Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 1992-06 Systematic analysis of complex dynamic systems : the case of the USS Vincennes Dotterway, Kristen Ann Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/30594 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX DYNAMIC SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF THE USS VINCENNES Kristen Ann Dotterway June 1992 Principal Advisor: Nancy C. Roberts Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Unclassified SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THlS PAGE I I; REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE I I la. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS JNCLASSIFIED 2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITYOF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADlNGSCHEDULE I I 4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) I 6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b. OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School (If applicable) Naval Postgraduate School CC 6c. ADDRESS (City, State, andZlP Code) 7b. ADDRESS (City, State, andZlPCode) Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Monterey, CA 93943-5000 Ba. NAME OF FUNDINGISPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ORGANIZATION (If applicaMe) I 8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS Program Element NO Project No I Task No Work Untt Accesson I Number I 1 1. TITLE (Include Security Classification) SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX DYNAMIC SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF THE USS VINCENNES 12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Dotterway, Kristen Ann I 1 3a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b. TIME COVERED 14. DATE OF REPORT (year, month, day) 15. PAGE COUNT Master's Thesis From TO June 1992 256 16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION Phe views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US. lhvernment. 17. COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary andidentify by block number) FIELD GROUP SUBGROUP Command and Control, C2, Cybernetics, Organizational Learning, Vincennes Incident. Complex Dynamic Systems, NegativeIPositive Feedback, Systems Analysis, Garbage Can Model,.. ..- Mutual Causality, Wholistic Approach to Change, Decision Making, Ambiguity, 19. ABSTRACT (continue on reverse if necessary andidentify bi block number) I Recent studies on the Vincennes incident have centered around the impact of stress in decision making. This thesis, which is a case analysis of a historical event, offers another perspective through the use of organizational and contextual factors as a means to ascertain "what happened" when the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655. Data extracted from the unclassified investigation report by Rear Admiral William M. Fogarty and the transcripts from the Senate Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services were analyzed quantitatively, through regression and correlation analysis in conjunction with a graphical analysis and interpretation, in an effort to resolve the lack of reconciliation between system and recollected data by witnesses. A comparative analysis was also conducted between these archival sources of data and interview data from Captain Will Rogers, 111, former Commanding Officer of the Vincennes. Additionally, to identify "causal factors" that led to the outcome, further analysis using the Events Path Model, Dynamic Systems Model, and Cybernetic Model of Mutual Causality was conducted. The findings of the quantitative analysis portion supports Captain Rogers'argument, which included a track number issue and the existence of another aircraft. Among the "causal factors" identified contributing to the accidental shoot down, the most significant finding revealed was the failure to identify and differentiate between two aircraft, which was primarily due to the functional lack of negative feedback as a control mechanism that keeps a system stable and under control. Consequently, the issue of stress was not as significant as ws originally diagnosed 20. DISTRIBUTIONIAVAILABlLlTY OF ABSTRACT 1 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION f UNCLASSIFIEDIUNLIMITED 0 SAME AS REPORT DTIC USERS 1 Unclassified !2a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL I 22 b. TELEPHONE (Include Area code) I 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL Nancy C. Roberts l(408) 646-2742 IAS I IDFORM 1473,84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE All other editions are obsolete Unclassified Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Systematic Analysis of Complex Dynamic Systems: The Case of the USS Vincennes Kristen Ann Dotterway Captain, United States Air Force B.S., United States Air Force Academy Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 1992 Author: Kristen Ann ~otterwd Approved by: Nancy ~hoberts,Principal Advisor Allan W. Tulloch, CDR, Associate Advisor car1 Jones, Chairman CommfJ d, Control, nd Communications Academic Group ABSTRACT Recent studies on the Vincennes incident have centered around the impact of stress in decision making. This thesis, which is a case analysis of a historical event, offers another perspective through the use of organizational and contextual factors as a means to ascertain "what happened" when the USS Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655. Data extracted from the unclassified investigation report by Rear Admiral William M. Fogarty and the transcripts from the Senate Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services were analyzed quantitatively, through regression and correlation analysis in conjunction with a graphical analysis and interpretation, in an effort to resolve the lack of reconciliation between system and recollected data by witnesses. A comparative analysis was also conducted between these archival sources of data and interview data from Captain Will Rogers, 111, former Commanding Officer of the Vincennes. Additionally, to identify "causal factors" that led to the outcome, further analysis using the Events Path Model, Dynamic Systems Model, and Cybernetic Model of Mutual Causality was conducted. The findings of the quantitative analysis portion supports Captain Rogers' argument, which included a track number issue and the existence of another aircraft. Among the "causal factors" identified contributing to the accidental shoot down, the most significant finding revealed was the failure to identify and differentiate between two aircraft, which was primarily due to the functional lack of negative feedback as a control mechanism that keeps a system stable and under control. Consequently, the issue of stress was not as significant as was originally diagnosed. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1 A . THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ........................... 1 B . STRUCTURE OF THESIS ............................... 2 C . METHODOLOGY .................................... 3 D . SCOPE/BENEFITS .................................... 3 I1. THE VINCENNES INCIDENT ................................. 5 A . OVERVIEW ......................................... 5 B . HISTORY .......................................... 5 1. U.S. Presence in the Gulf ............................ 5 2 . U.S. Interest in the Gulf ............................. 7 3. Iran-Iraq War .................................... 7 4 . The Tanker War .................................. 8 5. The Stark Incident ................................. 8 6. Increased U.S. Involvement .......................... 9 C . AIR OPERATIONS .................................... 11 1. Commercial Air Activity ............................ 11 2. Military Air Activity ............................... 14 I D. THE USS VINCENNES ................................. 16 1. Training and Readiness ............................. 16 2 . Organization ..................................... 19 3 . Combat System Status .............................. 26 4 . Communications .................................. 26 a . Internal .................................... 26 b . External .................................... 27 5 . Rules of Engagement ............................... 27 E . SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ............................... 27 1. Environmental Information ........................... 27 2 . Events Prior to the Surface Engagement ................. 28 3 . Surface Engagement ............................... 31 4 . Air Engagement .................................. 34 111 . ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION .......................... 49 A . ADMIRAL FOGARTY'S ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION ... 49 B . CAPTAIN ROGERS' ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION ...... 57 1. Introduction ..................................... 57 2 . Naval Tactical Data System .......................... 58 3 . Aegis Command and Decision System ................... 59 4 . Track Number Sequence ............................ 60 5 . Summary ....................................... 62 C . AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION ............. 62 1. Introduction ..................................... 62 2 . SystemData ..................................... 63 a . Altitude versus Range .......................... 65 b . Altitude versus Time ........................... 67 c . Range versus Time ............................ 69 d . Summary of System Data ....................... 69 3 . Recollected Data .................................. 73 a . Altitude versus Time .......................... 75 b . Altitude versus