Analysis selection for JCC July 2021 Foreign troops’ deployment in Mozambique likely reducing insurgent capability, but funding and lifespan of operation unknown 6 Aug 2021 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis Tanzania Air Force freight aircraft reportedly unloaded troops and military supplies at Pemba airport in Cabo Delgado province, northern Mozambique, between 1 and 3 August. • In the past month, to counter the insurgency in northern Mozambique, an estimated total of 3,300 to 4,000 troops have been deployed in the country by Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, as well as small contingents from Portugal and the United States. The South African navy’s SAS Makhanda offshore patrol vessel, docked at Pemba port, is part of a small maritime contingent. South Africa has also deployed mechanised infantry, while Botswana, Rwanda, and South Africa have stationed helicopters in Pemba. Rwanda has established a logistical base in Nacala, Nampula province, northern Mozambique, and reportedly has deployed 1,000 personnel in Pemba and Mueda, Cabo Delgado province. Rwanda has taken a more aggressive stance than other countries, with its forces retaking from insurgents and holding the city of Awasse on 27 July, 40 kilometres west of Mocímboa da Praia, Cabo Delgado. The other countries’ militaries and governments have been in discussions on organising as a Southern African Development Community standby force (SADC-SF), but the command structure remains undefined as yet. Following a disagreement between Mozambique and South Africa over which country should head the mission, South African Major-General Xolani Mankayi, who commanded the South African National Defence Force peacekeeping mission in Burundi from 2001 to 2009, was appointed commander during the second half of July. • The Rwandan troops will very likely be able to secure a limited area within Mozambique’s northeastern Cabo Delgado province. However, the 1,000 Rwandan soldiers will be unlikely to secure a wider perimeter due to the focused nature of their offensive operations. According to an IHS Markit source, insurgents at least partly deserted Mocímboa da Praia in early August to avoid a confrontation with Rwandan troops, and based themselves 30 km south, near the Messalo river. The insurgents will likely carry out hit-and-run attacks on roads and villages in this district, and in the future, possibly attempt to develop crude improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to target troops present in the area. However, the insurgents are likely to be deterred from staging a large-scale assault on a city, due to their need to defend against the foreign forces arriving. Pemba will most likely remain an aspirational target, but the presence of the SADC-SF and the SAS Makhanda ship will very likely deter an assault on the city as long as they remain in place. • If the SADC-SF achieves enough co-ordination to provide support to Rwandan troops, the insurgency is likely to lose its current level of territorial control of the northeast of Mozambique and to be reduced to carrying out hit-and-run attacks. Such support from the SADC-SF would probably include ensuring a Confidential | Copyright © 2021 IHS Markit Ltd Analysis selection for JCC - July 2021 month-long presence in key cities, performing regular patrols on the province’s roads, providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and airpower (attack helicopters). The insurgents will very likely fully withdraw from Palma, Mocímboa da Praia, Macomia, and Muidumbe districts in Cabo Delgado province. This loss of territorial control will diminish the insurgents’ sources of revenues by hindering their ability to extort civilians, engage in smuggling, and ransom kidnapped civilians. The remaining insurgents will very likely attempt to carry out occasional small-arms and crude IED attacks on Mozambique Armed Defence Forces (Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique: FADM) and SADC-SF soldiers and attempt to loot, extort, and carry out attacks on civilians in the northern Niassa province’s rural areas. • Insurgents’ tactic of avoiding confrontation with the armies will likely lead to quick claims of victory by the government-aligned forces. Unless the SADC-SF secures external funding, it is unlikely to be able to sustain itself beyond six months, which, combined with a perceived quick victory, is likely to lead to the withdrawal of the SADC-SF in early 2022. However, the insurgency's social roots will most probably remain unaddressed, leading the threat to reappear in the future. • The SADC-SF and Rwandan troops’ deployments increase the likelihood of the ruling Mozambican Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique: FRELIMO) party’s opposed factions calling for an extraordinary central committee congress in an effort to replace President Felipe Nyusi as party leader before the end of his mandate in 2024 and to call for an early general election. All the factions of FRELIMO have been against the presence of foreign troops in the country, something that President Nyusi was also against but eventually relented to under regional pressure. The government forces’ inability to mount efficient counterterrorism operations on their own, despite the president having been minister of defence from 2008 to 2014, as well as being from Cabo Delgado province and an ethnic Makonde, one of the groups specifically being targeted for execution by Cabo Delgado insurgents, is likely to weaken his authority within FRELIMO. | 2 Analysis selection for JCC - July 2021 Indicators of changing risk environment Decreasing risk • If the SADC-SF finds an external source of funding, it will likely be able to sustain its presence for over six months, increasing its ability to secure cities in Cabo Delgado province. Increasing risk • The SADC-SF does not co-ordinate well, leading to ineffective operations, including friendly fire incidents, civilian casualties, and/or criminal accusations that fuel Mozambican domestic opposition to the foreign troops’ presence. US withdrawal timeline precipitates Taliban attacks on Afghan provincial capitals, representing hardening negotiations to seek interim government 6 Aug 2021 - Country Risk | Headline Analysis The deputy chairman of Helmand’s provincial council, Majid Akhund, said on 3 August that the Taliban now controlled nine out of the 10 districts of the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah. Fighting has also intensified during the past week in other provincial capitals, specifically Herat and Kandahar. The Taliban also claimed the 3 August attack in the capital Kabul, where a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) was detonated at the residence of Afghan Defence Minister Bismillah Mohammadi, who was not injured. The VBIED attack was followed by multiple explosions and shooting in Kabul’s ‘Green Zone’, with at least 20 people injured. • The Taliban’s recent attacks on key provincial capitals reflects a hardening of its negotiation strategy to demand the formation of an interim government. Although the Taliban and the Afghan government issued a statement on 18 July reaffirming their commitment for a political resolution, the increasing attacks on Lashkar Gah, Herat, and Kandahar mark a hardening of the Taliban’s negotiating position. Initial Taliban commitments to not target these cities were probably intended as leverage against a potentially protracted timeline of the withdrawal of US troops. With the withdrawal now expected by end-August – although the official date is 11 September – the Taliban calculates that an expedited timeline for intensifying its offensives would probably force Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to resign and allow for an interim government that it would dominate, which is a key Taliban demand for a ceasefire. On 2 August, President Ghani told parliament that the offensives were a consequence of the “hasty” US withdrawal, but offered no indication of resigning. The attacks, however, are unlikely to represent a broader shift in Taliban intent to take control of the country militarily, even if it has the capability to do so. The Taliban is wary of internationally delegitimising the resultant government: for instance, on 2 August, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, said that the United States would consider the Taliban a “pariah state” should it control the country by force. • Afghan forces successfully resisting the Taliban in these cities would be a key marker of President Ghani’s options to delay a Taliban-dominated interim government. Media reports as of 6 August showed that Afghan forces were still fighting the Taliban in Lashkar Gah. Similarly in Herat, Afghan forces were attempting to push Taliban militants back towards the peripheries of the city and were still in control of the city’s civilian airport, with fighting continuing in Kandahar as well. Afghan security forces have a numerical advantage over the Taliban, although their morale is very likely to be low, given the Taliban’s increasing military momentum. Holding these cities would be key to the forces’ security, and successfully pushing the Taliban back would be a boost to their morale, also allowing Ghani to not yield to Taliban demands for the interim government. Security forces’ morale would likely be further aided by civilian support, which took the form of anti-Taliban street protests in Herat and Kabul this week. Crucial to this would be continued close air support from the US, which the US has not yet confirmed following its withdrawal from Bagram and Kandahar | 3 Analysis selection for JCC - July 2021 air bases earlier in July. Although the Afghan Air Force has the capability to strike Taliban positions, its experience, ability to co-ordinate with ground forces, munition stocks, and aircraft maintenance capability are lower than those of US forces. • Even if the Taliban assumes military control of these cities, it is unlikely that the group intends to hold them indefinitely. For the aforementioned reasons of seeking a political resolution and forming a legitimate international government, should the Taliban come to control Lashkar Gah, Herat, and/or Kandahar, this is unlikely to be intended as indefinite.