INTERVIEWS 151 Interview with Graham Harman man-world relation is no different in kind from any other relation.” And this to me is the key. A good example of an R7 philoso- 1) The words ‘realism’ and ‘anti- pher would be Alfred North Whitehead, realism’ are ancient words, almost who does not treat the human-world relation as old as the history of Western phi- as different in ontological kind from that of losophy itself. Yet these are empty raindrops and a wooden roof. There is at concepts if they are not contextual- best a difference in degree between these ized: one has to specify the classes kinds of relations. With Kant, however, it is of objects to which these words re- quite different. Even if we might read Kant fer. So, can you explain on what as an R1 realist who believes very strongly basis you use different approaches in the independence of the thing-in-itself depending on the class of objects from the mind (which is how I read him) he under consideration? still definitely counts as an A7 philosopher for whom the human-world relation is spe- “Realism” obviously has different senses cial, since it mediates all our talk of all other in philosophy, politics, mathematics, the art relations. Whitehead lets us talk straight- of the novel, and in other areas. But we all away about raindrops striking wood, more or less know what it means in philoso- whereas Kant would say even this talk is phy— the commitment to a world existing mediated by the twelve categories of the independently from the mind. understanding as well as space and time, That’s only a rough approximation, of none of them necessarily applicable beyond course. One of the chief merits of Lee Bra- the realm of appearance. ver’s candidly anti-realist masterpiece A The fact that the human-world relation is Thing of This World: A History of Continental not special also has consequences for the Realism is that Braver carefully distinguishes scope of our knowledge. I see all relation as between six possible meanings of realism a matter of translation. There is no possible and their six possible anti-realist counter- direct access to reality that gives us that re- parts (R1-R6 and A1-A6, respectively). This ality in the flesh, without relation or medi- gives Braver a neat technical shorthand that ation. This holds for human knowledge, allows him to say things like “Philosopher X animal awareness, plant life, and even in- combines R1 realism of the external world animate collision. The human mind has no with A3 and A5 antirealist positions on re- especial entanglement in error and no special lated issues,” and so forth. capacity for direct contact with the real. This However, Braver neglects a key seventh is the point where I seem to disagree with realist thesis that in my review of the book I my colleagues Maurizio Ferraris and Markus called R7, with a counterpart antirealist A7. Gabriel, not to mention Quentin Meillas- Thesis R7 would run as follows: “the hu- soux, all of whom seem to hold that realism ISSUE VI – NUMBER 1 – SUMMER 2014 PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 152 INTERVIEWS also marks an end to the relativity of per- between perspectives than the internal con- spectives. For me, by contrast, realism en- flict within a perspective to measure up to a tails the very opposite: the impossibility of real that eludes it. ever gaining direct knowledge of the world. In analytic philosophy, I believe Nancy Car- twright has said something similar: that she’s 3) Relativism is particularly hard to an ontological realist but a theory anti- refute in ethics. What can be the realist, or something along those lines. consequences of adopting a realist That’s more or less my position as well. perspective, from this point of view? 2) Relativism has often been treated One frequent assumption about realist as an extreme and necessary out- ethics is that it would require the same ob- come of antirealism. Is that so? jective rules to be followed by everyone, And, if not, what is the difference rules somehow grounded in the nature of re- between relativism and antirealism? ality itself— an “ought” grounded in an “is.” This follows the same assumption Allow me to approach this question from found elsewhere in philosophy: namely, that the opposite end instead: anti-relativism has realism does not just mean the existence of a often been treated as a necessary conse- world outside the mind, but also the ability quence of realism! Many people are moved of the mind to know it. to pursue a realist ontology precisely be- But this is a counter-philosophical atti- cause what they worry about most is relativ- tude from the start. Philosophy is phi- ism. Personally, I’m a lot more worried by losophia, or love of wisdom rather than wis- idealism than by relativism. A certain plu- dom itself. Note that Socrates is never able rality of perspectives is inevitable. Indeed, to give us a definition of friendship, justice, realism requires this if we allow that the real virtue, or love, however much he searches can never be equalled or exhausted by any for one. Socrates is not a knower, and we do particular perspective. not escape sophistry through knowledge One of my most observant readers, Jo- claims. seph Goodson of Michigan, has noted the So in a sense, I conclude the opposite of following difference between my position what your question might have suspected. and postmodern relativism. The relativists For me, a realist ethics entails the failure of are all hung up on the incommensurability of objective rules of behavior. Any ethical rule perspectives with each other, while for me can be no more than a rough approximation this is uninteresting, and the real problem is of the reality it attempts to address. Such ap- the incommensurability of any perspective proximation is necessary for social exist- with the real. It’s less a matter of the conflict ence— we can’t necessarily affirm a wildcat PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS ISSUE VI – NUMBER 2 – SUMMER 2014 INTERVIEWS 153 planet of ethical freelancers who invent their 4) Why is it that new realism is es- own standards at every moment. Nonethe- sentially continental? Is it true that, less, each of us has broken basic ethical rules as Quentin Meillassoux put it, “in at various times (not too brazenly, one analytic philosophy there is so much hopes) precisely because ethics often re- realism that they can’t be amazed by quires this. It is easy to imagine moments the capacity of realism”? And, if it when stating a cold, hard truth would is true, what distinguishes analytic amount to needless cruelty, for instance. For realism from continental realism? any ethical rule, we can probably dream up an exceptional situation that would strongly In the first place, Meillassoux’s statement encourage its violation. is basically correct. Realism has always been In fact, this to me is the key fact of ethics: a live option for analytic philosophy, where- everyone seems to be allowed certain ethical as in the continental tradition one has always exceptions on a fairly constant basis. There risked becoming a laughingstock even by is my colleague who regularly speaks of posing the question of realism vs. antirealism. dirty jokes in class streams, and this in cul- Thanks to the phenomenological tradition turally conservative Egypt. If you or I were (which I love for other reasons, unlike Meil- to do it, we would quickly be terminated, lassoux) we have been trained to treat the since there would no doubt be a certain ugly problem of realism as a pseudo-problem. edge to it. But my colleague is able to pull After all, thought is “always already outside off the “crazy uncle” persona that allows itself in intending an object.” However, we him to get away with this pretty regularly can also intend hallucinatory or otherwise despite a number of close calls. Women gen- delusional objects, which does not make erally get away with certain sorts of things them “real” in any defensible sense of the that men generally do not, and certainly vice term. versa. It is by no means the case that we treat Husserl is a full-blown idealist, though al- everyone the same. And while this may so an object-oriented realist— the first to sometimes be the result of “hypocrisy” or a merit that description in the history of phi- “double standard,” the most interesting losophy. There were other philosophers cases are those in which it may be a double such as Kasimir Twardowski (Husserl’s true standard but not mere hypocrisy. Though predecessor in the Brentano School) who the surface value of two actions may be insisted on a doubling, with an object equivalent, their underlying character may outside the mind and a content inside the be completely different in the two cases, mind. We are quick to see that Husserl got based on who carries them out. rid of the “outside the mind” part but rarely notice that he preserved Twarodwski’s dualism, while ingeniously imploding both terms into the phenomenal realm. The British Empiricist tradition disdained objects ISSUE VI – NUMBER 1 – SUMMER 2014 PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 154 INTERVIEWS cist tradition disdained objects and analyzed justified) but also as one/many (which is them away as “bundles of qualities,” but for not). Husserl the object remains somewhat con- As for realism in analytic philosophy, it stant, robust enough to withstand numerous tends to involve too much science-worship changes in qualities.