CHAPTER JX MORLANCOURT-MARCH 28~~AND 30~11 ll-rrrr2E the left of the 3rd .4ustralian Division was a\\istiiig the 35th British Division to repel tlie attacks on 'I'reus. its right was watching rather perplesedly, from the folds aliove the Somme, scattered evidences of a hattle \\hich was apparently proceeding across tlie region southward f roni the rivet- At the saiiie time preparations were 111 progress for immediately mdertnking the projected advance of the division's line. Brigadier-General Cannan, who was visited during :he niorning by his divisional commander, General Motlash, obtained from him the impression that this advance \vas intended rather as a demonstration-to itnpress the Germans with the fact that their progress in that sector was at an end. Cannan accordingly put forward a plan, already prepared, for a patrol action. The 43rd, holding the higher part of the slope above the Soninie, would try to steal, by daylight patrols, the un- occupied portion of the knuckle in its front and possibly part of tlie nest spur, in front of Morlan- court. The ground so occupied would afterwards be consolidated Monash also visited General McNicoll, commanding his northern brigade. the xotli. and arranged for an advance on its front also. Tt was probably after these visits. 1)ut before noon, that Monash received from VI I Corps an important communication. It had been made known that the conference at Doullens had arrived at the decision--welcomed with intense satisfaction throughout the British Army-to give suprenie control over 212 z6th-28th Mar., 19181 MORLANCOURT 213 the Allies’ forces on the Western Front to a single leader- the French general, Foch. Foch had evidently been discussing with General Byng of the Third Army the possibility of that army’s passing to the offensive, and had apparently ascertained that lie was favourable to an attack, when possible, astride of the Sonime.’ Particulars of the message now received by Rlonash are nut recorded, but in a letter written on the 28th to Birdwood, whom he kept fully informed of his doings, he says: I am now considering whether it will be feasible to push forward my line between the rivers in the direction of Morlancourt, as I understand that General Foch is anxious, in view of his future plans, that we should get as far in the direction of Bray as we can. An Australian. who saw both Monash and MacLagan that day, notes in his diary that, south of the Sonime, the Germans have only the remains of the 5th Army (whatever that is) and the 1st Cavalry Division in front of them. Up at the 4th and 3rd Divisions we cannot get a word as to what the real position there is Only they say that General Foch has promised that his army wlll cnncentrate somewhere there within the next few days. He wanLed Konash to take the hill by Morlancourt at once, because from there his detraining point was overlooked. The critical position was ol)viously now south of the Sonime, and the chief anxiety of all ranks at this time was whether the remnant of the Fifth Army would manage to delay the enemy long enough to enable the French divisions to come up before their intended assembly area was overrun. The Germans who crossed the Somme at C6risy 011 the previous evening had seized the main Roman road behind the Fifth Army’s left flank, and were now astride of it at WarfusCe, the next village east of Villers-Bretonneux. \Yhether the left flank of the Fifth Army still existed was unknown. But the 1st Cavalry Division was holding an emergency line south of the Somme in continuation of the 3rd Division’s. The old French defence-line, so far as it had not been filled in and ploughed over by farmers, continued there also, far across country southwards. Since March 26th, it liad been garrisoned at widely scattered points by a small scratch force consisting of tunnellers, instructors troni army schools. and 500 American engineers-some 2,000 in all, -. ‘Cetirral Raullnson on taking commanrl of the Flfth Army ihat afternoon wrcDtr to Foch “I alii In accord with General Byng oil the subject of an offensive along thc tu0 banks of thc bonime. It is not feashle for tbc moment.” 214 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [&th Mar., ~gre first organised under General Gough’s instructions by Major-General Grant, chief engineer of the Fifth Army, and now commanded by hlajor-General Carey,* whose headquarters were at the old army headquarters at Villers- Rretonne~ix.~The Fifth Army’s main line was still ahead of this in the south, and the 61st British Division was being brought up to Marcelcave, in this line south-west of WariusBe, in order to retake WarfusCe. But the 61st was a tired division, which had been engaged in the Fifth Army’s operations since March 2rst. To assist it, the 1st Cavalry Division would attack at the same time. As the cavalry would then be operating east of the alignment of Sailly-Laurette, General Congreve first asked the 3rd Aus- tralian Division to suppress the Germans in that village with artillery-fire. Later, at 11.20 a.m., on learning that the 61st Division was to have begun its advance at 11, he ordered the 3rd Division to send strong patrols to Sailly-Laurette. If the village was found unoccupied, they were to seize it, but in any case they were to guard the left of the cavalry. 011 these grounds Monash at noon ordered an advance by the whole line of the 3rd Division. The operation was to be carried out in two leaps, each of 1,000 yards: first, to a line on the forward slone of the cross-ridce which the division was ‘h1aj:Gen. G. G. S. Carey, C.B, CM.G.; R.A. BG.RA., XI Corps, 1g15/17. commanded 139th Inf Bde, 1917/18. 20th Div., 1g18/1g. Officer of British Regular Army; of Wiltshlre. b. London, 13 Feb, 1867. *General Cough had shifted his headquarters on hfarch a5 to Dury, south of Amiens. 18th Mar, 19181 MORLANCOURT 215 already holding; second, to the crest of the next cross-ridge, immediately short of Morlancourt. The first advance was to I)c made by both brigades at 4 p.m., and the second at 7; but, on the right, the second advance would be fully attempted only if Sailly-Laurette had previously been taken ; if not, the right flank would be swung hack north of the village. IVith what strength each brigade should attack, and how its troops should be disposed, appears to have been left by hfonash to the discretion of the brigadiers ; but, possibly through lack of time, or difficulty of communication, or even through general inexperience in the sudden operations of open warfare, that prudent and normal procedure was not accompanied by close consultation between the brigadiers to whom it was committed or by such action from above as would ensure that the detailed plans of the two subordinates dovetailed. The attack thus took on an entirely different character in the two brigade sectors. General McNicoll of the loth Brigade, as his left, at Treux Wood, was already on the first objective, decided to attack in the first stage by throwing a reserve battalion, the @i, through his right battalion. In the second stage, his other reserve battalion, the 3gth, would be thrown through his left, and, together with the 40th, would advance to the second objective. The history of the 4Oth,‘ to the young acting-coniinander of which, Major Payne,6 the brigadier gave verbal orders, says that “it was anticipated that very little resistance would be met with, as the ground . was probably held by the enemy advance guard only. The object of the advance was to seize the high ground west of hlorlancourt before the ma111 body of the enemy came up.” The division’s front was now served by two brigades of field artillery, but both of these were north of the Ancre; one, a weak British brigade, the 18gth, from a firing position a mile north of Ribeniont, directly enfiladed the eiieiny ; the other, the 7th A.F.A. Brigade, had, during the night, collie into position in the valley behind Heilly, and could assist the advance by firing at long range from the rear. Under these circumstances, no elaborate artillery support ‘ Thr Fortieth, by Capt. F. C. Green. p. 116 [.leut.-Col L. H Payne. D.S.O., V.D.: 40th Bn Commission agent; of New Town. Tas : b. Burnic. Tas.. 5 Nov., 1888. 216 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Sth Mar., 1518 was possible. The orders merely stated that the artillery “ would be able to assist if required.” The 40th Battalion had camped in the trees south of the Ancre near Heilly station. At 3.40 it marched by platoons at fifty yards’ interval, diagonally towards the centre of the peninsula, so as to advance with its right resting on the Corliie-Bray road. On reaching the crest, it opened into artillery formation, with two companies in front and two in rear, all advancing in sections in file. At this point there came into view not only the front line close ahead but the open plateau reaching to far beyond Morlancourt. Guns which the troops could actually see on the hill behind Morlancourt began to shell them with accuracy. The officers of the 40th understood that, at this stage, the support battalion (1Ist) of the 11th Brigade would be joining up on their flank, in order to make a similar advance on the southern side of the road; I)ut no sign of it could be seen.