One problem led to another, and the Apache helicopters never flew a combat mission in Kosovo. Task Force Hawk By Benjamin S. Lambeth An Army AH-64 Apache in Albania. At right, a line of Apaches in Bosnia. nly days after Operation Allied dorse the deployment. That approval Force commenced in March finally came on Day 12 of Allied 1999, Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Force. The US Defense Department NATO’s Supreme Allied Com- at first indicated that it would take omander Europe, asked the up to 10 days to deploy the package. United States Army to deploy In the end, it took 17 days just to a contingent of its AH-64 Apache field the first battalion of Apaches, attack helicopters to the combat zone which arrived in Albania on April to provide a better close-in capabil- 21. ity against enemy tanks and armored At first glance, the idea of using personnel carriers than that offered Apaches to reinforce NATO’s fixed- by fixed-wing fighters, which re- wing aircraft seemed entirely appro- mained restricted to operating at me- priate, considering that the AH-64 dium altitudes as a general rule. Clark had been acquired by the Army ex- initially had hoped to deploy this pressly to engage and destroy enemy force to Macedonia, where the roads armor. As Pentagon spokesman Ken- and airfields were better and the ter- neth Bacon put it in announcing the rain was less challenging. The Mace- deployment, they would offer NATO donian government, however, de- “the type of tank-killing capability clined to grant permission because it that the bad weather has denied us. It was already swamped by the flood will give us the capability to get up of Kosovar refugees, so Albania was close and personal to the Milosevic sought instead as the best available armor units units in Kosovo.” In a alternative. normal weapons load, the Apache Within four hours, NATO ap- mounts up to 16 Hellfire anti-tank proved Clark’s request. It took more missiles, 76 folding-fin anti-person- than a week, however, for the US nel rockets, and 1,200 rounds of 30 and Albanian governments to en- mm armor-piercing ammunition. 78 AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2002 US Army photo by Spc. Johnny H. Vazquez With that armament, it gained de- fenses, military engineers, and head- ing vehicles; an armor company with served distinction by destroying more quarters overhead. As the core of 15 M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks; than 500 Iraqi armored vehicles dur- this larger force complement, now a howitzer battery with eight 155 ing Operation Desert Storm. Yet in designated Task Force Hawk, the mm artillery pieces; a construction Desert Storm, the Apaches had de- Apaches were drawn from the Army’s engineer company; a short-range air ployed as an organic component of 11th Aviation Brigade stationed at defense battery with eight more Brad- two fully fielded US Army corps. In Illesheim, Germany. The deployment ley armored fighting vehicles armed this case, the Army was being asked package included, however, not only with Stinger infrared surface-to-air by SACEUR to cobble together an the two battalions of AH-64s but missiles; a smoke generator platoon; ad hoc task force designed to oper- also 26 UH-60L Black Hawk and a brigade headquarters complement; ate essentially on its own, without CH-47D Chinook helicopters from and diverse other elements. In all, to the backstopping support of a fielded the 12th Aviation Regiment at Wies- backstop the deployment of 24 at- US ground combat presence in the baden, Germany. Additional assets tack helicopters to Albania, Task theater. The Army is not configured whose deployment was deemed es- Force Hawk ended up being accom- to undertake such ad hoc deploy- sential for supporting the Apaches panied by a support train of no fewer ments, and its units do not train for included a light infantry company; a than 5,350 Army personnel. them. Instead, an Apache battalion Multiple Launch Rocket System pla- To be sure, there was a legitimate normally deploys only as a part of a toon with three MLRS vehicles; a force-protection rationale behind this larger Army division or corps, with high-mobility multipurpose wheeled accompanying train of equipment and all of the latter’s organically attached vehicle (humvee) anti-tank company personnel. Unlike the Marines, who elements. equipped with 38 armed utility ve- deployed 24 F/A-18D fighters to hicles; a military intelligence pla- Hungary only a few weeks thereaf- Apaches, and More toon; a military police platoon; and a ter and had them flying combat mis- Accordingly, the Army was driven combat service support team. The sions within days with nothing even by its own standard operating proce- Army further determined a need for approaching Hawk’s overhead and dures to supplement the two Apache its Apaches to be accompanied by a support baggage, Army planners had battalions with a heavy additional mechanized infantry company equip- to be concerned about the inherent contingent of ground forces, air de- ped with 14 Bradley armored fight- risks of deploying a comparable num- AIR FORCE Magazine / February 2002 79 ber of Apaches on terrain that was way and ramp specifications to ac- tion concluded that the first accident not that of a NATO ally, that lacked commodate the more capacious C-5.) had been caused by the pilot’s hav- any semblance of a friendly ground In the end, it took more than 500 C- ing mistakenly landed short of his force presence, and that could easily 17 sorties, moving some 22,000 short intended touchdown point. The sec- have invited a VJ (for Vojska Jugo- tons in all, to transfer Hawk in its ond was attributed to an apparent slavskaya, the Serb army) cross-bor- entirety. Commenting later on the failure of the tail rotor, considering der attack in the absence of a US deployment, one Army officer com- that the aircraft had been observed ground force sufficient to render that plained that the Army is “still orga- to enter a rapid uncontrolled spiral an unacceptable gamble for VJ com- nized to fight in the Fulda Gap.” during the last moments before its manders. Even the outgoing Army Chief of impact with the ground. That said, it bears noting that the Staff, Gen. Dennis J. Reimer, admit- threat of Serbian forces coming ted in an internal memo to senior Rising Costs across the Albanian border did not Army staff officers once the deploy- As of May 31, the cost of the appear to be a matter of great con- ment package had finally been as- Task Force Hawk deployment had cern to anyone in the Allied Force sembled in theater that the manifold reached $254 million, much of that command hierarchy before the ar- problems encountered by Hawk had constituting the expense for the rival of Task Force Hawk, even underscored a “need for more adap- hundreds of C-17 sorties that had though there were US troops already tive force packaging methodology.” been needed to haul all the equip- on the ground. The troops, who were In all events, 23 Apaches with their ment from Germany to Albania, not provided with any comparable attached equipment and personnel plus the additional costs of build- force protection package, were in arrived in Albania in late April. (The ing base camps and port services Albania as a part of Joint Task Force 24th Apache had developed hydrau- and conducting mission rehearsals. Shining Hope, the Albanian refugee lic trouble en route and remained on Yet despite SACEUR’s intentions relief effort. the ground in Italy.) No sooner had to the contrary, the Apaches flew not the Army declared all but one of the a single combat mission during the Baggage Problems aircraft ready for combat on April entire remainder of Operation Al- As one might have expected with 26 when, only hours later, one crashed lied Force. The reason given by then– that much additional equipment and at the Tirana airfield in full view of JCS Chairman Army Gen. Henry H. personnel, however, the Apache de- reporters who had been authorized Shelton was that Serb air defenses in ployment soon encountered the pre- to televise the flight. Neither crew Kosovo, although noticeably de- dictable consequences of the Army’s member was injured, but the acci- graded by early May, remained ef- decision to accompany the AH-64s dent made for an inauspicious start fective enough to warrant keeping with such a surfeit of arguably un- for the widely touted deployment. the Apaches out of action until sup- necessary extra baggage. It was at Less than two weeks later, on May 5, pression of enemy air defenses op- first estimated that 200 USAF C-17 a second accident occurred, this time erations had “reduced the risk to the transport sorties would be needed to killing both crew members during a very minimum.” airlift the assorted support elements night training mission some 46 miles In a final coda to the Army’s with which the Apaches had been north of Tirana. The aircraft was plagued Task Force Hawk experi- burdened. (The airport at Tirana, carrying a full load of weapons and ence, Shelton conceded later in a Albania, lacked the required taxi- extra fuel. A subsequent investiga- written response to questions from the Senate Armed Services Commit- tee that “the anticipated benefit of employing the Apaches against dis- persed forces in a high-threat envi- ronment did not outweigh the risk to our pilots.” Shelton added that by the time the Apache deployment had reached the point where it was ready to engage in combat, VJ ground for- USAF photo by SrA.