Case Study 3 A Review of UNMISS’ Political Strategy in South Sudan by Charles T. Hunt 64 This case study was developed to inform The Political Practice of Peacekeeping by Adam Day, Aditi Gorur, Victoria K. Holt and Charles T. Hunt - a policy paper exploring how the UN develops and implements political strategies to address some of the most complex and dangerous conflicts in the world. The other case studies examine the political strategies of the UN peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Darfur and Mali. Dr Charles T. Hunt is a Non-Resident Fellow at United Nations University Centre for Policy Research and an Australian Research Council Fellow at the Social and Global Studies Centre, RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia. He co-authored the report: “Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Mission in South Sudan / UNMISS,” Effectiveness of Peace Operations Network [EPON] (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2019). The author would like to thank Lauren Spink for her review of this paper. Any remaining errors are those of the author. he United Nations Mission in obstructed and impediments to basic South Sudan (UNMISS) was operational functions commonplace in T established in 2011 in a climate flagrant violation of the Status of Forces of optimism, immediately following the Agreement (SOFA). This was followed peaceful secession of South Sudan from by years of broken ceasefires and Sudan. While UNMISS was in part designed peace accords facilitated by duplicitous to prevent a return to hostilities between neighbours and all without the genuine Khartoum and Juba, its principal mandate buy-in of the main parties. Despite the was to build up the capacities of the South signing of the revitalized agreement on Sudanese State; one of the most ambitious resolution of conflict in South Sudan and far-reaching State-building mandates (R-ARCSS) in late 2018 – paving the in UN peacekeeping. With a USD $1 billion way for the formation of a Transitional annual budget and an extraordinarily Government of National Unity – pockets broad remit to strengthen institutional of violence endured. Threats to civilians capacities in the areas of rule of law, are manifold as critical provisions of the administration, and security sector reform accord, such as cantonment and security (SSR), the first Special Representastive of arrangements as well as the issue of the the Secretary-General (SRSG) of UNMISS number and boundaries of States, face declared that the UN’s task in South Sudan significant hurdles to implementation. As was “literally building a country.”1 of the time of writing, there are still more than 190,000 displaced people inside The hubris and hope as UNMISS launched UN-administered protection of civilians did not last long. The mirage that South (PoC) sites and millions more displaced Sudan could be held together by a complex around the country and across borders in patronage network soon evaporated neighbouring countries. While the relative and in-fighting within the ruling Sudan traction of the R-ARCSS offers hope, the People’s Liberation Army/Movement limited role UNMISS has played in making (SPLA/M) precipitated the outbreak of the deal, and is envisaged to play in its a brutal civil war in December 2013. In implementation, means that its impact on response, the Security Council mandated the political solution to conflict dynamics the termination of State-building in South Sudan is diminished. activities and a reorientation towards physical, rights-based and humanitarian This study examines UNMISS’ political protection. Shifting mid-conflict from a strategy in South Sudan with a specific peacebuilding mission to one focused focus on the Mission Concepts developed primarily on protecting civilians was a at key junctures throughout the mission’s radical departure from anything that history. It is based on a desk review of had been tried before in the history of reports of the Secretary-General, Security peacekeeping. UNMISS’ cooperation with Council resolutions, Mission Concept and the Government deteriorated quickly and strategies as well as an extensive review significantly, with freedom of movement of the scholarly literature. It also draws © UN Photo/Martine Perret 65 on field research in Juba, Bentiu and Malakal in by the signing and incremental implementation December 2018, as well as interviews conducted of the R-ARCSS. These moments were selected as with dozens of key informants remotely in May having triggered significant adjustments to the and June 2020. The main questions addressed mission’s political strategy. At each of these key herein are: How did mission leadership, in junctures, the study examines the intent of the cooperation with the UN secretariat, interpret and Security Council, how a new strategic direction translate the mandate handed down by the Security was derived from the Council mandate and Council into political strategies for UNMISS; what how that strategic vision was articulated within factors influenced this process; and, how has the the mission’s guidance architecture – focusing strategy evolved? The study examines three key specifically on the directives for the mission to moments of the mission lifecycle to date: first, support the political process. In addition, the study the establishment of the mission in 2011, creating analyses how this political work was articulated what was primarily a State-building mission to with other key priorities of the mandate, including consolidate the newly independent State;2 PoC, facilitation of humanitarian assistance, and second, the transformation of the mandate in human rights monitoring. Based on this analysis, 2014 following the outbreak of war, ceasing the the study concludes with a series of lessons for State-building project and pivoting to a protection peace operations stakeholders, including mission focused operation;3 and, third, the emergence leadership, parts of the UN Secretariat and from the outbreak of violence in 2016 symbolized Member States in the Security Council members. 66 © UN Photo/Martine Perret I Translating UNMISS’ Mandate into Political Strategies his part of the study examines three linking its local conflict resolution to the broader key moments of UNMISS’ time in South national political process. T Sudan. At each critical juncture, it analyses: the context, examining the Security Council’s intent for the mission; the interpretation of that mandate and translation into a Mission Phase I Concept and/or strategy; and the implementation of that strategy. The analysis shows that in Establishing the Mission each of these stages the political space for the mission to influence and manoeuvre was limited, (2011) often by factors well beyond the UN’s control. UNMISS’ inaugural mandate was the product of a Consequently, UNMISS has played a limited clear objective to build the capacity of the newly political role in the peace process. Nevertheless, minted nation State and to work on outstanding at some moments the mission has developed Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) issues politically-driven strategies, helping it to carve out that risked a return to all-out war with the north. a political role, and has also proven innovative in This section argues that the political objectives 67 of the Council were fairly straightforward but left and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire little room for building peace that predicated on agreement. However, as the mission progressed anything other than central Government as the its support to the implementation of the peace main guarantor. A lack of political leverage over agreement was overwhelmingly focused on the Government was compounded by a lack of resolving the dispute over the oil-rich Abyei buy-in to critical disarmament, demobilization region and preparing for national elections in and reintegration (DDR) and security sector 2010 and the referendum in 2011. reform (SSR) processes. This dictated that little progress was made on the political strategy It was widely agreed that without a meaningful to create a peaceful polity predicated on the transformation process, the SPLA/M rebel-group- rule of law and democratic principles before it turned-Government and more than 100,000 descended into civil war. former liberation soldiers now responsible for security across the country posed high risks to civilians. The lack of progress on DDR and SSR HISTORY AND BACKGROUND would later contribute to the collapse of the fledgeling South Sudanese State in 2013.9 The The UN’s role in South Sudan since 2011 is referendum on statehood for South Sudan was inextricably connected with what happened held in January 2011 resulting in an overwhelming throughout the 22-year civil war of independence. majority (98.83% of participants) in favour of Sudan’s ‘second’ civil war4 pitted the Khartoum independence.10 On 9 July 2011, South Sudan Government against the SPLA/M fighting over declared its independence marking the end of wealth, power, the role of religion in the State the CPA and the conclusion of UNMIS operations. and self-determination. Over the course of two decades, more than two million people were killed, four million were displaced and around 600,000 sought refuge in neighbouring countries MANDATING THE MISSION as refugees.5 In 2005, a CPA was struck between On 8 July 2011, the Security Council unanimously the parties,6 bringing an end to the war, sharing passed Resolution 1996 mandating UNMISS to wealth from oil revenues and making provision replace UNMIS.11 Determining that the situation in for a UN mission to support its implementation South Sudan constituted a threat to international and oversee a referendum on the question of peace and security in the region, acting under independence for southern Sudan. Through Chapter VII of the Charter (Actions with Respect Operation Lifeline and other channels, western to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace donors had been zealous supporters of southern and Acts of Aggression), the Council authorized Sudan in its war with the north, providing political UNMISS with 7,000 troops and 900 police.