Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Service Lyndon Baines Johnson Library The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training oreign Affairs Oral History Pro$ect AMBASSADOR ELBRIDGE DURBROW Interviewed by: Ted Gittinger Initial interview date: June 3, 1981 TABLE OF CONTENTS Background - Pre-Saigon experience with Communists Moscow 19,4-19,. Deputy Chief of Mission - 1946-194. State Department - 0ast 0uropean Division - 1122 2taly and Poland - pre-1122 Communist Party and Soviet techni3ues Subversion and terrorism Saigon, 5ietnam 1957-1961 5iew of Diem Diem defeats Binh 8uyen 9.S. A2D programs 1olf Lade$insky;s land reform Relocation program Montagnards vs. 5ietnamese 9.S. military program Road-building 0mbassy-MAAG friction General 1illiams Diem and 1illiams; rapport Maxwell Taylor 9nconventional warfare Civil Guard (5ietnamese) 5iet Cong attack Bien Hoa Air Base Soviet assistance and Ho Chi Minh Trail Hanoi;s tactics against Diem Sihanouk and 5iet Minh intrusions C2A activities 9S advisory buildup Counter-insurgency (9.S.) 1 2nternational Control Commission (2CC) 5iews on Diem Can Lao Party 9.S. advice to Diem Halberstam;s The Best and the Brightest Pentagon Papers Anti-Diem coup Diem;s farewell to Durbrow Diem-9SOM relations Saigon rumor factory Nhus Civil Guard training Briefing successor Nolting Paris, rance - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 196l - 1965(?) Diem overthrown Democracy problems 5ietnam 1966 elections Religion and ethnic South 5ietnamese Buddhist AtroublesB Gulf of Tonkin (comments) Graduated response My Lais 1illiam Calley 5iews on 9.S. in 5ietnam Prosecuting the war Civilian vulnerability 5iet Cong and terrorism 1ars of ANational liberationB INTERVIEW Q: Mr. Ambassad r, were y u given a briefing, a f rmal briefing r inf rmal, bef re y u went t Saig n in 1957% D9RBRO1C Oh, yes. 2 came back to 1ashington for about three or four weeks, 2Dve forgotten how long. 2Dd been in 5ietnam before, because 2 was stationed in Malaysia. 2Dd been up there Eto visitF my predecessor, reddie Reinhardt, Ewho isF a very close friend of mine, an old Moscow callow colleague. 2Dd been up to Saigon on a long visit one time, so 2 knew the situation up there, the physical situation. Then 2 came back and 2 was briefed in the department and in the Pentagon and in the C2A and everything else, a full briefing. 2 went out there in March of 1957. 2 Q: What were y ur e(pectati ns that y u derived fr m the briefing% What s rt f situati n did y u e(pect% What kind f pr blems did y u e(pect t enc unter% D9RBRO1C 1ell, one way or the other, 2 was not surprised by anything for the simple reason that 2 spent most of my career dealing with communists. 2 went on my first mission to Moscow in 19,4, was there for four years. 2 had gone into Moscow again during the war on a short TDG, about four months. Then 2 came back again to Moscow in 1946-4. as the deputy chief of mission there dealing with the Hremlin boys. 2 dealt with them during the war when 2 was with the 0ast 0uropean Division. 2 had been in 2taly, a big Communist Party thereI 2Dd been in Poland way back when before that, so 2 thought 2 knew something about the way they operate. Nobody does really, but you get a better idea if youDve been there. So 2 wasnDt surprised. 2 knew what we were fighting, which is something 2 donDt think they understand today, really. The American public and the press doesnDt, 2 donDt think. So therefore the public should learn much about it, what a war of national liberation is all about. ThatDs a techni3ue that the Soviets developed a long time ago. TheyDve perfected it, and 5ietnam is one of the best examples of it. Our press, in 5ietnam particularly but elsewhere even before that, they think this is a local insurgency, a local civil war, grow like Topsy in whatever country it is, and theyDre fighting for their freedoms against the oppressive government or the imperialist Americans, whatever you want to call it. So, in that sense, 2 suppose thatDs one of the reasons why 2 was sent there, because 2 had had experience in that sort of thing before. So 2 wasnDt surprised in any way at all. The problem was that they were trying to take over the country by subversive methods and terrorists. ThatDs one thing 2 think that is not understood at all, is that a war of national liberation is a well worked out techni3ue, and only one of the tools of that techni3ue is terrorism. 1eDre talking so much about terrorism today, and terrorism, well, thatDs part of it, no 3uestion about it. But 2 donDt think anybody else has any--0l Salvador is a war of national liberation. 2tDs not a local civil war down there. Nicaragua is the same thing. Angola was the same thing. 5ietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Cuba, South Gemen, theyDre all caused by national liberation. 2 tried to bring that out in that paper 2 gave you the other day. Q: Let me ask y u ab ut President .Ng Dinh1 Diem. N w, when y u went t 2ietnam in 1957, what was the generally held view f Diem and what he had d ne in 2ietnam up till that time% D9RBRO1C 1ell, his image was going up 3uite well by that time. reddie Reinhardt, who had also done the Moscow tour and knew the situation, was there when he took over and he helped him to get started. 1e all did or our government did. So by 1956, 1957, heDd beaten down the Binh 8uyen in the town there in the 1955 war, fighting right in the streets. On the other attempts by the two to three thousand well-trained communist guerrillas that theyDd left behind after the 1954 accords... They werenDt supposed to, of course. And Hanoi hoped and expected Ehe would be defeatedF. Diem wasnDt too well known, he didnDt have too much of a following in the country. HeDd been exiled and out and that sort of thing. They hoped 3 that by terrorism, subversion, propaganda, and intimidation that they could topple that government without having to go to an all-out military effort. But by 1956 Diem had calmed those things down pretty well, beaten the Binh 8uyen. The Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai sects were collaborating with him. 2n the time beginning in 1956 he started to rebuild the country, the countryside and things of that kind. 1ith our A2D program and our assistance, we worked on a plan for land reform, which turned out to be 3uite a good one, as a matter of fact, eventually. As 2 remember the figures, there were about six hundred thousand acres taken from the larger landlords and divided up into seven acre or three hectare plots for about a hundred and twenty-five thousand families, mostly in the Delta, because thatDs where it was easier to do and where the best productivity on this land was. Q: ,et me ask y u t f ll w n a line c nnected with that. N w, there was a l t f criticism then and later n the sub3ect f land ref rm in S uth 2ietnam, at least there was in the press. And there was s me, I understand, am ng s me members f the missi n, t . Did y u kn w W lf Lade3insky% D9RBRO1C Lade$insky, yes. 2 knew him very well. HeDs the guy that put it in. HeDs the guy that worked it up. Q: Didn4t s mething c me up between him and Diem later% D9RBRO1C Ges, but it wasnDt over the land reform. Q: Oh, it wasn4t ver land ref rm% D9RBRO1C No, no. 1olf Lade$insky had done a wonderful job in Japan, you know, before that. He got them to become eventually self-sufficient in their rice production. HeDd worked in the Philippines and he came down to 5ietnam. And 1olf did a very fine job basically in that field and other agricultural developments, helping with the rubber and new plants and that sort of thing. But there was no Edisagreement thereF. They fought over other things later, because he became a very intimate adviser to Diem. On some of the things 2 worked with 1olf, too. 2Dd only maybe come into it later, 2Dll bring it up now, though. Gou probably have seen the Pentagon Papers or somewhere else or EDavidF HalberstamDs book EThe Best and the BrightestF about the instructions 2 asked for in September 1960 to help Diem to get a better hold on things and get things going in a better direction, more democratic and that sort of thing. 1ell, 1olf was all for me on that sort of business because the land reform was going great guns by then. So 1olf was a great help, but he was advising on all sorts of other things besides land by that time. So when the break came--2Dve forgotten--he and 2 talked it over, but it wasnDt a Kthrow him out of the country in twenty-four hoursK sort of thing. Just a disagreement-- Q: Falling ut. 4 D9RBRO1C --falling out, yes. And he went on to 2ndia from there. But the land reform, 2 tell you, was a darn good success, six hundred thousand acres, a hundred and twenty-five thousand families. 2 visited many times, saw the things and we did the cadastral work and a lot of the other stuff to help them out.