Food Service Privatization in Michigan’s Prisons: Observations of Corrections Officers March, 2016 Roland Zullo, Ph.D. Associate Research Scientist Institute for Research on Labor, Employment and the Economy University of Michigan 734-998-0156 [email protected] This research was funded by the Institute for Research on Labor, Employment and the Economy (IRLEE) at the University of Michigan. I gratefully thank the Michigan Corrections Officers (MCO) for their cooperation and assistance. The MCO recruited participants, arranged interview locations, and reimbursed participants for travel. I also thank the following staff at IRLEE for research assistance: Breana Morton-Holt, Saku Floyd, Andrew Young, James Hendrickson and Rebecca Maher. 1 Table of Contents Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... 4 Research Purpose .......................................................................................................................... 6 Data and Methods ......................................................................................................................... 6 A Controversial Inception ............................................................................................................ 7 Questionable Performance and Escalating Price ..................................................................... 10 Reading and Interpreting Officer Testimony ........................................................................... 11 Theme 1: Food Service Role and Changes with Privatization ................................................ 12 1.1 Food is Central to Prison Life .......................................................................................... 12 1.2 Food Quality and Quantity Declined ............................................................................... 13 1.3 Slower and Less Reliable Food Service ........................................................................... 16 1.4 Unsanitary Food Handling and Dirty Kitchens .............................................................. 20 Theme 2: Inmate Response ......................................................................................................... 23 2.1 Inmate Protests .................................................................................................................. 23 2.2 Competition for Kitchen Jobs .......................................................................................... 25 2.3 Theft of Food ...................................................................................................................... 27 2.4 Gang Control of Kitchens ................................................................................................. 30 2.5 Inmate Manipulation of Contractor Employees ............................................................. 32 2.6 Anatomy of a Set-Up ......................................................................................................... 35 Theme 3: Divisions and Contested Turf .................................................................................... 40 3.1 Neglecting the Mission of Custody and Security ............................................................ 40 3.2 Disputes over Access and Control of Kitchen Area ........................................................ 41 3.3 Disputes over Inmate Worker Assignments .................................................................... 43 3.4 Disputes over Meal Counts ............................................................................................... 46 Theme 4: Risks to Personnel and Inmates ................................................................................ 51 4.1 Loss of Security Back-up Support ................................................................................... 51 4.2 Inmate Access to Weapons ............................................................................................... 54 4.3 Unjust Treatment of Inmates ........................................................................................... 55 4.4 Inmate to Inmate Conflict................................................................................................. 57 4.5 Inmate Risk due to Food, Sanitation, or Equipment ...................................................... 59 4.6 Risks for Contractor Employees ...................................................................................... 61 Theme 5: Sources of Problems ................................................................................................... 64 5.1 Divided Loyalty and the Profit Motive ............................................................................ 64 2 5.2 Insufficient Contractor Employee Pay ............................................................................ 65 5.3 Contractor Employee Turnover ....................................................................................... 66 5.4 Inadequate Training .......................................................................................................... 67 5.5 Loss of Professionalism ..................................................................................................... 69 5.6 Unstable Staffing ............................................................................................................... 69 5.7 Poor Supervision of Inmate Labor .................................................................................. 71 5.8 Unresponsive Political Leadership ................................................................................... 74 6. Interpretation and Discussion ................................................................................................ 78 6.1 Negative Reciprocating Effects ........................................................................................ 78 6.2 Limitations of the Service Contract ................................................................................. 79 6.3 Hidden and Not-So-Hidden Costs .................................................................................... 80 Appendix A: Aramark Contract Language .............................................................................. 82 3 Executive Summary Prison food service is indelibly joined with the custody and security of inmates. Meals of sufficient quality and quantity that conform to inmate dietary needs, produced in clean environs with sanitized tools, and served punctually temperate inmate behavior, set the rhythm of the prison schedule and are symbols of a just State. Effective policing in the kitchen and chow hall is vital, because these are areas where inmates work, congregate and commit prison infractions. Prior to December 1, 2013, the inmates cooking and serving food in Michigan’s prisons did so under the supervision of a State Food Service Leader. Since then, private firms have supervised food provision, first with Aramark and now Trinity. Using focus group interviews of corrections officers stationed in the chow hall, the goal of this research was to elucidate how privatizing food service affects officers, inmates, contractor personnel, and the mission of custody and security. One theme, which corroborates media accounts, was the dramatic decline in food provision standards. Inferior ingredients, unsanitary conditions, an absence of portion control, shortages and menu substitutes, and disruptions or delays were universally observed. These changes negatively affected the whole prison, and were perceived by officers as a function of the cost- reducing tactics of the contractor. A second theme was the inmate response. Protests by inmates were varied in form and intensity. Individual outbursts occurred, yet more worrisome for officers were collective protests, such as strikes or sit-downs. Inmates also conspired against the contractor by miscounting trays, stealing food and by engaging in other actions that disrupted operations. Contractor employees were largely inexperienced and inadequately trained to work in a prison environment. The authoritative vacuum created by unfit contractor employees was filled by enterprising inmates. Inmates persuaded contractor employees to smuggle in contraband and commit infractions, such as over-familiarity. Contractor employees were manipulated by inmates to form alliances against officers. In some locations gangs gained control the kitchens. A third theme was the divisions between officers and contract employees. In general, the security-minded officers report lax operational practices of contractor staff. Kitchen tools were unsecured, doors were left unlocked, the meal line was not monitored, and inmate workers went unsupervised. Contract employees objected to the removal of inmates from the kitchen, and would grant privileges to inmates that contradicted officer judgment. Officers were accused of sabotaging contractor efforts by stealing food, and were obstructed in their efforts to make security rounds and inspections. Officers even performed tasks that were the responsibility of the private contractor. For instance, to remedy unsanitary kitchen conditions, officers at some facilities supervised a cleaning crew to follow up after the contractor. On occasions when contractor employees failed to show for their shift, officers filled the food supervisor role. In most facilities, officers became obligated to monitor food portions in the serving line and tray counts in order to hold the contractor accountable