A WAR WITEIN A WAR: THE iMLI.i'ENCE OF BALKAN IRREDENTISM ON B-H STRATEGY IN SOUTE-EASTERN EUROPE, l9l4 - 1918 Sebastian Hubert Lukasik B.A. @Ions.). Simon Fraser University, 1998 THESIS sUBmIN PARTIAL FULmLLMENT OF THE REQUREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of History O Sebastian Hubert Lukasik 2000 SMON FRASER UNIVERSiTY Iune 2000 GU rights remed. 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ABSTRACT During the First World War, the military and diplomatic efforts of individual Balkan states were directed towacd the fulfillment of national goals that had remained essentially unchanged since their fomiulation in the 19th century. Predating many of the Great Power rivalries that lay at the heart of the First World War, these aims contributed to the Balkan states' perception of the conflict as yet another oppoctunity to attain the elusive goals of irredentism and "national unification," and endowed the war in South- Eastern Europe with the characteristics of a Third Balkan War - the last stage of the Balkan liberation struggles initiated in the early 1800s. These aspirations did not always coincide with the broad diplomatic and military objectives espoused by the respective alliance systems on whose side the nations of South-Eastern Europe fought in the course of the war. For these countries, the dl-encompassing strategic priorities of the principal belligerents could rarely cepresent anything more than an abstraction. Consequently, Balkan statesmen considered such designs meaningfûl only if they offered the possibility of advancing their own national policy goals. The aim of this thesis is to analyze the influence of this perception of the nature of the conflict on Britain's Balkan strategy. An anaiysis of this kind will serve as the bais for the argument that conventional interpretations of the factors that shaped Britain's overall strategy in the First World War cannot, by themselves, account for the course and conduct of British strategy in South-Eastern Europe. Instead, they must be supplemented with considerations of the strategic priorities of Britain's Balkan allies and enemies, and their impact on the policies that guided British strategy in the region dunng the Great war. This thesis is based on a synthesis of a variety of primary and secondq sources. The doçumentary foundations consist of materials contained in the British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reuorts and Paoers from the Foreim Office Confidential Print. These are supplemented with a selection of unpublished documents, including the Conclusions and the Memoranda of the British Wu Cabinet for the time period between December 19 16 and September 1918. Lastly, a broad range of secondary sources, including mernoirs, published collections of private papers, and key monographs, has also been utiüzed. DEDICATION To my parents "Easyys myne booke to rede and telleth of moche fite, But then your easy rede is damned hard to wryte.... " - WiUiarn Napier, Histoy of theWu in the Peninsula and in the South of France: From the Year 1807 to the Year 18 14 The process of cesearching and writing this thesis has ben, for the most part, a lonely task. Nevertheless, its completion would have been difficult, if not impossible, without the kind assistance of many individuals. In the first order, 1would like to acknowledge the debt of gratitude 1owe to my gmduate supervisor, Professor Andre Gerolyrnatos. My guide and mentor for the past three years, he has ken a source of unflagging encouragement and practicai assistance far in excess of what a graduate student rnight customarily expect from a supervisor. To him, 1will be always grateful. Next, 1would like to thank Professor Martin Kitchen for reading my work and providing comments and suggestions for improvement. Likewise, 1wish to offer thanks to Professor Lenard Cohen for his willingness to act as my extemal examiner. 1am ais0 grateful to the Department of History at Simon Fraser University for providing the financiai support that has allowed me to finish this work. Many thanks, too, must go to the administrative staff of the Deportment, especialiy Mary Ann Pope and Susan MacIntosh, for patiendy enduring the endless barrage of questions to which 1subjected them. 1am equally thankful for the moral support 1received hmfellow students and fnends in the History graduate program. In particular, 1would like to extend my most sincere gratitude to Christian Nielson and Stefani Marciante, whose fciendship, kindness, and encouragement sustained me at ail times, but especialîy in the "darkest hours." Most importantiy, however, 1would like to thank my parents. It was they who, more than anybody else, had to bear the costs - both real and figurative -of my academic presumptions. They did so patientiy, untiringly, and without cornplaint or reptoacb, al the whiîe providing me with hop, encouragement and inspiration. Tt is only fitting, therefore, that this thesis should be dedicated to them. TABLE OF CONTENTS .. APPROVAL.. ........................................................................................ ii S.. ABSTRACT.. ..................................................................................... ..ri1 DEDICATION.. .................................................................................... iv ACKNOWCEDGEMENTS ..................................................................... ..v Introduction BRITISH STRATEGY IN SOUTB-EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE FIRST WORLD WAR: AN HISTORIOGRAPHICAL SURVEY. ............... L Chapter One FROM "CONTINENTAL COMMi'ITMEiïT" TO A PEFUHPERAL STRATEGY: BRITAIN TüRNS TO THE BALKANS, DECEMBER 19141JANUARY 1915.. ........................................................ ..8 Chapter Two THE BALKANS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR........... 17 Chapter Three THE DARDANELLES, GALLIPOLI, AM)THE FALL OF SERBU, 1915.. .... ..39 Chapter Four TEE ROMANIAN INTERVENTION,1916.,. ............................................ .67 Chapter Five TEE MACEDONIAN FRONT,1917 - 1918............................................... 103 Conclusion A WAR WITHIN A WAR ...................................................................... 132 BIBLIOGRAPHY... ............................................................................ 138 Introduction BRITISH STRATEGY IN SOUTH-EASTERNEUROPE DURING TEIE FlRST WORLD WAR: AN BISTORIOGRAPBICAL BACKGROUND Throughout the First World War, Great Britain maintained a substantial military presence in South-Eastem Europe. British and imperid troops first arrived in the region in early 1915, when units of the hastilysrganized Mediterranean Expeditionary Force landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula. At the the, a number of Britain's leading military and politicai figures believed that the diversion of some of the Entente's human and material resources from the Western Front to the Balkans might üigger a set of military and political developments that would bnng the war to an early and successful conclusion for the Allies. The failure of the Gallipoli expedition, combined with the unsuccessful Franco-British attempt to render military assistance to Serbia in the fall and winter of 1915, discredited the notion that military operations in peripheral theaters such as the Balkans offered the best prospects for the defeat of the Central Powers. After the twin fiasco of the Dardanelles and Salonika, the strategic focus of most British leaders turned to other, seemingly more promising theaters of operations. In conformity with their new strategic priorities, British leaders attempted to effect a complete, or at least a partial disengagement fmm the Balkans. Nevertheless, although the retention of a large military force in the Balkans had seemingly ceased to conform with Britain's strategic interests, British units remained in South-Eastern Europe for the duration of the war. Altogether, the sheer number of troops that Britain and its allies maintained in the region until 1918, combined with the intensity of the inter-Allied disputes conceming the military and diplornatic conduct of the conîlict in South-Eastern Europe, transformed the Balkans into one of the most important theaters of the Great War. The corpus of historical titerature pertaining to the higher direction of Britain's war effort hliy reffects the prominent mle that the Balkans occupied in Britain's strategic calculations during the war. While there is no single monograph devoted exclusively to Britain's Balkan strategy, victually al1 of the principal studies of Britain's overall strategy between 19 14 and 19 18 accord a conspicuaus place to the Balkans. In analyzhg the forces