The Political Economy of State Controls in the Transition from War to Peace, c. 1945-1955 Henry Irving University of Leeds School of History October 2012 Submitted in Accordance with the Requirements for the degree of PhD The Candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to others This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no quotation form the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement © 2012 The University of Leeds and Henry Irving The right of Henry Irving to be identified as Author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 i Acknowledgements The following pages are the result of a process that began in Leeds during December 2007. Then, as an eager third year history student, I was asked during the course of a presentation on the 1945-51 Attlee governments how one could define a control. My answer was concise: I simply did not know. Moreover, despite a niggling curiosity, nor did I really care. After all, who would? This, it must be admitted, was a fairly inauspicious start. However, given that I have now spent five years thinking about the issues raised, it was also quite fitting. The question “what is a control?” certainly proved me wrong. Indeed, continuing to beguile, it has demonstrated itself to be one that should be given considerable attention. Although rooted in this very personal episode, the opportunity to undertake this research would not have been possible without the help and support of numerous individuals and institutions. I must firstly thank both Richard Whiting and Owen Hartley for their invaluable guidance throughout the research process. Their encouragement, coupled with Richard’s patience in considering my many drafts, has helped to make this thesis what it is. My personal debt to each is matched by a practical one to the AHRC, the University of Leeds and the Economic History Society for having made this project financially possible. I am equally grateful for the kind help given to me by numerous staff at the Brotherton library, the Bodleian Library, the British Library of Political and Economic Science, the Conservative and Labour Party Archives, the National Archives and the University of Sussex’s special collections. It is they who have allowed this research to become more than an idea. Of course, a special mention is reserved for the family of Ely Devons. Without them, and especially David, my understanding of this topic would have remained that of a curious outsider. On a similarly personal level, I would also like to thank all of those at the University of Leeds who have helped me to appreciate the irrationality of administration and encouraged me to keep asking “what is a control?”. My continued interest in this i ii question – and willingness to explore its many aspects – certainly owes a great deal to the many discussions that I have enjoyed with colleagues and in departmental seminars and colloquia. I am particularly grateful to all those who have attended the Historians’ Workshop, to everyone with whom I have shared the delights of P424 and to those who encouraged me to embrace uncertainty whilst in Beijing. It is they who have made this process worthwhile. In fact, Devons and Jewkes would not have provided better company. My patient (and geographically well-placed) family also deserve mention for having made this research logistically bearable. So, too, Rafe Hallett, Will Jackson and Kevin Linch for encouraging me to apply my curiosity into other spheres. The last words are, however, reserved for Jennifer Fellows – without her support and inspiration, none of this would have been possible. ii Abstract This thesis uses a detailed study of industrial economic controls to examine the broader relationship between popular politics and economic policy in Britain between 1945 and 1955. Combining the personal insights of administrators with a high level intellectual history, it begins by analysing the relationship between controls and attempts to manage the economy during and after the Second World War. After tracing these developments in administration and usage, it will demonstrate that the ambiguous nature of individual controls allowed for the system as a whole to be used as a symbolic device within an intensely political debate. Indeed, far from raising entirely technical questions, it will show that controls were able to reduce complex economics into a simple form and provide a tangible link between everyday economics and potent philosophical critiques. They were, in this sense, able to symbolise both administrative inefficiencies and a rhetorical ‘choice between two ways of life’. Nevertheless, acknowledging the inherent artificiality of a debate that had imbued individual controls with an undue sense of significance, it will be argued that this discussion testified to certain shared ‘high level’ assumptions and did little to clarify confusions within the system. Thus, although the debates could be politically advantageous in the short term, it will be shown that they made little difference to the actual mechanisms of control and served to entrench barriers between the public and policy formers to which all were ostensibly dedicated to overcome. iii iii Contents Acknowledgements pp. i-ii Abstract p. iii Contents p. iv Abbreviations pp. v-vii Introduction pp. 1-13 Chapter One Planning and Economic Controls pp. 14-48 Chapter Two The Development of Economic Controls Improvisation and Adaptation, c. 1939-1947 pp. 49-97 Chapter Three The Development of Economic Controls Rethinking and Reaction, c. 1947-1955 pp. 98-148 Chapter Four The Politics of Controls and Freedom pp. 149-194 Chapter Five The Limits of Public Control pp. 195-235 Conclusion The Political Economy of Controls pp. 236-244 Bibliography pp. 245-272 iv iv Abbreviations ACP Conservative Party Advisory Committee on Policy BIPO British Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll) BAC British Aluminium Company BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BMC British Metal Corporation CC Co-ordinating Committee of the Departmental Examinations into Controls CCO Conservative Central Office CE Controls and Efficiency Committee CEC Committee on Economic Controls CEIS Central Economic Information Service CEPS Central Economic Planning Service CIPC Conservative Party Industrial Policy Committee COI Central Office of Information CPA Conservative Party Archives CPC Conservative Political Centre CRD Conservative Research Department CSO Central Statistical Office DDGstatsP Ministry of Aircraft Production Directorate of Statistics and Planning DR55 Defence Regulation 55 EC Working Party on Economic Controls v vi EC(S) Economic Section ED Official Steering Committee on Economic Development EIU Economic Information Unit ELC Emergency Legislation Committee EL(EC) ELC Working Party on Economic Controls EOWG Economic Organisation Working Group EPB Economic Planning Board FBI Federation of British Industries GOC Government Organisation Committee GPC Working Party on Government Purchases and Controls HMSO His/Her Majesty’s Stationary Office IEA Institute for Economic Affairs IH Home Information Service IPC Investment Programmes Committee LPA Labour Party Archives LP(I) Lord President’s Industrial Subcommittee LPRD Labour Party Research Department LSE London School of Economics and Political Science MAP Ministry of Aircraft Planning MFP Ministry of Fuel and Power M-O Mass Observation MOI Ministry of Information NEC Labour Party National Executive Committee NFRB New Fabian Research Bureau NFY The Next Five Years Group vii NIB National Investment Board OC Official Committee on Control PEP Political and Economic Planning PORD Conservative Party Public Opinion Research Department PWPCC Conservative Party Post-War Problems Consultative Committee RAF Royal Air Force R(OI) Minister of Reconstruction’s Organisation of Industry Subcommittee SCG Socialist Clarity Group TLS The Times Literary Supplement TNA The National Archives TUC Trade Unions’ Congress VE Day Victory in Europe Day Introduction Understanding Economic Controls The number of materials which sooner or later came under some form of government control during the Second World War ran into the many hundreds, and no single volume, or indeed series of volumes, could fully set out the history of these controls. Joel Hurstfield, The Control of Raw Materials (London, 1953), p. xiii. There [exists] a terrifying mass of original documents, and there are thousands of people who actually took part in the performance, each with his own ideas of how, when and why things happened … How much easier it will be for some future historian to rewrite it all when the events can be viewed in dispassionate perspective, when mice have eaten some of the files, and when none of those who were alive at the time are there to point out the distant connection between what was written on the official files and what actually happened. Ely Devons, ‘The Control of Raw Materials’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 116:4 (1953), 466-7 (p. 466). This thesis owes its existence to ambiguity. Although it is explicitly focused on the political economy of those controls enforced by the state in the decade after 1945, it will become apparent that this is a subject mired in misunderstanding and one that is not easy to categorise. The history of such controls, it will be argued, is one of uncertainty. This conclusion was perhaps inevitable. After all,