America, An Aloof Friend The Limits of U.S.-Czechoslovak Relations from Munich to War By Connor Schonta A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History Liberty University 2018 Table of Contents Introduction – 1 Chapter One: “Realization” – 20 Chapter Two: “Consolidation” – 56 Chapter Three: “Occupation” – 99 Chapter Four: “Documentation” – 130 Conclusion – 174 Bibliography – 184 Introduction “There are times when Europe can seem alarmingly big, and two people alarmingly small.”1 It was fall 1938. George F. Kennan, a diplomat at the American legation in Prague, was moving into a new apartment with his wife, Annelise. Europe was at a crossroads, mostly because Adolf Hitler, chancellor of Germany, was snatching up territories he felt belonged to the Reich. He had already gotten Austria, and he now wanted parts of Czechoslovakia. Consequently, Prague, Czechoslovakia’s capital city, became the center of the world’s attention, as chaos and war threatened to swallow central Europe whole. The United States, though having a diplomatic presence in Czechoslovakia, made sure to stay out of Europe’s newest crisis. The administration of President Franklin Roosevelt was intent on remaining neutral to a European imbroglio. Thus, Kennan and his wife, along with all the other Americans working in Prague, could only watch the events transpire, contemplating their relative smallness in light of Europe’s big—immense—problems. Such feelings—that is, one’s smallness in the face of Europe’s sheer complexity—would continue to figure prominently into America’s relationship with Czechoslovakia over the next eleven months, and altogether, they aptly represent the peculiarities of U.S.-Czechoslovak diplomacy in the year leading up to World War II. It was from the Schonborn palace and its 127 rooms that America’s diplomats to Czechoslovakia carried out their daily work. Located in Prague’s historic Mala Strana district, the palace is situated just a few hundred meters west of the capital’s great waterway, the Vltava River. The Schonborn’s initial buildings were constructed in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War, 1 George F. Kennan, Unpublished Memoirs, “Part II: Prague—Munich to Occupation,” 1939, George Kennan Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library, 14. 1 and by the twentieth century it held great historical value to the public.2 With vast rooms, extensive gardens, and ornate architecture, it procured fond memories, and not the least bit of awe, from its American inhabitants. And despite the tumultuous events of 1938 and 1939, the palace’s terraced garden always offered “silence and serenity” to those who needed it. From the Schonborn, one could catch sight of both the Hrad and the Charles Bridge, worthy reminders of Prague’s enduring democracy and international flare. When the crises of September 1938 had reached a frightening pitch, and after wives and children had been sent out of the country, the American legation staff hunkered down in the palace together, outfitting a few of its rooms to something akin to school dormitories.3 In the months following Munich, it was primarily from the Schonborn that America’s diplomats observed Czechoslovakia’s neighbors, most of all Hitler’s Germany, squeeze the life from the embattled state, and with it, the special bond that had long personified U.S.-Czechoslovak relations. From 1918 to 1938, the United States and Czechoslovakia shared unique, friendly diplomatic relations, or what some even called “special” relations.4 Circumstances changed drastically in 1938 as a result of the Munich Agreement and its aftermath, and more broadly speaking as a result of Hitler’s foreign policy. While grounded in shared history and common values, the U.S.-Czechoslovak connection that existed prior to World War II was often implicit 2 Richard Crane, the first American diplomat to Czechoslovakia, purchased the palace in 1919 and sold it to the U.S. government in 1925. National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, 124.60F1/348; The Schonborn had even been classified as a national monument. In a 1930 report on the palace, the American inspectors made sure to point out that the Schonborn was much more beautiful than the British, French, and Italian legation buildings. NARA, RG 59, 124.60F/283.5. 3 Kennan, “Memoirs Part II,” 7. The Hrad, or Prague Castle, is the presidential castle in Prague. The Charles Bridge is a major pedestrian thoroughfare and tourist epicenter. 4 This sentiment was expressed in a number of capacities, both official and unofficial, but a good example is a message sent by Wilbur Carr, American minister to Czechoslovakia, just a few days before he closed the U.S. embassy in March 1939. Wanting the United States to provide relief to Czech refuges, Carr cited the “special situation” that existed between the two countries, noting Washington and Prague’s long history of reciprocal friendliness, and how the United States even served as the model to which Czechoslovakia always looked. Carr to Hull, March 19, 1939, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1939, General, Vol. I, 50. 2 and exaggerated. During the twenty years of Czechoslovakia’s First Republic, though, it hardly mattered whether the bond was perceived or tangible, as circumstances in the world held to a state which, for all its hardships, allowed Washington and Prague to maintain normal relations without having to question the actual value of their friendly relationship. It was not until fall 1938 that the efficacy of the two countries’ relations were put to the test, and they did not fare well. Where did the special bond come from? Much of it came as a result of Czechoslovakia’s independence movement, and the role played by the United States therein. The notion that the United States, and specifically President Woodrow Wilson, fought hard on behalf of Czechoslovakia to secure the former’s independence is not true, or it is at last too simple of an explanation. Wilson’s commitment to liberalism and ‘self-determination,’ which in itself is an endlessly complex idea, did not necessarily extend to granting recognition to central Europe’s various ethnic groups, and he preferred that Austria-Hungary outlive the war. It was only when this possibility lost all tenability that Czechoslovakia and the successor states, essentially through fait accompli, earned Wilson’s blessing.5 That being said, America’s eventual support of an independent Czechoslovakia, which became formalized in November 1918, was crucial to the Czechoslovak cause. As one of the tantamount figures of the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson, and by extension the United States, was a necessary factor in legitimizing Czechoslovakia’s right to exist and guaranteeing her borders.6 5 For a thorough unpacking of Wilson’s ideas of self-determination and his role in creating the postwar order, see Trygve Throntveit, “The Fable of the Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self- Determination,” Diplomatic History 35, no. 3 (2011): 445-481. 6 For an appraisal of Czechoslovakia’s drive toward independence, including American involvement, see Vera Olivova, The Doomed Democracy: Czechoslovakia in a Disrupted Europe, 1914-1938 (Montreal: McGill- Queen’s University Press, 1972), 52-100. 3 As would become a trend in U.S.-Czechoslovak relations, it was the efforts and eagerness displayed by Czechoslovaks toward Americans that proved most important in establishing the special bond. As mentioned, Wilson and most other leaders did not seriously consider the national aspirations of Czechs and Slovaks until the end of the war when other options had failed.7 On the other hand, Czech leaders, zealous for Habsburg dissolution and autonomy for their people, actively campaigned for independence. The most central figure in the Czechoslovak struggle for independence, and by extension the most important person to the development of a U.S.-Czechoslovak bond, was Tomas Masaryk. Long an admirer of American democracy, Masaryk’s ties to the United States turned personal when he married an American, Charlotte Garrigue, in 1878. They moved to Prague, where Masaryk had taken a university professorship, and while there Masaryk became an important voice in Czech politics. The couple made frequent trips to the United States, allowing Masaryk to mingle with influential American circles and float ideas of Czech autonomy.8 Toward the end of the war, Masaryk, who at that point was still drumming up support for an independent state for Czechs and Slovaks, moved to the United States and established a base of operations in Washington D.C. where he gained Wilson’s ear.9 In May 1918 in Pittsburgh, delegations of expatriate Czechs and Slovaks drafted the Pittsburgh Agreement, which declared the intent of the two groups to establish a unified Czechoslovakia. Five months later, on October 17, Masaryk provided the State Department with a draft of the Czechoslovak declaration of independence. The following day, Czechoslovakia published its declaration of independence 7 Victor Mamatey, “The Establishment of the Republic,” in A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918- 1948, eds. Victor Mamatey & Radomir Luza (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 20-22. 8 Paul Selver, Masaryk: A Biography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 285-293. 9 For a thorough account of Masaryk’s efforts in America, see Josef Kalvoda, “Masaryk in America in 1918,” Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 27, no. 1 (1979): 85-99. 4 from Paris, and just a short time later, Prague’s National Committee issued its first law declaring that the Czechoslovak state “has come into being.”10 Efforts, however tempered or calculated, came from the American side, too. In early October, Secretary of State Robert Lansing publically stated U.S. support of Czech and Slovak independence.11 Later, in the midst of the Czechs preparing their declaration, Wilson indicated that he no longer intended to ‘save’ the Habsburg monarchy and gave mention to Czechoslovak autonomy.