FIREFORCE EXPOSED The Rhodesian security forces and their role in defending white supremacy CONTENTS Page FOREWORD iii INTRODUCTION 1 WHOCONTROLSTHESECURITYFORCES? 2 MILITARY SPENDING 3 MANPOWERFORTHESECURITYFORCES 5 CONSCRIPTION -WHITES, ASIANS & COLOUREDS 7 CONSCRIPTION -AFRICANS 9 THE ARMY 12 THE SELOUS SCOUTS 17 THE POLICE FORCE 20 THE GUARD FORCE 24 INTERNAL AFFAIRS 25 THE AIR FORCE 26 AIRFIELDS AND AIRSTRIPS 30 MERCENARIES 31 SECURITYFORCEAUXILIARIES 33 SOUTH AFRICAN COLLABORATION 36 THE RHODESIAN ARMS INDUSTRY 37 CHEMICALWARFARE 39 RACISM IN THE SECURITY FORCES 40 DISAFFECTION AND DESERTION 42 CONCLUSION 45 AppendixI:ARMSSUPPLIESTORHODESIA 46 Appendix I1: INVENTORY OF RHODESIAN ARMAMENTS 50 Appendix III: RHODESIAN AIRCRAFT REPORTED SHOT DOWN 51 BY THE PATRIOTIC FRONT Appendix IV: SELECTED PRESS CUTTINGS 52 ANTI-APARTHEID MOVEMENT 89 Charlotte Street, London W1P. 2DQ November 1979 ISBN No. 0 900065 04 4 Typset at Alden Press Oxford, London and Northampton Printed by Anvil Printers Ltd. (T.U.) FOREWORD This book is being published at a time of heightening war in Southern Africa. While'the future of the people of Zimbabwe is being debated at Lancaster House in London, events are taking place on the ground which, while they receive little coverage in the Western press and media, clearly reveal the aggressive and menacing character of the white supremacist regimes. In the current discussions on the future of Zimbabwe, there is major division about the process of transition to genuine majority rule. The illegal regime in Salisbury and the British government both insist that the existing Rhodesian security forces should be used to "police" the transitional period. The Patriotic Front, however, has demanded that the transitional period be supervised by an impartial international force, followed by the establishment of an army and police force which genuinely serve the interests of a new and democratic Zimbabwe. In the process of transforming the present war situation to a peaceful society, it is impossible to conceive of those forces which have upheld the system of white supremacy for so many years being "impartial" in any way. This book gives details which are crucial to a proper understanding of the Rhodesian situation. It must also be remembered that the Rhodesian forces operate, in effect, as an informal extension of the South African armed forces, both in their repressive role inside Zimbabwe and in the attacks which they repeatedly carry out against the front line states. The retention of these forces will assure South Africa that its interests in the region will be more adequately protected, and that Pretoria will exercise substantial influence and control over the process of change. Anyone who reads this book cannot but reach the conclusion that no genuine peace is possible without disbanding the existing forces. Abdul S. Minty Hon. Secretary, Anti-Apartheid Movement INTRODUCTION In August 1979, Bishop Muzorewawas reminded by a British television interviewer that at the opening of the Geneva constitutional talks nearly three years before, he had delivered a hard-hitting speech in which he had accused the Rhodesian army of conducting a -reign of terror and extermination against the rural population of Zimbabwe. Interviewer: Do you think that's changed now you're head of the security forces? Muzorewa: I believe it has been customary in the history of decolonisation by the British government, that the forces who were there before are taken by those who come to power. The only thing we must do now, and that I must do now, is (to ensure) that they behave in a relationship to the people (which) reflects that they are forces of a popularly elected government. And that is what we are doing, that is what I am doing as the head of these forces. (Taken from a live television interview with Bishop Muzorewa, ITV "Face the Press", 5.8.79) Bishop Muzorewa's revised opinion of the Rodesian security forces is perhaps the most dramatic symptom of his decision to abandon the aims and ideals of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle and to throw in his lot with the illegal regime. From the time of his entry on to the political stage in 1971, up to and even beyond the Geneva talks, Muzorewa was an outspoken critic of the brutal methods used by the regime's police, army and airforce to suppress popular support for the liberation struggle. But today, he and his colleagues in the "government of ZimbabweRhodesia" do not simply argue that the security forces have been brought under their control, but that they have somehow undergone a far-reaching change in character and have emerged as a "army of the people", responsive to, and ready to defend, the interests of the Zimbabwean people as a whole. Part of the purpose of this publication is to examine the truth of this claim. Bishop Muzorewa's present position is not, however, a particularly surprising one, in the light of the role that the Rhodesian security forces have always played in defending the colonial system. From the earliest days of white conquest, Rhodesia enjoyed a significantly different status from that of Britain's other African colonies, in that the white settlers were able to build up and control their own police, army and airforce. As such, the security forces have always been the guarantee of white power and privilege. For decades they have been responsible for enforcing a mass of racist and exploitative laws and practices, and for suppressing African opposition to colonial rule, both through peaceful means and in recent years through the armed liberation struggle. They have committed crimes in clear contravention of the Geneva Conventions on the international laws of war, and against all basic tenets of human rights. (See for example the publications of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa and the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Rhodesia). The fact that the Salisbury regime, by mounting bombing raids and commando strikes, is today able to bully and intimidate the population not only of Zimbabwe but of the front line states, owes much to decisions which were taken by the British government at the time of the break-up of the Central African Federation in 1963. During the period of the Federation, responsibility for the defence of the three territories (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia - now Zambia, and Nyasaland - now Malawi) was exercised by the Federal government. The Rhodesian Light Infantry, for example, now the main all-white unit within the Rhodesian army, started life in 1961 as a Federal force deployed on Zambia's northern border (see THE ARMY). In June 1963, a conference convened by the British government at Victoria Falls to plan and implement the dissolution of the Federation formally decided that when the Federal government ceased to exercise responsibility for defence, the position should revert to that which obtained before 1953 - i.e. when Southern Rhodesia had responsibility for its own defence and Britain had operational control of the forces in the other territories. In practice, however, and in consequence of subsequent manoeuvres in Salisbury involving British and Southern Rhodesian government officials, most of the Federal forces were handed over to the white Rhodesian settlers. This deal, under which powerful and well-equipped military forces were handed over lock, stock and barrel to a government which was clearly committed to white supremacy and racist exploitation, provoked a storm of protest internationally. The arrangements meant that the white settlers ended up with much more than they had originally put into the Federal defence pool. The Federal air force, in particular, comprising Canberra bombers, Hunter fighters and Alouette helicopters, was one of the most advanced in Africa at the time. The widespread concern that these forces would be used not only to suppress the Zimbabwean population but also to terrorize neighbouring states was expressed in a Security Council resolution of 13 September 1963 calling upon Britain "not to transfer to its colony of Southern Rhodesia the armed forces and aircraft as envisaged by the Central Africa conference of 1963". In response, Britain used its Security Council veto for the first time since the Suez crisis in 1956 -thereby also rejecting a Security Council appeal not to transfer to the white settlers "any powers or attributes of sovereignty until the establishment of a government fully representative of all the inhabitants of the colony". The British permanent representative at the United Nations denied that the situation in Southern Rhodesia represented "a threat to peace and security" and dismissed fears about the use to which the white settlers would put their air force as "irrelevant, untrue and wildest flights of the imagination". He also assured the Security Council that the British government would retain control of the use of Southern Rhodesia's forces outside the frontiers of Zimbabwe for as long as Britain's responsibility in relation to Southern Rhodesia remained unchanged. (Elaine Windrich, Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence, Croom Helm 1978, pp. 15- 16). In practice, events nave proved the majority of United Nations member states right, and the Rhodesian security forces, strengthened through regular sanctions-busting injections of military hardware and spares, have developed to a point where they are now violating international borders on a daily basis. The role of the Rhodesian security forces has not essentially changed under the 'internal settlement' agreement of 3 March 1978. Bishop Muzorewa and those other African personalities who have been coopted into the regime are well aware that military superiority remains crucial to their survival. For this reason, it continues to be safe to assume, as the AntiApartheid Movement pointed out in 1978, that "if there is any area in which the regime will not be prepared to compromise it is that of its security forces".