Anglo-Jewish Rescue and Relief Efforts, 1938-1944 Pamela Joy Shatzkes P h D T h e s is Department of International History London School of Economics and Political Science University of London UMI Number: U 144585 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Disscrrlation Publishing UMI U144585 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 3 s 3 'S. Library British Library of Political and Economic Science '. r - H -V Abstract Recent scholarship has focused on the response of Jews in the free world to the plight of European Jewry in Nazi-occupied Europe. The work of Anglo- Jewish refugee organisations in facilitating the arrival of over 50,000 refugees in Britain between 1933-1939 has been variously chronicled as a model of charitable endeavour and a half-hearted effort cramped by insecurity and self- interest. More consistently, scholars argue that Anglo-Jewry failed to respond to the catastrophe of the war years with the resolution and vigour that might have saved more lives. This thesis takes issue with the current consensus on both the pre-war and war periods. Anglo-Jewry was a confident, well-integrated community which tackled the escalating problems of refugee immigration in the 1930s with common sense and administrative expertise born of a long tradition of communal charity. Its achievement is all the more remarkable measured against the scale of the disaster, the constraints of government immigration policy regulations and the organisations' own chronic lack of funds. By contrast, the Anglo-Jewish organisations were hamstrung during the war years by their political naivete and inexperience in dealing with government officials. Although their administrative skills remained valuable in areas of relief work such as internment and parcel schemes, their preoccupation with the Jewish humanitarian issue prevented them from grasping the military and logistical implications of their proposals. Misreading the language of diplomacy, they doggedly pursued aims which were in practice, if not in theory, unrealistic. Unlike most previous literature on the record of Anglo-Jewry during this period, this thesis eschews both the didactic and speculative approaches to historical interpretation. Instead of attempting to apportion blame, or to answer hypothetical questions of responsibility, it offers an evaluation based on the evidence available. The thesis examines the quality and scope of rescue and relief work, both of organisations and individuals. What was done, rather than what should have been done, is the focus of attention. Acknowledgements 4 Abbreviations 6 Introduction: Historiography and Methodology 7 Chapter 1 The Composition and Character of the Anglo-Jewish 17 Community Chapter 2 The Austrian and Czechoslovak Crises, 1938-1939 58 Chapter 3 Escalating Crisis: Kristallnacht and After 87 Chapter 4 National Emergency: Internment and Deportation 113 Chapter 5 Turning Point: The Final Solution - 142 Political Activity (Summer 1942 - Spring 1943) Chapter 6 Impasse and Frustration - 191 Political Activity (Summer 1943 - Autumn 1944) Chapter 7 A Chronicle of Failure? Rescue Efforts, 1942-1944 237 Chapter 8 A Chronicle of Success? Relief Efforts, 1942-1944 280 Conclusion: Lack of Will or Lack of Skill? 322 Bibliography 349 Acknowledgements The idea for this topic originated in a conversation with David Bankier, who made me aware that very little scholarly work has been done on the role of refugee organisations during the Second World War. I wish to express my gratitude to the British Academy for both a three-year studentship and additional funding for research trips to America and Israel. Thanks are also due to the Central Research Fund and to the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, New York, for their generosity, which enabled me to carry out further research. I am grateful to the staff of the various libraries and institutions which allowed me to examine their collections and offered me their assistance. In particular, the Central Zionist Archives (Jerusalem), the Wiener Library (Tel Aviv), Yad Vashem (Jerusalem), the Pubic Record Office (Kew, London), the Board of Deputies Archives held at the London Metropolitan Archives, the Wiener Library (London), Anglo-Jewish Archives held at the Parkes Library (Southampton University), the Rothschild Archives (London), the Agudat Israel World Organisation (New York), the American Joint Distribution Committee (New York) and the American Jewish Archives (Cincinnati). Victor, Simon and Joe Goodman generously allowed me to consult material in their private possession, as did Jonathan Schonfeld. Joseph Munk made some of the Schonfeld papers available to me when they were still in the basement of University College, before being transferred to the Parkes Library. Amy Gottlieb made the CBF files personally available to me, as well as giving of her time and sharing some valuable insights into the period. I would also like to thank all those whom I was able to interview, for their time and helpfulness. I would like to express my appreciation for the interest, support and continuous encouragement of my first supervisor Donald Cameron Watt; of Michael Burleigh, who guided me through the next stage of my research; of John Kent, who encouraged me to complete this work and of Anita Prazmowska for her concern and valued help in the final stages prior to submission, I was also privileged to share my interest in the subject with various scholars, including, among others, Geoffrey Alderman, Richard Bolchover, David Cesarani, John Fox, David Kranzler, Tony Kushner, Louise London, Bill Rubinstein and Meir Sompolinsky. Although some of my views differ from theirs, they all expressed interest in my work. Finally, a note of personal thanks to my friends at the LSE, including Lisa Pine. Effie Pedaliu and Kit Neuman for their willingness to discuss problems and provide constant encouragement. My greatest debt of gratitude is due to my husband Jerry and my family, who never doubted that one day I would finish. AIWO Agudat Israel World Organisation AJA Anglo-Jewish Association AJAC American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati AJYB American Jewish Year Book Board Board of Deputies of British Jews CBF Central British Fund for German Jewry CBFRR Central British Fund for Relief and Rehabilitation CCJR Central Committee for Jewish Refugees CGJ Council for German Jewry COBSRA Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad GRREC Chief Rabbi's Religious Emergency Council FAC Foreign Affairs Committee GJAC German Jewish Aid Committee ICA Jewish Colonisation Association IGCR Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross JC Jewish Chronicle JCRA Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad JDC American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee JFC Joint Foreign Committee JRC Jewish Refugees Committee JTA Jewish Telegraphic Agency JUS Juedische Unterstuetzungsstelie fur das Gouvernement General RJCC Refugee Joint Consultative Committee WJC World Jewish Congress WRB War Refugee Board UNNRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Introduction: Historiography and Methodoiogy Since the pioneering study by Arthur D. Morse in 1967, many scholars have analysed the response of the ‘bystander’ nations to the plight of Jews In Nazi Europe. Historians specialising in America's response to the Holocaust have largely endorsed Morse's contention that the attitude of the Allied nations was one of indifference and perhaps even of complicity in the ‘Final Solution’ of the Jewish question. This view is based on what historians see as the Allies' deliberate restrictions and apathetic rescue efforts. 1 An important element In the evaluation of the ‘bystander’ nations and a partial explanation for their relative inaction has been held to be the failure of their organised Jewish communities to exert pressure on their governments. Some historians maintain that the Jews of the free world must, to some degree, share with the Allied governments the burden of guilt for failing to prevent the destruction of European Jewry. The issue has always been highly sensitive and contentious within Jewish communities themselves. It was first raised during the war, when accusations were levelled by Jewish leaders in Nazi Europe, as well as by anti-establishment Jewish groups in the free world, at 'world' Jewry, for failing to speak out with necessary force.2 This criticism was based on the premise that 'world' Jewry was capable of such action; little attention was given to the political powerlessness of Jewish communities world-wide during the 1930s and 1940s. 3 1 Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died: A Chronicle of American Apathv (New York, 1967). See Bibliography for works by, Richard Breitman and Alan K. Kraut, Henry Feingold, Saul Friedman, Monty Penkower and David Wyman. 2 Michael Dov Weissmandel, Min Hamevtzar (Hebrew for ‘From the Depth of Despair ) (Jerusalem, 1960), cited in Abraham Fuchs, The Unheeded Crv (New York, 1984), pp. 105-6. 3 Henry LFeingold, The Politics of Rescue: The