THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS TREVOR FINDLAY The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations Stockholm International Peace Research Institute SIPRI is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace. The Institute is financed mainly by the Swedish Parliament. The staff and the Governing Board are international. The Institute also has an Advisory Committee as an international consultative body. The Governing Board is not responsible for the views expressed in the publications of the Institute. Governing Board Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Chairman (Sweden) Dr Catherine M. Kelleher, Vice-Chairman (United States) Dr Alexei G. Arbatov (Russia) Dr Willem F. van Eekelen (Netherlands) Dr Nabil Elaraby (Egypt) Sir Marrack Goulding (United Kingdom) Professor Helga Haftendorn (Germany) Professor Ronald G. Sutherland (Canada) The Director Director Alyson J. K. Bailes (United Kingdom) Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden Cable: SIPRI Telephone: 46 8/655 97 00 Telefax: 46 8/655 97 33 Email: [email protected] Internet URL: http://www.sipri.org The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations Trevor Findlay OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2002 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © SIPRI 2002 First published 2002 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of SIPRI or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organizations. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to SIPRI, Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70 Solna, Sweden You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Data available ISBN 0-19-829282-1 Typeset and originated by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., Guildford and King’s Lynn Contents Preface viii Acknowledgements ix Acronyms and abbreviations x 1. Introduction 1 I. Peace operations: a typology 3 II. Mandating the use of force by UN peace operations 7 III. Command and control of the use of force 9 IV. Regulating the use of force 13 V. The origins of the self-defence norm 14 VI. Myths, puzzles and paradoxes about the UN’s use of force 16 2. The emergence of the self-defence norm: UNEF I 20 I. Genesis and mandate 20 II. Use-of-force rules 23 III. Application and evolution of the use-of-force rules 26 IV. UNEF’s experience of the use of force 44 V. Codification of the UNEF I experience 46 VI. Conclusions 49 3. Breaking the rules: peace enforcement in the Congo 51 I. Genesis, mandate and deployment 51 II. Policy and directives on the use of force 55 III. The use of force in practice and the evolution of policy 62 IV. The use of force in Katanga: a lapse into peace enforcement 71 V. Conclusions: lessons of the Congo 81 Figure 3.1. Summary of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s 74 instructions to ONUC, 7 or 8 September 1961 4. The Congo to Lebanon: from self-defence to ‘defence of the mission’ 87 I. The impact of the Congo on the UN’s use-of-force norms 87 and rules II. The UN Force in Cyprus (1964 to the present) 89 III. The UN Emergency Force II (1973–79) 99 IV. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (1978 to the present) 103 V. UN doctrine on the use of force by the 1980s 121 Table 4.1. The Nordic UN Tactical Manual situation schedule for the 122 use of force vi THE USE OF FORCE IN UN PEACE OPERATIONS 5. After the cold war: use-of-force dilemmas resurface 124 I. The immediate post-cold war missions and the use of force 124 II. Use-of-force norms under strain 148 III. The peace enforcement debate 154 IV. The UN reconsiders the use-of-force issue 160 6. Somalia: crossing the Mogadishu Line 166 I. The United Task Force (1993–94) 166 II. The second UN Operation in Somalia (1993–95) 184 III. Somalia and the use-of-force issue 204 7. Bosnia: from white-painted tanks to air strikes 219 I. The use of force by UNPROFOR 219 II. The use of force by NATO on behalf of UNPROFOR 231 III. The use of force by UNPROFOR and NATO for peace 252 enforcement IV. The lessons of the use of force in Bosnia 262 V. Conclusions 271 8. From Haiti to Rwanda to Sierra Leone: new missions, old 273 dilemmas I. The UN Mission in Haiti (1993–96) 273 II. The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (1993–94) 276 III. New missions in the Balkans 284 IV. The East Timor operations 287 V. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (1999 to the present) 296 9. Retreat, resurgence and reform: rethinking the use of force by the 315 United Nations I. Back to basics? 315 II. The UN struggles to learn lessons 320 III. The Annan era 326 IV. The Brahimi Report 332 V. Beyond Brahimi 337 Table 9.1. Mission support requirements for effective deployment 341 Figure 9.1. Rapid deployment 340 10. Conclusions 351 I. The use of force and the UN: a reckoning 351 II. Improving the ability of UN peace operations to use (and 360 avoid using) force III. Peace enforcement and the UN 374 IV. Towards a UN peace operations doctrine? 384 V. Conclusions 389 CONTENTS vii Appendix 1. National peace operations doctrines 391 I. The USA 391 II. The UK 399 III. France 404 IV. Australia 406 V. Canada 407 VI. Russia 409 Table A1. Operational variables in US Army Field Manual FM 100-23 394 Figure A.1. The British Army’s conceptual model of peace support 400 operations Appendix 2. Rules of engagement 411 1. Selected ONUC operations directives 411 2. Use-of-force instructions for UNEF-II 416 3. Rules of engagement for UNPROFOR 417 4. Rules of engagement for UNITAF: ROE card for Operation Restore 422 Hope 5. Rules of engagement for UNOSOM II 423 Appendix 3. The UN master list of numbered rules of engagement 425 Appendix 4. The Charter of the United Nations 428 1. Chapter VI. Pacific settlement of disputes 428 2. Chapter VII. Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches 429 of the peace, and acts of aggression Bibliography 431 Index 469 Preface This book is a product of SIPRI’s Project on Peacekeeping and Regional Security, which was led from its inception in 1993 to 1997 by Dr Trevor Findlay, the author. The aim of the study is to examine the use of force in all its forms—in self-defence, in defence of the mission and as a tool of peace enforcement. One of the most troubling issues that faced the international community in the closing decade of the 20th century was the use of force by the United Nations peace operations in situations where the ultimate goal was the alleviation or ending of armed conflict. Such missions were dubbed ‘peace enforcement’. The difficulty is that they were carried out by peacekeepers—UN forces designed for the relatively benign function of monitoring borders between states after conflict has ended. Complex civil wars in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, in which UN peacekeeping missions were deployed with disastrous results, raised several stark questions. When and how should UN peacekeepers use force to protect themselves or protect their mission, or, most troublingly, to ensure the compliance of recalcitrant parties with peace accords? Is a ‘peace enforcement’ role for peacekeepers impossible? Is there a middle ground between peace- keeping and enforcement or is there a stark ‘Mogadishu Line’ across which peacekeeping should never stray? More recent UN operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone have kept such issues at the forefront of international concern. This project was made possible by the funding received from various sources. We are indebted to all the external funders involved for supporting this study. The Australian Government funded a conference organized by SIPRI on the subject in Stockholm in April 1995 which was attended by senior academics, former UN force commanders, and UN and government officials. The then Australian Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans, opened and participated in that meeting. Funding for subsequent research was provided by the US Institute of Peace in Washington, DC, and by an Evans-Grawemeyer Travel Award to Dr Findlay by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. We would like to thank Dr Findlay for the invaluable work he has done to bring this project to completion. In publishing this book he makes a significant contribution to both the theory and the practice of the use of force in peace operations. Adam Daniel Rotfeld Director of SIPRI to June 2002 Alyson J.