CHAPTER XI1 AUSTRALIA DOUBLES THE A.I.F. THEAustralians and New Zealanders who returned from Gallipoli to Egypt were a different force from the adven- turous body that had left Egypt eight months before. They were a military force with strongly established, definite traditions. Not for anything, if he could avoid it, would an Australian now change his loose, faded tu& or battered hat for the smartest cloth or headgear of any other army. Men clung to their Australian uniforms till they were tattered to the limit of decency. Each of the regimental numbers which eight months before had been merely numbers, now carried a poignant meaning for every man serving with the A.I.F., and to some extent even for the nation far away in Australia. The ist, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Battalions-they had rushed Lone Pine; the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th had made that swift advance at Helles; the gth, ioth, I ith, 12th had stormed the Anzac heights; the igth, iqth, igth, 16th had first held Quinn’s, Courtney’s and Pope’s; the battalion numbers of the 2nd Division were becoming equally famous-and so with the light horse, artillery, engineers, field ambulances, transport companies, and casualty clearing stations. Service on the Gallipoli beaches had given a fighting record even to British, Egyptian and Maltese labour units that normally would have served far behind the front. The troops from Gallipoli were urgently desired by Kitchener for the defence of Egypt against the Turkish expedition that threatened to descend on it as soon as the Allies’ evacuation had released the Turkish army ANZAC TO AMIENS [Dec. igiij-Jan. 1916 also. It was estimated that the Turks might concentrate 250,000 men for this purpose; and the plans announced by the Germans might, Lord Kitchener feared, “set the East in a blaze”. His own proposal for countering this threatened invasion by striking at Alexandretta had been rejected by the British government, and he therefore reluctantly fell back on the plan of the British War Office for defending Egypt by holding the line of the Suez Canal. Thither, then, the troops from Gallipoli and others were directed, making a force of some twelve infantry and two cavalry divisions for the defence of Egypt but also as a reserve “for the whole Empire” against other coming needs. General Sir Arcliibald Murray, hitherto Chief of the General Staff at the War Office, was sent to command it. Instead of “making the Canal defend him” --a policy much criticised-he was to defend it by pushing his garrison about eight miles east of it. The line they were to fortify there was already being surveyed and was guarded by a few isolated posts. The forces from Gallipoli urgently needed their ranks to be filled, and also re- equipment and reorganisation in accordance with the new composition of British infantry divisions. For these purposes the two Australian divisions, I st and 2nd, were sent to a huge camp on the hl E OITERRANEAN SEA site of -4rabi Pasha’s old battlefield at Tel Alexand el Kebir, on the desert thirty miles west of Ismailia and the Suez Canal; the New Zea- land and Australian Division was sent to Moascar Camp near by, outside Ismailia. The line east of the Canal was still being surveyed, and the front along the 184 I 9 15-19161 THE A.I.F. DOUBLED Canal was held by one English and one Indian division, the newly arrived 8th Australian Infantry Brigade, and some Indian troops. The nearest large body of Turks comprised 13,000 men at their railhead in southern Palestine at Beersheba, 120 miles away, on the other side ot the Sinai Desert. Turkish forward troops were 70-1 oo miles away, making and guarding preparations for an advance through the desert against Egypt.’ The 8th Brigade was far from being the only Xus- tralian force found in Egypt by the troops returning from Gallipoli. In addition to the A.I.F. headquarters staff in Cairo, and the transport troops there and at Alexandria (the base of the hlediterranean Expeditionary Force), there were in the Australian training and con- valescent depots very great nuinbers of sick and wounded and of reinforcements. Most of those who during recent months would normally have been shipped to Gallipoli had been stopped in Egypt by the decision to abandon the Peninsula. After the Evacuation over 10,ooo joined their units in Lemnos. But the depots near Cairo still held at least zo,ooo, and more were arriving. The chief reason for these numbers was the flood of recruiting in Australia. The plunge of the A.I.F. into Gallipoli, and the sudden, first, terrible casualty lists, had caused more Australians to offer. The sinking of the crowded liner Lusttanta by a submarine without warning increased the bitterness against Germans; but the chiet urge came from the realisation that, contrary to the opti- mistic communiques, the war was going badly-with the repulse of all efforts to break the stalemate in France, and with the drive of the Germans into Russia. It is true that the entry of Italy on the side of the Allies showed that she expected them to win. But eager citizens demanded a properly organised recruiting cainpaign; and, in the energetic recruiting that followed, the enlist- 1During the Gallipoli Campaign Turhish spies and scouo had occa- sionally reached the Canal A mme placed in it had sunk a British areamer. 185 ANZAC TO AMIENS [~girj-Jan.1916 inents rose from Gn50 in April, 10,526 in May, and 12,505 in June, to 36,575 in July, 25,714 in August and 16,571 in September. The numbers in training camps in Aus- tralia swelled from 16,424 in June to 73,963 in October. It happened that in October Australia experienced a change of Prime Ministers: Andrew Fisher, on whom the responsibilities of that position had borne heavily, was appointed to succeed Sir George Reid as High Com- missioner for Australia in London, and William Morris Hughes, who already was the chief force in the Ministry, became Prime Minister in his place. At this juncture a War Census, which largely by the action of Mr Hughes had just been completed, showed that 244,000 single men of military age were still available for enlistment- according to the classification of the statisticians, not, of course, of the medical authorities. Australia was then maintaining overseas a force of some 60,000 men. The government thereupon decided that, in addition to the monthly quota of 9500 reinforcements, it would send, if desired by the British government, 50,000 fresh troops, organised as nine infantry brigades with attendant troops -in effect, three infantry divisions without artillery. This decision, announced on November 26th, would raise Aus- tralia’s oversea force to about 1 io,ooo men. The War Office subsequently indicated that it would prefer three divisions ,complete, but the Defence Department could not promise artillerymen, guns, or rifles. A.I.F. headquarters at the front had been informed of this offer. At that time the A.I.F. was being adminis- tered by General Godley, commander of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, who, during Birdwood’s appoint- ment to the Dardanelles Army, was commander of the Anzac Corps. On arrival in Egypt Godley-who was still holding these commands, with Brudenell White as chief of his staff-was faced by the problem of what to do with the 40,000 unallotted Australian and New Zealand reinforcements already there. He was most desirous of 186 Jan. 19161 THE A.I.F. DOUBLED organising the New Zealand troops in Egypt into a divi- sion, the existing New Zealand Infantry Brigade being expanded with reinforcements to lorm two brigades, and the Rifle Brigade (then arriving from New Zealand) pro- viding the third. The Australian reinforcements could similarly be used to expand the A.I.F. from two divisions into four divisions. These, and the New Zealand Division, officered and trained by experienced solcliers from Gallipoli, could then form two army corps. Later the 50,000 troops arriving from Australia would allow still another division to be formed besides providing reinforcements. Godley suggested that, for the period of the reorganisation, General Birdwood, with General White as chief-of-staff, should administer the whole Aus- tralian and New Zealand forces. It was mid-January 1916, when Godley made this proposal to Sir Archibald Murray. Murray gave his approval against the advice of some of his staff, who had a very low estimate of the capacity oE the Australian depot in Egypt for training officers and N.C.O.’s. Murray especially desired that the 30,000 Australian reinforce- ments, then unallotted at Cairo, and swarming in the streets and hotels, should be brought quickly into con- trol and training in fighting units. Birdwood reaching Egypt on January 1 gth, enthusiastically developed the scheme, being particularly hopeEd that, with two Anzac corps, the War Office might sanction the formation of an Australian and New Zealand Army. He suggested that the third new Australian division should be formed in Australia. The War Office, though not yet prepared to sanction the grouping of the Anzacs into an “Army”, passed on the rest of the proposal to the Australian and New Zealand governments, which presently agreed. Australia promised to send artillerymen with the third division- but it could not send guns or train their crews. This would ultimately give five Australian infantry divisions. 187 ANZAC TO AMIENS [Nov. 1915-Jan.1916 In addition there would be the New Zealand infantry division, and an Anzac mounted division, formed from the Light Horse and New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigades, which had now returned from Anzac to their beloved horses.