOOD ................ 80 1. Introduction.. 80 2. Simhony's Categories ..................................... 81 3. Morality and The True Good. 83 4. The True Good and Social Embeddedness ...................... 89 5. The Formal Structure of the Common Good . 99 6. The Non-Competitiveness of the Common Good ................ 108 7. The Substance of the Common Good: Citizenship and Public Service 113 8. Conceptual Confusion and Authoritarianism. ................. 123 9. Conclusion: The Problem of Social Fragmentation ............... 133 CONSCIENCE, SOCIAL CRITICISM AND PROGRESS ................... 137 1. Introduction . .. 137 2. Self-Alienation as the Motor of Reform ...................... 138 3. The spriritual deterministConscientious Action . 140 4. The Problems with Green's Theory of Progress . 154 5. The Spiritual Determinist Theory of Moral Development ......... 160 6. Conclusion ............................................ 164 RIGHTS AND THE STATE .......................................... 165 1. Introduction.. .. 165 2. Rights and Recognition. .................................. 167 3. Entities which Cannot Possess Rights ........................ 181 4. The State and Cultural Diversity . .. 185 5. Participatory Democracy and State Intervention. .............. 197 4 6. Social Change and Civil Disobedience ........................ 207 7. The Downfall of Green' s Liberalism? ........................ 216 8. Conclusion: Spiritual Determinism ........................... 219 THE ETHICAL POTENTIAL OF THE ECONOMIC REALM ............... 221 1. Introduction.. 221 2. Private Property and Capitalism. 221 3. The Origins of the Present Evils of Capitalism .................. 232 4. The Naivety and Flexibility of Green's Analysis ................ 237 CONCLUSION .................................................... 243 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 246 1. Thomas Hill Green . 246 2. Other Sources ......................................... 251 5 Immature minds delight in argumentation and fault-finding, because it is easy enough to fmd fault, though hard to see the good and its inner necessity. The learner always begins by finding fault, but the scholar sees the positive merit in everything. (Georg W F Hegel, 1967, The Philosophy of Right, translated by T M Knox, Oxford, Clarendon Press, paragraph 268A.) This thesis is dedicated to Jack for having to suffer the work for so long and to Ray Solly, who got me through my 0 Levels and stopped me from giving up on academia. 6 Preface. It is very strange to think that this thesis is finally finished. It has taken a great deal of work and a great deal of my life and attention for the past three years. I apologise to everyone who has had to suffer a boring conversation or two over that time because of my obsession with writing it. Over this time, I have gained a great deal of respect for those individuals who manage to retain their standards of scholarship in the face of increasing pressures to become a "learner" again. Unfortunately, the community of scholars continues to be in danger of becoming merely a collection of career academics. Disclaimer In the course of this thesis, I use the male pronoun to refer to the generic moral agent. I do this because Green does so. It should not be taken to imply that his thought applies only or even mainly to men. Green worked hard for women's rights and his philosophy logically entails equal recognition and treatment, irrespective of gender (see Anderson, 1991). Green's use of 'he' and 'his' is an expression of the academic conventions of his day rather than any sexism inherent in his writings. 7 Acknowledgements I would like to begin by thanking Mr. Peter P Nicholson for supervising this research. He has been very challenging, very encouraging and always very willing to share his knowledge, expertise and resources. Next, thanks are due to the Department of Politics at the University of York for employing me as a Teaching Assistant during the first year of my research. In particular, my gratitude goes to Prof. Rod Rhodes, Mrs. Susan Mendus, Mr. Peter Nicholson and Mr. John Horton for helping with the assistantship in various ways. Also, my thanks go to the British Academy for funding the rest of my research. Finally, Prof. Alex Callinicos and Mr. Philip Simison and Mr. John Curry helped to get that grant extended, for which obviously I am very grateful. In relation to Green's unpublished material, thanks go to Mr. Peter Nicholson for providing me with copies of Green's speeches which he has collated. Also, I would like to thank the Master and Fellows of Balliol College, Oxford for their permission to consult and quote from Green's papers. In particular, thanks go to Dr. Alan Tadiello for all of his help during my stay in Oxford between 9th and 13th January 1995, inclusive. I have benefitted from discussions with Matt Carter and Maria Dimova regarding British Idealism over the past couple of years for which I am grateful. I wish to thank all other members of the Political Theory Workshop (with a special mention for Susan Mendus) for the same reason. On a more personal level, I would like to thank Diane Adams, Steven Benson, Frank Brogan, Natalie Humphreys, Bernadette and Stewart Kirk, Andy McLellan, Michele Marin­ Dogan, Andrea Miccoci, Jeremy Nolan, Giuseppe Tassone, Andrew Tesseyman and Angie Wilson. Jenny Bradford, Linda Lofthouse, Caroline Moore and Gill Pulp her have all borne the interruptions of their work with good