Proclus and Plotinus on Self-Constitution in the One Jonathan Greig 29,998 words MSc by Research in Philosophy The University of Edinburgh August 20, 2014 (With minor corrections made November 19, 2014) This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 1 Proclus and Plotinus on Self-Constitution in the One Jonathan Greig Abstract The first principle, called the ‘One’, in Neoplatonism is typically asserted to be absolutely simpleand beyond being, such that all positive attributes implying multiplicity are denied of it. With this inmind, in his Commentary on Parmenides, Proclus critiques the view that the One constitutes its own being. In making this critique, Proclus has his predecessor, Plotinus, in mind, who, although agreeing that the One is beyond being and absolutely simple, also holds the view criticized. At the same time, Plotinus’ careful use of saying that the One is ‘as if’ (οἷον) self-constituted ensures that he is not contradicting himself when he also denies that the One is divided or made dual in its constituting its own being. With this in mind, one could go with John Dillon’s assessment that this disagreement is over semantics and that Proclus misunderstands Plotinus. However is Proclus misunderstanding Plotinus here, and are the differences between the two inconsequential on this count? In this dissertation, I wish to showthat Proclus is accounting for Plotinus’ ‘as if’ language through appropriating Plotinus’ understanding of the One’s causality, which is what makes possible Plotinus speaking of the One ‘as if’ causing itself. I focus on the two concepts of self-constitution in itself and the One’s causality for both figures. Plotinus understands self-constitution such that, in the realm of being with Intellect and Soul, it represents each entity imperfectly realizing the One’s perfect unity, which points to the One pre-containing perfect attributes that are imperfectly realized in Intellect. Likewise, the way Plotinus understands theOne producing Intellect implies that the One anticipates Intellect in pre-containing its effects as a direct cause, albeit in a way that transcends literal description. This is what makes possible the language of the One ‘as if’ being self-constituted for Plotinus. Proclus rather understands the process differently: self-constitution in the realm of being indicates the respective perfection of each such entity (such as Being, Life, and Intellect), while simultaneously necessitating higher causes, eventually leading to the One as the first, uncaused cause. Proclus’ One is rather an indirect cause through its production of beings by negation, starting with the two basic principles of the Limit and Unlimited as positive aspects of the One. Given these two factors of self-constitution in itself and the One’s causality for Plotinus and Proclus, there is reason to see an underlying disagreement. I finally conclude that Proclus addresses and critiques Plotinus’ causal model which supports the ‘as if’ language, which makes possible Plotinus’ quasi-self-constitution in the One, so that insofar as Proclus requires the One to be absolutely simple in negating all sense of multiplicity, Proclus’ critique is to this extent justified, where his own causal model is an attempt at improving on the inadequacy seen in Plotinus’ system. 2 Proclus and Plotinus on Self-Constitution in the One Jonathan Greig Acknowledgements Special thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Inna Kupreeva, for all her support, insight, and advice in these past two years, and especially recently in the creation of this project. I also wish to thank Prof. Carlos Steel for his recommendation for me to look into the metaphysics of self-constitution (αὐθυπόστατον) in Proclus, which was the inspiration for this project. As well, I must thank Prof. Peter Adamson, Dr. Gary Gabor, Dr. David Butorac, Evan King, and Alan Brown for all of their insights and suggestions with textual references and help with understanding the various concepts involved in this project between Plotinus and Proclus. 3 Proclus and Plotinus on Self-Constitution in the One Jonathan Greig Contents 1 Introduction 5 2 Self-Constitution and Its Conceptual Origin in Self-Motion 9 2.1 Self-Motion in Plato ........................................ 10 2.1.1 Assessing Plato on Self-Motion ............................. 13 2.2 Aristotle on Self-Motion and the Unmoved Mover ....................... 14 2.2.1 Self-Motion as Distinguished into Unmoved and Moved Movers ........... 15 2.2.2 Comparing Aristotle’s Approach with Plato’s on Self-Motion ............ 17 2.3 Plotinus on Self-Constitution ................................... 18 2.3.1 Intellect and Soul’s Self-Constitution .......................... 18 2.3.2 Answering the Aristotelian Objection to Self-Motion: Motion as an Aspect of Self- Constitution ........................................ 20 2.3.3 Conclusion: Self-Constitution in Plotinus’ System ................... 22 2.4 Proclus on Self-Constitution ................................... 22 2.4.1 Proclus’ Technical Concept of αὐθυπόστατον (Self-Constitution) ........... 23 2.4.2 Self-Constitution in the General Structure of Causality ................ 27 2.5 Conclusion: Comparing Plotinus and Proclus on the Concept of Self-Constitution ..... 28 3 Plotinus on the One and Its Causality 30 3.1 Plotinus’ Principle of Simplicity and the Necessity for the One as First Principle ...... 30 3.1.1 The One as Beyond Being and Absolutely Simple ................... 32 3.2 The One’s Causality of Being ................................... 33 3.2.1 The One as Causing By What It Does Not Possess ................... 34 3.2.2 The Two-Act Theory ................................... 36 3.3 The οἷον Principle: The One as Pre-Containing Multiplicity and Being ............ 39 3.4 Conclusion: Plotinus’ Conception of Simplicity and the Implications for Self-Constitution 40 4 Proclus on the One and Its Causality 42 4.1 Proclus’ Proof for the One .................................... 42 4.2 The One’s Causality of Being ................................... 45 4.2.1 The Principles of Limit and Unlimited ......................... 46 4.2.2 The One’s Causality via Negation ............................ 48 4.3 Conclusion: The One as Uncaused and Cause of Self-Constitution .............. 52 5 The One and Self-Constitution 54 5.1 Enn. VI.8.13–14: Plotinus’ Argument for the One as Cause of Its Own Being ........ 54 5.1.1 Contextualizing Plotinus’ Argument for the One’s Self-Constitution ........ 55 5.1.2 Plotinus’ Analogical Language as Corresponding with the One’s Being ....... 57 5.2 Reviewing Proclus’ Critique of Self-Constitution in the One ................. 59 5.3 Objection: Is Proclus’ Critique Justified? ............................ 61 5.4 Conclusion: Proclus’ Causal Model as a Response to Plotinus ................. 63 A The One and the Henads in Proclus 65 B Some Conceptual Background on the Limit and Unlimited in Proclus 68 4 Proclus and Plotinus on Self-Constitution in the One Jonathan Greig 1 Introduction The nature of the first principle’s causality is a major question for the Neoplatonists. From Plotinusonward, the Neoplatonic tradition has as its axiom that (1) all being is derived from a first principle that is an efficient cause, as well as final cause; and (2) that the first principle, the ‘One’, is absolutely simple and beyond being in itself.1 Where all being is characterized by some form of multiplicity, whether at the physical level or even the intelligible level, the One functions as the source of unity, and therefore existence, for all being. How the One is simple, and how the One functions as a cause of being, is at once a difficult, contested question for the Neoplatonists. Given this background, in the Commentary on Parmenides,2 Proclus critiques the view that the One is self-constituted, saying that what is self-constituted, ‘must necessarily be divisible into a superior and an inferior element; for it is superior in so far as it creates, and it is inferior in so far as it is created; the One, on the other hand, is entirely indivisible and non-multiple’ (In Parm. 1150.6–9; trans. Morrow/Dillon). For Proclus, self-constitution implies a distinction of cause and effect, between a ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ aspect of the same being, which implies a duality that the One, by definition, precludes. In giving this critique, Proclus appears to have Plotinus in mind, the latter of whom holds that the One in some sense constitutes its own being: …for [the One] is the father of reason and cause and causative substance, which are certainly all far from chance, he would be the principle and in a way the exemplar (παράδειγμα) of all things which have no part in chance, truly and primarily, uncontaminated by chances and coincidence and happening, cause of himself and himself from himself and through himself. (Ennead VI.8.14.37–42; trans. Armstrong) Plotinus asserts self-constitution in the One insofar as it is the source of being and Intellect, so that because of this, the One is most free and in control of itself such that it constitutes its being from itself and not from chance or any prior cause.3 In the background to this disagreement, Plotinus and Proclus equally hold that the One is absolutely simple and beyond all multiplicity, even to the point that all literal knowledge of the One is impossible. As a result, both Plotinus and Proclus negate all positive attributes applying to the One, insofar as any such attribute implies multiplicity. At one level, both philosophers agree that theOneis beyond being a cause in any sense, even of having any activity or causation in relation to itself. Given this picture, one could go along with John Dillon’s assessment of Proclus’ critique: Proclus next turns to an attack on those Platonists who wish to make the One ‘self-constitutive’αὐθυπόστατον ( ). In Plotinus’ case, this is bound up with his doctrine, in Enn.