ntrocluc ocienee rext BOOKS :00 1C AND METAPHYSICS OUTLINES OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS o H d > O VA L- O :: o u OUTLINES OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS BY JOHANN EDUARD ERDMANN Late Professor of Philosophy in the University of Halle TRANSLATED FROM THE jlh {REVISED} EDITION, WITH PREFA TOR Y ESSA Y BY B. C. BURT, PH.D. r, LONDON SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO. LIMITED NEW YORK: MACMILLAN & CO. 1896. Printed by Co-wan & Co., Limited, Perth. PREFATORY ESSAY. IN all discourse, or verbal expression of thought, there regularly occur, besides terms representing mere objects or groups or classes of objects, terms which, instead, stand for general notions, originating within rather than from without, predicates and relations under which, for the mind, objects stand or by which they are determined that is to say, the so-called categories of thought. Such terms are, for example, being, quantity, essence, cause, actuality, end, truth, with their primitives or derivatives. The general notions for which such terms stand are of very great significance and interest, not only as form ing the ground of definite connection, in consciousness, among objects, but also as together constituting a world of realities of themselves. That these notions have a necessary reality and meaning in experience, and so are a possible matter for a real science, is practically evident from the fact that they are indispensable to thinking and discourse as such, to objective or fixed coherence among ideas, to knowledge or science : the very forms of language necessarily imply them, and for this reason, if for no other, they are, since language is but the embodiment and instrument of thought in general, indispensable to itself and the as thought ; sciences, the embodi ment of ideas of definite and necessary connections v vi PREFA TOR Y ESSA Y. involve so that it among objects, continually them, with entire truth be said that science is may _any _ science in to (in really and truly a proportion _the the receive in it. direct) recognition which categories And for the matter of that it is worthy of being of mere observed in passing the products fancy could not exist without a certain basis in the cate gories. and The theoretical proof of the necessity, reality the has to be great significance of categories given by takes them for its a special science which precisely which the sciences subject-matter. The recognition for the in general give to the categories, is, greater and indirect, not theoretical part, merely practical and direct. Even the sciences of discourse grammar, formal philology, rhetoric, logic though containing of the as some very distinct implications categories a material in which, thing distinguishable from given so to immersed, and speaking roughly, they are, say, the of bringing to clear consciousness necessity study in and for themselves, do not ing the categories their undertake so to study them, to investigate relations, (logical) origin, necessity, validity, organic " " the and groupings in short, to criticise categories the as such. Still less is this study undertaken by external world sciences whose subject-matter is the rather than discourse or thought itself. Such study, let it be investigation, criticism, is, repeated, the_task of science of a distinct science, the science, in fact, in the as such, namely, Philosophy, and, particular, fundamental part of it, Logic. of the nature ot Now a complete understanding at the threshold of the Loo-ic is, of course, not possible the of it in its science, but must be gained by study certain notion of it is entirety. But a preliminary be laid down. Let, then, necessary and may here defined excellence, the Logic be provisionally as, par PREFA TOR Y ESSA Y. be of two criticism of the categories. Criticism may or restric sorts : it may be merely mostly analytical, or it be tive, negative, formal; may synthetical, real. Criticism of the first- developmental, positive, as named sort is content to assume its object given, to detect its isolate, scrutinize closely enough merely limitations without always positively and directly for the supplying the proper complement overcoming of the limitations; and instead of allowing its object to be determined for thought by its natural relations, to a standard too is apt to judge it according lying be formal rather much outside itself, and hence to an than real. Of this nature is, to cite example, in^a measure the Kantian criticism of the categories, in search for truth which that spite of the synthetic by in criticism was motived. That criticism was great the of the part an effort to prevent (mis)application a restricted to categories beyond sphere, keep within certain secure bounds. "human" thought It assumed the categories as logical facts, analysed certain of them them, treating as distinct and opposed which had real meaning and truth only in organic reference to one another, and in consequence reached " " human the essentially negative result that thought as ultimate is fatally self-contradictory regards is or be a realm the reality, that there may beyond " and reach of thought, an unknowable thing-in-itself," that the laws of thought are in relation to it merely regulative. But criticism, to be adequate to its be more than the Kantian criticism or object, must kind. The must be anything else of its categories another and to viewed ~as in organic relation to one or conceivable matter of The all possible thought. of the taken discovery of the limitations categories also be the either individually or as groups must them each discovery of what is complementary to_ ; of assumed as must be category, instead being given, viii PREFA TOR Y ESSA Y. known in its origin in a logically preceding one, and its transition into a logically succeeding one, and the categories collectively must be seen as a system of predicates in organic relation to a subject to which they apply and give determination and meaning. The true criticism of the categories is their self- criticism, their spontaneous self-limitation and self- sublation into higher truth, their evolution in a series or system. It is thus the affirmation as well as the of the a which negation categories ; criticism, indeed, contains as a factor a certain measure of dogmatism. Such is the general nature of the logical criticism of the categories. From this it is necessary to distin guish strictly the "psychological" criticism which occupies itself with the determination of the temporal order in which, and the circumstances under which, they make their entrance into the individual consciousness as such in its relations with environ ment. The meaning of a category in itself and in re lation to other categories as such is not identical with its meaning in and for the merely individual mind. Logic, then, is the solution of the problem of the evolution of the categories is itself this evolution. This solution, as having to do solely with activities or objects of pure thought, is itself a work of pure thought, and, naturally, proceeds according to the method of that which is determined from within rather than from without, or is self-determined. Beginning with the lowest, simplest, most abstract form of thought, it proceeds by a gradual develop ment to the highest, most complex, most concrete, thereby discovering or rather evolving the series or system of pure forms of thought or the categories. (See below 20.) For the sake of as full as possible a preliminary notion of the nature and importance of the Science of Logic, we may here consider, very briefly, its relation PREFA TOR Y ESSA Y. ix of to the sciences in the more common acceptation or the term. These sciences, whether consciously not, the world assume as a fact the general rationality of is the out of existing things, and their task working or verification of this assumption. Now it is almost a mere truism to say that to the complete realisation conscious of this assumption made by science the as such is in understanding of what the rational, is, the of the rational as dispensable. But knowledge is therefore the cultiva such is precisely what Logic ; tion of the sciences, to be sound and truly successful, has sometimes must be coupled with that of Logic. It that the been supposed, not unnaturally, perhaps, and science of thought as such is empty and barren, for should be in fact, really has been superseded, a new form of really active intelligence, by thought, a rich and valuable viz., natural science possessing content. But the judicious will guard against being the value of the content of too sanguine in belief as to in the new form of thought taken merely by itself, or entire abstraction from that which it is supposed to is more than one sort of have superseded. There and barrenness or emptiness ; pure sense-knowledge, as barren and mere experience, is quite empty _as pure or mere can be. And science as thought, speculation, _ the work of observation, experiment, and formal in a ference must, to maintain its interest for, and have real claim upon, the mind of man in its full integrity, of become distinctly congruent with and expressive The final the essence of pure, self-active thought. of the results reached in interpretation and valuation limits of the the sciences is not possible within the natural sciences as such, but must depend upon the of as such. No co-operation of the science thought so- thoroughly intelligent devotee of science, commonly as and called, thinks of the science of thought empty he knows as his limited oppor- lifeless ; better, and, x PREFA TOR Y ESSA Y.