Journal of Genocide Research, 2014 Vol. 16, Nos. 2–3, 263–280, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2014.936704 Israel, Nigeria and the Biafra civil war, 1967–70 ZACH LEVEY The Biafran secession of 1967 and ensuing civil war presented Israel with an acute dilemma. Israel sought to maintain correct relations with the Federal Government of Nigeria, which viewed as a hostile act any support rendered to the Biafran separatists. At the same time, the plight of the Igbos reminded many Israelis of the Holocaust. This article makes use of Israeli archival material to shed new light on how Israel shaped its policy towards the conflict. The Israeli public, press and parliament called for assistance to Biafra, evoking their country’s deep moral obligation to help a people in distress. Israel aided Biafra, including, in a clandestine manner, the supply of weapons for which the secessionists pressed, in addition to humanitarian assistance. At the same time, Israel also sold arms to Nigeria, seeking to prevent a diplomatic rupture with the Lagos government that would have affected Israel’s position in all of black Africa. Introduction This article analyses Israeli policy towards the Nigerian civil war, exploring Israel’s relations with both the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) and separatist Biafra. Israel encountered obstacles in Nigeria that turned that country into one of the most difficult tests of its African statecraft. The most severe challenge Israel faced in Nigeria was the 1967 Biafran secession, the product of Nigeria’s acute political and ethnic conflicts. By that time, Israel had begun to sell Nigeria military equipment on a modest scale and hoped to heighten security ties in order to further consolidate relations with the Nigerian govern- ment. The civil war forced Israel to choose between the expansion of ties with Nigeria, an exigency of realpolitik, and the moral imperative of aiding a people whose plight was, for many Israelis, a disturbing reminder of recent Jewish experi- ence. While the literature on the Nigerian civil war affords some insight into Israel’s policy towards the conflict, files made available by the Israel State Archives (restrictions notwithstanding) comprise the material most salient to this study. The documentary record reveals that Israel transferred arms to Nigeria while at the same time secretly providing assistance to the Biafrans. This study is divided into four sections, covering Israel’s relationship with Nigeria from the time of that country’s independence in 1960 to its severing of ties in October 1973. The first section explains the circumstances in which # 2014 Taylor & Francis ZACH LEVEY Israel entered Nigeria, Muslim resistance to that presence, and Israeli efforts to create a defence connection with Lagos. The second and third sections constitute the principal part of this work, accounting for how Israel dealt with the Biafran secession and the exigency of maintaining relations with the FMG. These sections examine the Israeli view of the plight of the Igbos, efforts to provide relief, the Igbo perception of Israel, and the diplomatic circumstances that determined the scope of Israeli assistance to Biafra. The fourth section analyses briefly Israel’s position in Lagos following the civil war, concluding with the break in relations that Nigeria effected in October 1973. Entry to Nigeria and the defence connection with Lagos: 1957–66 Israel was certain that Nigeria, the most populous country on the continent (fifty- five million in 1960) and rich in oil, would have a great influence on African poli- tics. The Israeli foreign ministry was determined to establish full diplomatic relations upon that colony’s receipt of independence (1 October 1960). Ehud Avriel, ambassador to Ghana and a close confidant of both Prime Minister David Ben Gurion and Foreign Minister Golda Meir, cautioned that were Israel to fail to establish ties with Nigeria, ‘all of our work in West Africa will have come to naught’.1 Chief C. D. Akran, minister of development for Nigeria’s Western Region, visited Israel in October 1957 and agreed to increased trade and technical assist- ance.2 Four months later, Meir included Nigeria in the itinerary of her trip to Africa. The Nigerians received her warmly, and Meir returned to Tel Aviv with a ‘full head of steam about West Africa’.3 Later that year, Chief Akin Deko, min- ister of agriculture for Western Nigeria, led a delegation to Israel. But Britain rejected the Israeli application to open a consular office in Lagos, the Foreign Office claiming that it would result in an Egyptian demand for similar status, to which it was averse. As British diplomats noted, the Egyptian government used Islam to exert political influence on the predominantly Muslim Northern Region.4 The legislature formed after Nigeria’s 1959 elections obtained Westmin- ster’s consent to the country’s independence,5 and in late March 1960 Britain finally allowed Israel to open a legation in Lagos. Israeli specialists were already aiding Nigeria; a joint enterprise for rural water prospecting operated in the Eastern Region, and Nigersol, the Israeli-Nigerian construction company, had been established.6 In July 1960, Levi Eshkol, Israel’s minister of finance, toured West Africa and announced a $10 million loan to the FMG.7 An Arab reaction followed quickly. Egypt’s envoy met with Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and premier of the Northern Region, and the two men deliv- ered speeches on Muslim unity.8 This rhetoric did not alter the fact that the Israelis were ‘in at ground level’ by the time of Nigeria’s independence. Israel had estab- lished good relations with the leading political figures of both the country’s Eastern and Western Regions. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who headed the Action Group in the predominantly Yoruba Western Region, was friendly to Israel.9 As Parfitt writes, the Igbo of the Eastern Region had since the early 264 ISRAEL, NIGERIA AND THE BIAFRA CIVIL WAR nineteenth century been imbued with the idea that their origins were traceable to the Lost Tribes of Israel, their language heavily influenced by Hebrew.10 Edith Bruder examines the lore of the Igbos’ Eri, Nri and Ozubulu clans, which claim descent from the Israelite tribes Gad, Zevulun and Menashe. She notes that the Igbo compare their traditional customs, including circumcision on the eighth day and ‘exclusiveness’, with those of the ancient Israelites.11 Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (‘Zik’), leader of the (largely Igbo-based) National Congress of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), admired Israel and had warmly supported its bid for diplomatic representation in Nigeria.12 Daniel Lis adds that the establishment of Israel had a profound effect on the Igbo and Azikiwe personally. Azikiwe gave expression to this deep affinity in a meeting in late 1960 with Hanan Yavor, Israel’s first ambas- sador in Lagos. Yavor presented ‘Zik’ with a silver goblet inlaid with stones from Eilat, moving the Igbo leader to speak, as the ambassador reported, ‘excitedly and knowledgeably’ about King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba.13 This was, for the Israelis, an auspicious beginning. Nevertheless, the conserva- tive Muslim leaders of the Northern Region viewed askance relations with the Jewish state.14 The Sardauna forbade the entry of any Israeli to the cities of Mai- duguri and Sokoto, sites the Nigerians considered holy to Islam.15 Not all of the Northern Region’s politicians were so ill disposed. Aminu Kano, the Muslim reformer and northern politician, had met Meir at Ghana’s independence celebra- tion in 1957. Aminu openly criticized the Sardauna’s attitude and eventually visited Israel.16 But such exceptions notwithstanding, the stubborn opposition of the northern ‘traditionalists’ to normal ties was an abiding encumbrance upon Israel’s undertakings in Nigeria. The Israeli ministry of defence expended considerable effort in establishing security ties with Nigeria, because the country’s size and economic potential made it a highly attractive market to purveyors of arms and military training. By early 1961, both the Israeli ministry of defence and the prime minister’s office began to press for entry to the Nigerian arms market. The Federal Govern- ment intended to abrogate the Anglo-Nigerian defence pact, and in September 1961 Azikiwe apprised Yavor of Nigeria’s determination to ‘conduct our military planning with no dependence upon Britain’.17 ‘Zik’ noted that the Lagos govern- ment would turn to the United Arab Republic (UAR), India or even Israel, resist- ance of the Northern Region to the last of these alternatives notwithstanding.18 During the next three years, the Israeli defence ministry worked to cultivate an arms relationship with Nigeria, but elicited little response. In April 1964, the defence ministry noted a few ‘encouraging signs’. In October 1963, Israel deliv- ered to Nigeria several mortars from Soltam Ltd., an Israeli company that manu- factured both civilian goods and military hardware. The Nigerian army had requested these mortars, and the defence ministry hoped that Nigeria would buy ammunition and additional items from Israel.19 The Nigerians turned instead to Finland.20 Soltam Ltd. urged the embassy in Lagos to convince the Nigerians to end their ‘quiet boycott’ of Israel’s defence industries.21 In 1964, Mashav (the foreign ministry’s division for international cooperation) received 71 Nigerians for study in Israel, bringing the number of trainees from that 265 ZACH LEVEY country up to 80. But in other areas Israeli ties with Nigeria languished, and Israel made little progress in defence affairs. That year the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) hosted fourteen Nigeria Airways trainees on a course for mechanics,22 but the defence ministry succeeded in selling the Nigerians almost no military equipment, failing to interest them even in the Gadna and Nahal paramilitary frameworks that other African countries had found attractive.23 Only in 1966, following the January coup in which the Sardauna was assassinated, was Israel able to break into the Nigerian arms market.