r.,..,.,., .. '"'""'" ·--··------·-·--·~~------~--------------. United Nations _A;54;549 Distr.: General ~) General Assembly 15 November 1999 ~ ~ Original: English Fifty-fourth session Agenda item 42 The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina 00907954 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35 The fall of Srebrenica Contents I. Introduction 1 9 6 IL Background I 0 -40 8 !\. Break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force .................. I 0 14 8 B. Independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the outbreak of war ....... 15 19 9 C. Humanitarian activities ........................................... 20 ·23 9 D. Proposals for a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina ....... 24 28 10 ~ ") E. The peace process ................................................ 29 -'- 11 I-'. Srebrenirn prior to the sati.: area resolutions .......................... 33 40 13 [ 11. Adoption of Security Counci I resolutions 8 19 ( 1993 ), 824 ( 1993) and 836 ( 1993) 41 · I 02 16 A. Minimal consensus within the Security Council ....................... 41-44 16 B. The concept of safe areas .......................................... 45 51 16 C. Security Counci I resolution 819 ( 1993) .............................. 52-58 18 D. Srebrenica demilitarization agreement of 18 April 1993 ................ 59 62 19 E. Security Council mission to Srebrenica and further demilitarization agreement of 8 May 1993 63-65 19 99-34876 (EJ 271199 I llll II Ill II Ill 111111111111111111111111111111 A/54/549 F. Security Council resolution 824 ( 1993) 66-69 20 G. End of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan: moves to strengthen the safe area regime .......................................................... 70-77 21 H. Security Council resolution 836 (1993) 78-79 22 L Positions of Security Council members on resolution 836 ( 1993) ........ 80-92 --'T' J. Reluctance to use force to deter attacks on safe areas ............ 93-95 25 K. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 836 ( 1993) (S/25939) ....................................................... 96-98 26 L. Efforts to lift the arms embargo 99 102 26 IV. Evolution of the safe area policy: June 1993-December 1994 103-174 29 A. Initial implementation of the safe area policy ......................... 103-105 29 B. Mount lgman crisis ............................................... I 06-113 29 C. Proposals to exchange Srebrenica and Zepa for Serb-held territory around Sarajevo ........................................................ 114-116 30 117- 123 31 D. Markale massacre and disagreements on the use of air power ........... ,, E. United Nations assessment of the safe area policy as of March 1994 ..... 124 130 _,_ F. Attack on Gorazde: March-April 1994 .............................. 131 ·· 145 34 G. Report ofthe Secretary-General of9 May 1994 (S/!994/555) ........... 146 152 36 H. Contact Group peace plan . .................................. 153-156 37 I. Serb assault on the safe area of Bihac: October-December 1994 ......... 157 163 38 J. Report of the Secretary-General of I December 1994 (S/1994/13 89) ..... 164 174 39 V. Events of January-June 1995 ............................................ 175 225 44 A. Cessation of hostilities agreement and its collapse 175-184 44 B. Air strikes around Sarajevo ........................................ 185-189 45 C. United Nations Protection Force hostage crisis ....................... 190-200 46 D. Report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444) .......... 201-209 48 E. Bosniac attempt to break the siege of Sarajevo and its consequences for the United Nations ................................................ 210-212 49 F. Rapid reaction force ......... 213 220 49 G. Fighting around Srebrenica ........................................ 221 225 51 VI. Overview of deployment in Srebrenica: February-July 1995 226 238 53 VIL Fall of Srebrenica: 6-1 I July 1995 ....................................... 239-317 57 A. 6 July: attack on observation post Foxtrot: request for close air support ... 239 245 57 B. 7 July: pause in Serb attack ...................................... 246 249 58 c. 8 July: request for close air support discouraged; Bosnian Serb Army overruns observation post Foxtrot: ARBiH kill Dutchbat soldier 250 261 59 2 00907955 A/54/549 D. 9 July: events leading to blocking position and warning to Serbs . 262-276 61 E. I 0 July: Bosnian Serb Army violates warning; use of close air support deferred . 277-296 63 F. 11 July: initial confusion over air support; Srebrenica falls . 297-317 67 VIII. Aftermath of the fall ofSrebrenica: 12-20 July 1995 . 318-393 72 A. 12 July: meetings with Mladic; deportation commences . 318-328 72 B. 12 July: Security Council resolution 1004 (l 995) . 329-339 75 C. Night of 12 July: sporadic killing begins . 340-345 76 D. 13 July: killing of hundreds of unarmed men and boys begins . 346-360 77 E. 14 July: mass executions commence; European Union negotiator meets Milo~evic and Mladic . 361-374 80 F. 15 July: massacres continue; agreement reached between Mladic and the United Nations Protection Force . 375-382 82 G. 16-18 July: reports of atrocities begin to surface . 383-390 83 H. 19 July: Mladic and United Nations Protection Force Commander meet again and conclude agreement . 391-393 85 IX. Fall ofZepa and the new safe area policy: July-October 1995 . 394-464 87 A. Preparations for the attack on Zepa: 11-14 July 1995 . 394-396 87 B. Attack, resistance and negotiations in Zepa: 14-20 July 1995 . 397-402 87 C. First formal reports of atrocities from Srebrenica . 403-404 88 D. London meeting and changes in the approach to the use of air strikes . 405-410 89 E. Operational arrangements resulting from the London meeting . 411-414 90 F. Fall ofZepa and the flight to Serbia . 415-431 90 G. Operation Storm and the United States-led peace initiative . 432-437 93 H. Attack on Markale marketplace in Sarajevo . 438-441 94 I. Operation Deliberate Force . 442-445 95 J. Serb assessment ofOperatiQn Deliberate Force . 446-447 95 K. Pause; a new peace map; opening a road into Sarajevo . 448-450 96 L. Resumption of air and ground attacks . 451-455 97 M. United States-led peace initiative; concerns about the mandate . 456-459 98 N. Croatian offensive and the end of hostilities . 460-464 99 X. Peacekeeping and the Peace Agreement: October-December 1995 . 465-466 I 00 XI. The fall of Srebrenica: an assessment . 467-506 I 02 A. Role of the United Nations Protection Force in Srebrenica . 470-474 102 B. Role ofBosniac forces on the ground . 475-479 103 00907956 3 A/54/549 C. Role of air power . 480-483 104 D. Unanswered questions . 484-487 I 04 E. Role of the Security Council and Member States.... 488-493 105 F. Failure to fully comprehend the Serb war aims . 494-497 106 G. Lessons for the future . 498-506 107 Annexes I. Senior United Nations personnel in the former Yugoslavia referred to in the report by their titles . 110 II. Individuals interviewed in the preparation of the report . 111 Maps The former Yugoslavia . 5 Vance-Owen Peace Plan (January 1993) . 15 Safe areas designated under Security Council resolution 824 (1993) . 28 Union of three republics plan (August 1993) . 42 Contact Group peace plan (July 1994) . 43 Dutchbat deployment around Srebrenica (June 1995) 56 Bosnian Serb Army attack on Srebrenica (July 1995) 71 Execution sites and mass graves . 86 Inter-entity boundary line established by the Dayton Peace Agreement . 10 l t--. L .. ) c:-. r, c:.; C'\ CJ C) 4 THE FORMER VisD YUGOSLAVIA D International boundary Republic boundary Autonomous province boundary 0 National capital . ADRIA TIC SEA ® Adm1m. "strative capital ·--- Railroad Principal road --- Secondary road 0 5-0 '100 150km 0 5-0 41' 13° 18' 19' 4131 United Nations ~~~e:::'ber 1999 A/54/549 I. Introduction I . This report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 of Nations failed to deter the Serb attack on Srebrenica and the General Assembly resolution 53/35 of 30 November 1998. appalling events that followed. In that paragraph, the General Assembly requested: 4. In my effort to get closer to the truth, I have returned "a comprehensive report, including an assessment, on to the origins of the safe area policy, discussing the the events dating from the establishment of the safe evolution of that policy over a period of several years. I have area of Srebrenica on 16 April 1993 under Security drawn the attention of the reader to the resolutions of the Council resolution 819 (1993) ofl6 April 1993, which Security Council and to the resources made available to was followed by the establishment of other safe areas, implement those resolutions; I have reviewed how the policy until the endorsement of the Peace Agreement by the was implemented on the ground, as well as the attacks that Security Council under resolution 1031 (1995) of 15 took place on other safe areas: Sarajevo, Goraide, Bihac. I December 1995, bearing in mind the relevant decisions have ·reviewed the debate that took place within the of the Security Council and the proceedings of the international community on the use of force and, in International Tribunal in this respect," particular, on the use of air power by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). I have also reviewed the role and encourages Member States and others concerned to ofUNPROFOR in the fall of Srebrenica, and in the almost­ provide relevant information. forgotten case ofZepa. Finally, I recall how, having failed "' "' "' to act decisively during all of these events, the international 2. On 16 November 1995, the International Tribunal for community found a new will after the fall of Srebrenica and the Former Yugoslavia indicted Radovan Karadzic how, after the last Serb attack on the safe area of Sarajevo, ("President of the Republika Srpska") and Ratko Mladic a concerted military operation was launched to ensure that (Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army) for their alleged no such attacks would take place again. direct responsibility for the atrocities committed in July 1995 5. In reviewing these events, I have in no way sought to against the Bosnian Muslim population of the United deflect criticism directed at the United Nations Secretariat.