The Epigenesis of Pure Reason: Systematicity in Kant’s Critical Philosophy by Farshid Baghai A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Copyright © 2013 by Farshid Baghai Dissertation Abstract Farshid Baghai Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto July 2013 The Epigenesis of Pure Reason: Systematicity in Kant’s Critical Philosophy Kant’s critical philosophy explicitly aspires to be systematic. Whether it achieves this aspiration is another question. Comparing pure reason to “an organized body,” Kant requires a critique of pure reason to be “entirely complete down to the least elements,” and regards this completeness or systematicity as a matter of “all or nothing” (Prol 4:263). He even speaks of critique as “a system of the epigenesis of pure reason” (KrV B167), i.e., an organic whole or system of possible ends that pure reason generates and also organizes entirely out of itself. Nonetheless, the epigenetic model of systematicity, which underlies critical philosophy, remains buried in Kant’s corpus. Neither Kant nor any interpreter of critical philosophy makes clear why and how pure reason generates and organizes itself as a self-standing operating system or whole of possible ends. They also do not explicate what this epigenetic conception of systematicity entails for the functioning of theoretical reason, practical reason, and the power of judgement. This dissertation investigates the question of the systematicity of pure reason in Kant’s critical philosophy, presenting an epigenetic interpretation of Critique of Pure Reason through the lens of the transcendental doctrine of method. It argues that, in its primary sense, a critique of pure reason is the methodological epigenesis – i.e., self- ii generation and self-organization – of pure reason as an organic system or embryonic whole of possible ends. The dissertation proceeds by discussing: 1) what motivates pure reason to generate itself as a system or whole of possible ends; 2) how pure reason generates itself as a whole of possible ends; 3) how pure reason structures this whole into organic parts; and 4) how pure reason’s self-generation and self-organization make the table of judgements transcendentally systematic. In contrast to prevalent readings of Kant, this methodological interpretation articulates the most basic – i.e., disciplinary – sense of critique, and accounts for the epigenetic systematicity of critical philosophy. In a broader philosophical sense, the account demonstrates how critique – or transcendental negativity – is the generative ground of all positivity. It suggests new ways to conceive the relation between Kant’s critical philosophy and post-Kantian philosophies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. More specifically, this interpretation reveals that Kant’s critical philosophy is closer to German Idealism than usually thought, and yet very different when their common focus on systematicity is better understood. iii Acknowledgements While doing research for and writing this dissertation, I have received much help and support, in many different ways. I would like to thank my supervisor, Paul Franks, and my readers, Rebecca Comay and Lambert Zuidervaart. Paul saw the significance of this project in its inception, and gave me unconditional freedom to pursue my thoughts. From his work, I learned how to learn from the history of philosophy. Rebecca’s thinking has inspired me from the first year in graduate school. Her belief in and enthusiasm for the project helped me persevere through difficult times in writing. Lambert’s writings and seminars heightened my sensitivities to the redemptive significance of philosophy. His encouragement and probing comments helped improve my research significantly. Thanks are also due to Stephen Engstrom, Robert Gibbs, Margaret Morrison, Amy Mullin, and Ulrich Schlösser. Stephen Engstrom appraised the dissertation in a way that was at once generous and critical. Robert Gibbs and Ulrich Schlösser kindly agreed to read the dissertation on short notice and to be examiners at my final oral defense. Margaret Morrison, my teaching mentor, gave welcome support at various stages throughout my graduate studies. Amy Mullin warmly accepted to be on my dissertation committee before I decided to shift my focus from the third Critique to the first Critique. I am grateful to James Porter who read the dissertation draft carefully, from the beginning to the end, and made numerous useful suggestions. I am also thankful to Katayoun Baghai and Rachel Bryant whose feedback on parts of the dissertation helped improve its clarity. Margaret Opoku-Pare offered kind assistance in all administrative matters. This doctoral research has been facilitated by an Ontario Graduate Scholarship, from the Government of Ontario, and a Canada Graduate Scholarship, from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I would like to thank my friends Azar, Bahar, Doug, James, Katy, Mahmood, Nasrin, Paula, and Rachel. With them, I have shared my frustrations, disillusionments, excitements, and hopes, including those I experienced during my time in graduate school. I am fortunate to enjoy their friendships through the twists and turns of life. I am appreciative of the support of my sister, Fereshteh, and my brothers, Parviz and Rashid, during my graduate studies. Above all, I am thankful to my parents for their care and sacrifice. This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Safa Bahadori, and to the memory of my father, Hamid Baghai. iv Contents Introduction 1 1. Metaphysics and the Problem of Method 63 2. Self-Generation of the Whole of Pure Reason 114 3. Self-Organization of the Parts of Pure Reason 200 4. The Systematicity of the Table of Judgements 262 Conclusion 313 Bibliography 316 v “Of course, the triadic form must not be regarded as scientific when it is reduced to a lifeless schema, a mere shadow, and when scientific organization is degraded into a table of terms. Kant rediscovered this triadic form by instinct, but in his work it was still lifeless and uncomprehended;” Hegel “… Kant has at least provided the first impulse which could carry philosophy beyond ordinary consciousness, and has at least shown the ground of the object that appears in consciousness; but he never even considered clearly, let alone explained, that this ground of explanation lying beyond consciousness is in the end no more than our own ideal activity…” Schelling “I am … certain that Kant has entertained the thought of such a system, that all of the things he has actually presented are fragments and results of this system, and that his assertions make coherent sense only on this assumption. Perhaps he himself has not thought this system through with sufficient precision and clarity to be able to present it to others; or perhaps he has indeed done so, but simply did not wish to present it to others…. ” Fichte “The greatest and perhaps only utility of all philosophy of pure reason is ... only negative.” “Transcendental philosophy is the act of consciousness whereby the subject becomes the originator of itself....” Kant vi Introduction Kant’s critical philosophy explicitly aspires to be systematic. Whether it achieves this aspiration is another question. Comparing pure reason to “an organized body,” Kant requires a critique of pure reason to be “entirely complete down to the least elements,” and regards this completeness or systematicity as a matter of “all or nothing” (Prol 4:263).1 He even speaks of critique as “a system of the epigenesis of pure reason” (KrV B167), i.e., an organic whole or system of possible ends that pure reason generates and also organizes entirely out of itself. Nonetheless, the epigenetic model of systematicity, which underlies critical philosophy, remains buried in Kant’s corpus. Neither Kant nor any interpreter of critical philosophy makes clear why and how pure reason generates and organizes itself as a self-standing operating system or whole of possible ends. They also do not explicate what this epigenetic conception of systematicity entails for the functioning of theoretical reason, practical reason, and the power of judgement. This dissertation investigates the question of the epigenesis, or genetic-systematic self-determination, of pure reason. The following introduction articulates the necessity, task, and structure of such investigation in four sections. The first section presents an overview of major responses to the question of systematicity in critical philosophy, and shows the need to take up this question in terms of the epigenesis of pure reason. The second section poses the central argument of the dissertation: critique of pure reason is in essence the methodological epigenesis – i.e., self-generation and self-organization – of pure reason as an embryonic whole or organic system of possible ends. The third section demonstrates that the failure to appreciate the epigenetic nature of the critical system lies 1 Abbreviations used in quoting and referring to Kant’s works are included in the bibliography. 1 primarily in the widespread neglect of the first Critique as a treatise on the method of metaphysics. Emphasizing the need for a close reading of the transcendental doctrine of method as the culminating section of the first Critique, the last section of the introduction outlines the task and structure of the ensuing investigation. 1. The systematicity of pure reason Kant on the systematicity of pure reason Despite characterizing the critical system in terms of the epigenesis of pure reason, Kant does not provide a clear account of the formation and functioning of this system. In fact, Kant’s own statements on the systematicity of critical philosophy seem inconsistent and contradictory. In the first edition of the first Critique, Kant claims that his comprehensive approach to the perennial problems of metaphysics makes critique systematic: “there cannot be a single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or at least to the solution of which the key has not been provided” (KrV Axiii).