SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 1 1 of 572 The Australian Army and the War in Iraq 2002-2010 Dr Albert Palazzo Directorate of Army Research & Analysis SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 2 of 572 Table of Contents Preface 6 Ch 1 – The Strategic Decision for War 11 Ch 2 – Australia Joins the Coalition 46 Ch 3 – Preparing for War 69 Ch 4 – Moving to the Gulf 129 Ch 5 – Into Iraq 198 Ch 6 – Australian Logistics and the War 263 Ch 7 – Descent into Anarchy 288 Ch 8 – Australia’s Phase IV Response 330 Ch 9 – Establishing Operation Catalyst 367 Ch 10 - The Threat Environment 421 Ch 11 – Critical Themes 458 Conclusion: Assessing the War in Iraq 514 s22 Glossary 529 Bibliography 535 SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 3 of 572 List of Illustrations SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 4 of 572 List of Photographs SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 33(SECRET )(iii) AUSTEO 5 of 572 List of Tables SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 33(SECRET )(iii) AUSTEO 6 of 572 Preface The origins of this project lay in a conversation that took place between LTGEN Peter Leahy, then the CA, Roger Lee, the Director of the Army History Unit (AHU) and the author, a Senior Research Fellow with what was then the Land Warfare Studies Centre (now Directorate of Army Research and Analysis). The goal articulated for the book was to provide an initial analysis of the Australian Army’s role in its first war since the end of the Vietnam War. It was to record the Army’s accomplishments; highlight the key issues and problems the organisation faced and their resolution; and identify the critical questions with which commanders and planners had to contend. The work also had a secondary goal, to lay the foundation for further analysis once the closed period came to an end in 30 years time. In its original conception the resulting volume was intended for publication as a part of the AHU’s Australian Army Campaign series, of which the author had already contributed two volumes.1 The book was to be unclassified, brief, heavily illustrated and aimed at a junior officer audience. Soon after the project’s commencement its original mandate began to unravel. The requirements of working in the closed period and the need to access classified materials meant that it would 1 See, Albert Palazzo, Battle of Crete, Canberra, Department of Defence - AHU, 2007 and Albert Palazzo, Australian Military Operations in Vietnam, Canberra, Department of Defence - AHU, 2006. SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 7 of 572 prove impossible to produce an unclassified book. The author was not helped in this situation by the ADF’s practice of minimising the amount of information it released to the open domain. It was also not possible to keep the book’s singular focus on the experiences of the Army. While this work does not purport to be an ADF-wide study it did prove necessary to delve into the experiences of the RAN and RAAF, albeit to a much lesser extent. But perhaps most importantly, as the book developed, it became increasingly clear that the truly significant lessons of Australia’s participation in the Coalition against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq lay at the policy level, not at the war’s conduct at the sharp end. This realisation sparked an entire rethink of the author’s approach to his task as well as the identity of the target audience. This book has taken more than three years to research and write. It is no longer a brief quick cut of the war for the enjoyment of the junior officer and general public. Instead, it is a more measured analytical tome whose conclusions will benefit those already of senior rank – or those destined for the highest levels of the ADF – whether military or civilian. It tells the story of an Army that in 2002 was not ready for war and of a defence organisation that would struggle to articulate a mission for the troops it dispatched and maintained in the MEAO over its long course. To some this work may appear overly critical, but if this is its tone it is only because the author believes war to be SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 8 of 572 a serious business, and that the recognition of a problem is the first step in the implementation of its solution. All books must have limits. Consequently, one of the most important responsibilities of an author is to decide which parts of the story will be left to others. To have done otherwise would have resulted in a shallow book of unusable length that would have been of little utility to its readers. In addition, authors must shape their works in the direction they believe most suited. The book’s concentration on the strategic and operational levels of war does not slight the accomplishments of those who worked primarily at the tactical, but their story awaits a different telling. As part of the rationale for this book was to record the memories of war’s participants before they began to fade, and to access documents before they were lost, a note on its sources for the benefit of future scholars is in order. The author interviewed over 75 individuals and corresponded with many others. All gave their time freely and frankly, although it must be admitted that a few needed encouragement from the chain of command. The author would like to thank all of these individuals. Defence holds a wealth of documentary materials on Operations BASTILLE/FALCONER/CATALYST/KRUGER and the author had no significant difficulties with access. If anything it was the sheer quantity of information that was the issue. Moreover, few records have been transferred into document repositories, examined by an archivist or organised for research purposes which meant that this SECRETs33(a)(iii) AUSTEO SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 9 of 572 author had to wear multiple hats. Some records were even still in use and on more than one occasion the author temporarily borrowed documents from their creator’s desk. Again, these individuals have my thanks. Most of the documents accessed for this project are stored electronically within the Defence data management systems. Where possible the author has provided the document’s electronic ID tag, although he must admit that this was not done in all cases. In addition the author was provided with documents from private sources and these are identified in the notes as fully as possible. Any omissions in citations were not deliberate but are rather a reflection of the haste in which the materials were created. Some note of caution on sources would also be prudent, however. The author was struck by the speed with which some types of documents disappeared. For example, he was never able to compile a complete set of post operation reports, a mandatory document that was to be prepared by all force elements. In addition, the long tradition of units maintaining a war diary appears to have lapsed as the author never encountered one, at least not one that reflected the richness of experience of those prepared during previous conflicts. Moreover, some force elements returned from the MEAO with all of their documents stored on portable storage drives. Much of this data remains on these drives and is inaccessible from within Defence’s data management systems. These omissions in the source trail did not impede this project as SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 10 of 572 the author was able to compensate with other sources. However, whether this happy state will hold with the passing of time is at best uncertain. As this author’s task nears its end one final issue remains in the telling of the story of the Australian Army’s war in Iraq. That is the distribution of this volume. As a classified work the author is well aware of the difficulties that this poses for its ready access and dissemination. It is hoped that the Army will be able to overcome this challenge and be willing to distribute this book as widely as possible. The memory and recognition of those who served in Iraq warrants no less. Dr Albert Palazzo Senior Research Fellow Land Warfare Studies Centre Canberra March 2011 SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO SECRET33( )(iii) AUSTEO 11 of 572 Chapter 1 The Decision for War The United States and the Case for War For the administration of the US President, George W Bush, the attacks of September 11th by the al-Qaeda terrorist organisation of Osama bin Laden on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon Building near Washington DC were a watershed event. Bush found himself the leader of a nation at war, and of a people who had just witnessed — and would view over and over again on their televisions — the nation’s greatest loss of life on domestic soil from a foreign attack. As would be expected the United States immediately began to plan to strike back at al-Qaeda, and its leader bin Laden. On 20 September 2001 Bush addressed Congress and delivered an ultimatum to Afghanistan’s Taliban government. Afghanistan had provided al- Qaeda with a safe haven, and Bush made it clear in only slightly tempered language that the Taliban would suffer the same fate as al-Qaeda if they did not meet his demands. These included the handing over of the al-Qaeda leadership to the United States and the permanent closing of all terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, conditions that the Taliban refused to meet.2 The US invasion of Afghanistan commenced on 7 October 2001 and in a rapid 2 George W Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,’ 20 September 2001, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8 html (accessed 25 July 2008).